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Hungary has undertaken bold, far-ranging reform  being largely discretionary, completely uncondi-
uf its system of financing local government. This  tional, and calculated according to a distribution
reform, in the context of national fiscal reforrn,  formula geared to both "equalization" and
implies significant shifts in the spending respon-  "need."
sibilities and revenue authorities of local govern-
ments as well as in their political relations with  Bird and Wallich argue that local govern-
the central government.  ments can budget with more certainty if the grant
is fixed to some national tax source and distrib-
The new system of local government has  uted in accord with a known formula so they are
both political and economic merit: it involves  not totally at the mercy of a discretionary central
Hungarians with their local govemments in a  policy.
positive way and can make government more
efficient by subjecting it to the scrutiny of local  They make a case for at least limited condi-
officials and voters. But because the system is  tionality - for requiring that grant funds should
new, there are still lessons to be leamed and  be spent, for exanple,  on a special priority area
some serious decisions tv  oc made.  such as education or health, or by requiring that
local governments receiving such grants should
The new system of local government finance  provide basic services at a minimum level of
tries both to free local authorities from the heavy  quality. And they insist on the importance of
hand of central control (by ending central control  changing the formula for distribution of the
over local spending, whether from central or  normative grant - adding a third element to
local revenues) and to make them more respon-  those of per capita equalization and need: that
sible (by providing new sources of locally  some explicit allowance be made for the rev-
controlled revenues). But new local taxes are so  enue-raising capacity of local governments.
inadequate that this well-intentioned experiment
could end in disaster. Some regions may fail to  The options they recommend have three
provide adequate basic services (especially to the  important effects. First, to varying degrees, grant
poor). Some may make increased demands on an  funds will be shifted from high-tax capacity to
already hard-pressed central government. And  low-tax capacity recipients. Second, all recipi-
local governments might feel increased pressure  ents, whatever their tax capacity, will be stimu-
to exploit enterprise and housing ownership and  lated to tax that capacity at the assumed rate
to engage in unwise entrepreneurial activities to  because if they do not do so the grant they
raise revenues.  receive will be reduced precisely by the amount
they fall below the assumed rate. And finally,
Bird and Wallich outline changes made in  any recipient that levies higher taxes than
the system of local finance, assess their implica-  assumed by the tax capacity element gets to keep
lions, and identify areas that need further reform.  all the extra revenues - that is, is not "taxed" by
They describe the so-called normative grant from  having its grant reduced. (In other words, the
the central to local governments, for example, as  marginal tax rate is zero.)
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Introduction
1.  Hungary  has undertaken  a bold and  far-ranging  reform of its system of subnational  finances.
These reforms, taking place against a background of  fiscal  reform at  the  national level'  imply
significant shifts in both the expenditure responsibilities  and the revenue authorities of subnational
governments,  as well as in their political relations with the central government.
2.  The new system of local government  has many merits in both political and economic terms.
Not only does it in principle involve Hungarians  throughout the country in a positive and democratic
way with  their local governments,  but it  has the important potential of improving the efficiency of
government in general  by subjecting government  actions to the scrutiny of responsible  local officials
and voters.  On the other hand, precisely because  the system is so new, there is still much to be
learned,  and  some  serious  decisions  to be made  by both officials and  citizens at large  in order  to ensure
that these potential gains  are actually realized.
3.  The new system of local government  finance attempts both to free local authorities from the
heavy hand of central control and to make them more responsible. The former objective is to  be
accomplished  basically by removing  all central control over local expendi^ure,  whether financed from
central transfers or own-source  revenues,  and the latter by providing new  sources  of locally-controlled
revenue. Unfortunately, the fundamental  inadequacy  of the newv  local taxes invokes  the specter that
possibly disastrous outcomes may ensue from this well-intentioned experiment.  Increased  local
demands  for transfers from an already hard-pressed  central budget, increased  rej:onal divergence  in
the provision of basic social infrastructure  and services  (particularly  perhaps  to the poorest elements
of society), and  increased  pressure  on local governments  to engage  in unwise  entrepreneurial  activities,
are among the consequences  that seem all too likely in the absence  of some revision of both local
revenues  and intergovernmental  transfers.
4.  This paper outlines the changes  introduced  in the system of local finance as a result of the
1990 Local Self-Government  Act,  and the  1990 Act  on Local Taxes and provides a preliminary
assessment  of their implications  as well as the need for further reform.  These Acts, together with
the annual  Act on the Budget, which establishes  both the criteria for the allocation of central grants
to  the  localities and their overall volume, define the  overall scope and authorities of  Hungary's
approximately 3100  new local self-governments. These Acts:  (i) define tie  new assignment of
expenditures  between central and local government;  (iil define  the new local revenue  sources;  and (iii)
establish  the economic foundation, property  rights and entrepreneurial  functions of the localities. The
yet-to-be-passed  Act on Provertv Trarsfer is expected  to give localities major new responsibilities  for
property ownership, management  and privatization.
5.  The paper is organized  as follows.  Part A outlines the historical evolution of the system,
provides international  comparisons,  and describes  its present-day  form.  Drawing  on this background,
Part B suggests some revised  policies  that should not only both help avert the potentially undesirable
outcomes of the current system but, more positively, help Hungary  to achieve its goal of a smaller,
more efficient government sector without unduly exacerbating  social inequalities. In turn, issues  and
recommendations  are discussed  in the following seven areas: (i) local finance in the macroeconomic
context; (ii)  the assignment  of expenditures;  (iii) the assignment  of taxes; (iv) the design  of the transfer
'See Tanzi, Vito, Editor, Fiscal Policies  in Economies  in Transition, IMF, Washington, DC, 1992.-2  -
system; (v) the role of the localities in property management,  entrepreneurship  and privatization; (t0)
capital investment  finance and borrowing; and other requisites for sound local finance such as (vii)
greater reliance on user charges and strengthened  budgeting practices.  An Annex explores some
empirical relationships  and seeks  to illustrate the directional effects of the reform proposals.
A.  Local  Finances: The Status QuQ
1.  Historical Backaroun and International  ComDarisons
6.  Under the system of national finance in place until 1990, Hlungary  essentially  had a unitary
system of government and finances, with  the local governments having little independent revenue
determination or expenditure functions.  1he system mirrored that found in  many other socialist
economies prior to tt,  transition, such as China, Poland,  and Romania, in which central and local
budgetary activities were accounted  for within a single, 'unified'  national budget system. 2
7.  The 1523 "local councils" in Hungary had no legally separate  identity, and were governed
by 19 "county councils" in the context of the unitary gv--nment  of the communist  regime  (see  Annex
Table 1). These  localities  und_--ook  a wide range  of expend.zures  as  agents  of the central government.
While certain fees and duties (such as tourist fees, stamp duties, and license  fees) were collected at
the local level, the rates were fixed by the central government. Any need for additional revenues  to
cover expenditures  was a matter for negotiation with the central government, and was channeled--
through the counties--from  the central budget.
8.  The new system of local self-government  represents  a major political and economic change
from the earlier  regime. Politically,  the reforms  have legislated  almost  complete independence  for local
government  and transformed  them into self-governing  units, with the elected Local  Assembly as the
decision-making  body.  As a result of the 1991 elections, the local government sector is currently
politically dominated  by parties in opposition to the main partner  in the governing  coalition. In addition,
county :_.wns  collect certain fees, and divide these across local  jurisdictions.
9.  Following  the passage  of the Local  Self Government  Act (LSGA),  in 1990,  a major separation
of economic functions was initiated.  This Act defines the roles and functions of Hungary's 8 new
regional  bodies, 19 county and  the 3070 local  governments  incorporated  as of 1991 (see  Annex Table
2).  The Act represents  a major redefinition  of the rights and responsibilities  of all  three levels of local
government. The responsibilities  of the regional  bodies have been  dramatically scaled back. 3 While
they  still  retain a coordinating and supervising function,  and a juridical function  to  review the
consticutionality and legality of local decisions, virtually no fiscal functions remain assigned  to the
regional level. 4 At the county level, the role has been significantly reduced  also. Counties remain
2World Bank. "China: Revenue  Mobilization and Tax Policy", Red  Cover  Report, Tanzi, Vito,
Ed., Fiscal  Policies  in Economies  in Transition, IMF, Washington, DC, 1992.
3These  earlier functions and political status of the local governments are well outlined in Davey,
as are the functions of present-day  regional,  country, and local bodies (1990, pp 2-3).
4Two  important  functions  which  remain  with  the  regional  bodies  are  (i)  the
information/d,asemination"  function,  and (ii) the juridical function  under the Commissioner  of the
Republic. The former requires  the counties to collect data on fiscal performance  and outcomes and
to provide information  and  training to facilitate the implementation  of changes  in national  fiscal policies
which are implemented  at the local level.  The Regional  Commissioner,  among other responsibilities,
determines  the legality of local tax decisions  and ensures  their consistcncy with national law.-3  -
responsible for expenditures of an interjurisdictional nature which serve multiple localities.  Their
revenue sources have likewise beRn educed; fees and duties previously retained by the county are
now ret.ainied  by localities, and  countie.;  no longer  serve as a conduit for local  finance from the central
L3vernment.
10.  Local Self-Governments  (referred to in this paper as localities) have thus become directly
responsible  for most local government functions; this shift in expenditurs responsibilities has been
paralleled  by a partial shift in taxing authority.  A financial transfer from the central government to
localities  is designed  to assist localities  in meeting their obligatory expenditure  responsibilities,  as laid
out in the LSGA. Though unconditional  in nature,  the grant is ielated in part to expenditure  "norms'
linked to the expenditure  responsibilities  of localities. Localities are in addition authorized  to borrow,
own and dispose -if property, and to manage,  establish  and/or sell public enterprises.
Local Government  in The National  Fiscal  Context
11.  In  the unitary system of finance  and  budgeting  which gcverned  Hungarian  public  finances  until
1989,  the finances of subnational  governments  had few macroeconomic  consequences. The transfer
to localities  was a matter of negotiation  between central government  and locJ.lities,  and, together with
the transfers to extrabudgetary  funds and extrabudgetary  institutions, was determined so as to be
consistent with the overall budgetary stance of the day.  While localities might have aspirations  for
higher expenditures  and transfer levels,  under the unitary system their access  to transfers was fixed.
While  the transfer was in principle  fixed as the residual  financing of localities  (given  their own revenues
and expenditure  needs), it was also in a sense  the residual  claimant on a fixed central .esource pie.
Table 1 below shows trends in the transfer over the period 1981-89.  Under the unitary system, it
ranged  from 9.6% of the general  government's  consolidated  expenditures  to 11  % in 1989. Since  the
passage  of the Local Self-Government  Act, the transfer has represented  13% (1999 estimate) and
17% (1991 budgeted)  of consolidated  general  government  expenditures.
12.  The share of the transfer to localities rose in 1990/91 commensurately  with the additional
expenditure responsibilities such as health services and the assets such as housing and transport
companies)  transferred  to localities. The system is in the early stages  of operation,  and it is premature
to judge trends at this point, or the implications  for the budget of larger fiscal transfers to localities.
However, as outlined later in Section I of Part B, there is potential for macroeconomic  vulnerability
relating to, in the first instance,  the dependence  of the local governments  G,1 central transfers and  the
difficulty  encountered by local governments in  raising taxes by the  projected amounts.  (Local
governments  depend  for some 82% of their receipts on central transfers) (See  Table 1).  In addition,
there is the possibility that localities  will recur to the central government  for assistance  in carrying out
their newly assigned responsibility for "social assistance", the demand for which might grow with
Hungary's worsening economic situation.  These is  also a  backlog of  un-met  infrastructure
improvements  for which localities  may also, within the framework of the Act, recur to the center.
Local Government  in International  PersDective
13.  Local Govemment Finance  in OECD  Countries. Comparison  of Hungary's local government
sector with local  governments  in industrial  and  developing  countries  is revealing. Since one  of the aims
of present Hungarian  policies is to move the country closer  to what may be called the 'European4 -
Table 1  iocal  Finance  in the National  Fiscal Context
(Ft. Billion and  Percent)
1981-L3
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Exvenditures
I.  Total General  Consol.
Expenditure'  498.0  519.2  555.2  581.2  632.9  719.0  786.6  895.8  1087.8
II.  Local Expenditure  as % Total  24.7  26.0  25.4  25.0  27.1  25.0  2S.1  25.0  23.3
ll.  Transfers  to Local
Government 2 47.9  53.'  59.4  65.9  66.5  75.1  81.5  97.6  123.3
IV. Transfer as % General  9.6  10.0  10.7  11.3  10.5  10.4  10.4  10.9  11.3
Consol. Exp.
Revenues
V.  Local Revenue  (Ft.)  105.6  115.9  122.1  128.5  147.6  156.9  169.5  205.2  243.0
VI.  Local Own Revenue 3 (Ft.)  23.2  26.5  22.9  22.6  40.3  48.1  53.0  42.8  49.4
VIl.  Local Own Revenue  as % Local
Revenue  22.0  22.9  18.8  17.6  27.5  30.7  31.1  20.9  20.3
Memo Item
- Transfer  as % of GNP  6.1  6.0  6.6  6.7  6.4  6.9  6.7  6.9  7.2
- Consolidated  Deficit (Ft.)  -24.7  -17.6  -9.5  3.8  -11.8  -31.8  -47.3  -0.6  -42.5
- Local Deficit as % Total
Deficit4  10.8  14.2  32.0  15.4  14.4  2.2  14.6  63.0  23.3
Source: GFS: (1981-89).
1/ Capital and c. rrent.
2/  Includes  transfers to local government  from social security fund for health care payments; excludes PIT  share.
(Data  excluding  social security  and PIT,  for  1990 would be: Ft. 113; and for 1991: Ft. 185 mil.)
3/  Excludes  PIT (includes  GFS  lines, 3, 4, 5, 7, V).
4/  GFS  sine  S.15 - V. S.15.
norm"--witness,  for example, the extent  .o  vuhich .he average size of government  in Western Europe
is postulated  as a target  for the size of government--it  seems eopropriate first  to consider briefly  what
lessons about  the structure  of local finance may be suggested  bv OECD experience. 5 (See Box.'
5See J. Owens and A. Panella, Eds., Local Government:  An International  Persoective (Amsterdam:
1991);  R.  Prud'homme,  ed.,  Public  Finance  with  Several  Levels  of  Government  (The
Hague/Koenigstein:  Foundation Journal  Public Finance, 1991).-5  -
Box  A  Lessns1  gx.Egrerience:  Local  Finance  in OECb  Countries 
A review  of OECD  experience  suggests  three  important  conclusions  4or sound  local  finance:
Fis,  while  there  is much  to be  said  for local  taxes  on  residential  property,  :here  is little case  for
allowing  local  governments  a free  hand  in taxing  buisiness,  whether  such  taxes  take the  formn  of the
nonresidential  property  tax, corporate  income  taxes,  or local  'buciness'  taxos  based  on  g.Jss  s-'es, type
of business  activity, or other  indicators.  Some  such  levies  rmay  of course  be  justi,ied  on  benefit
(efficiency)  grounds,  but  they should  always  be  strictly  constrained  within a uniform  national  tax structure
in order  to preclude  localities  from attempting  to shift  the costs  of their  services  to outsidtrs.
Second,  f a country  wants  local  governments  to be  boh la, e spenders  and  leEs  depencent  on
3frants,  it probably  must  pu,vide  them  with access  to the personal  income  tax, preferably  in the  form of
locally-established  surcharties  on the national  income  tax (or, if a different  degree  o. progressivity  is
desired,  local  rates  on the rational  tax base).
l  Third,  much  as there  is to be  said  in principle  for charging  for local  services,  experience  to date  in
most  countries  is not very  encouraging.  Even  where  the common  philosophical  objections  to priciig in the
public  sec!or  can  be overcome,  the  prices charged  are  seldom  those  needed  for efTiciency.  The  potential
for improved  user  charge  finance  as  a means  of financing  local  government  thus .'er. ins more  potential
than  reality.
14.  Expenditures. While information on the distribution of expenditure  functions by levels of
government is difficuh to obtain in a comparable  fashior;, evidence  suggests  that there is considerable
divergence  from country to country.  On the whole, however, local governments  in most OECD
countries  appear  to be responsible  for the delivery of most direct services  to citizens, such as primary
and secondary  education, health, social welfare, housing,  and the provision of local services  such as
street repair, refuse removal, and the like.  Local governments in  Hungary have broadly similar
responsibilities.
15.  Transfers. The size  and  pattern of local government  revenues  also  varies  greatly from country
to country within the OECD. One common  element, however, is that in no country do local taxes
come close to financing local expenditures.  In nine European  countries for which information is
available,  local taxes accounted  on average  for 41  % of local revenue  in 1  988 (ranging  from 6% in the
Netherlands  to 57% in Spain). Non-tax revenue  (such as user  charges)  for 20% (ranging  from 6% in
Belgium  to 32% in Austria), and grants  for 39% (ranging  from 16% in Austria and Switzerland  to 81  %
in the Netherlands). This compares  with  17% in Hungary for tax and non-tax revenues  together.
While, as usual, there is considerable  variation from country to country, in most countries grants
include both general grants, often with an explicit equalization  element,  and specific grants of many
varieties. In Hungary  grants (incliding the "grant" of PIT  transfers)  finance 83% of local expenditure.
16.  Taxes. In the countries  for which information  is shown in Table  2, income  taxes are  the most
important source of local tax revenue  in six of the eight countries in which local taxes
account for rnore  than 10% of total taxes, and in all of the five countries  in which local taxes exceed
15% of total  ices.  In only one country (Sweden),  however,  is the income  tax the sole local  tax, while
there are four countries in which the property tax is the only local tax.  Consumption  taxes (often-6  -
Table 2  The Pattern  of Local  Taxation in the OECD.  19er
LoclI Taxes  - As % of Local Taxes"'
Country  As % Total Taxes  As % Local  Revenue  Income  Sales  Property
Hungary  1.8  5.7  0.0  29.0  71.0 '
Australia  3.7  40.1  0.0  0.0  100.0
Austria  13.2  66.5  44.3  37.7  8.7
Belgium  5.2  33.4  79.8  14.4  0.0
Canada  9.3  37.0  0.0  2.0  98.0
Denmark  28.3  44.0  93.6  0.1  6.3
Finland  25.5  44.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
France  9.0  45.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Germany  7.7  34.9  85.8  0.8  13.5
Irelandk'  2.3  5.7  0.0  0.0  100.0
Italy  3.4  6.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Japan  26.3  n.a.  57.9  17.2  23.6
Luxembourg  7.0  43.1  87.S  3.0  7.S
Netherlands  0.8  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Norway  18.8  49.8  90.2  0.5  6.5
Spain  7.9  47.0  36.4  50.5  10.9
Sweden  32.6  55.2  100.0  0.0  0.0
Switzerland!/  17 0  52.8  87.0  0.0  12.2
United Kingdom  10.4  30.9  0.0  0.0  100.0
United States  12.6  38.8  5.9  19.8  74.2
Notes: p/  Figures  may not add to 100% owing tn 'other"  taxes.
b/  Preliminary  data
c/  1984 data
c/  Includes  all properti taxes and fees.
Source: Calculated  from International  Monetary  Fund, Government  Finance  Statistics Yearbook,
Vol. XII, 1988.
local "business" taxes of various sorts rather than conventional sales  taxes) account for more than
10% of local tax revenue  in only five countries, property taxes in nine countries and income  taxes in
10 countries.  Only Austria, japan and Spain,  however, have a "balanced" revenue  st'ucture in the
sense  that the revenue structure is not dorminated  by one tax.  Seven  countries may be categorized
as income-tax  countries and five (all predominantly English-speaking)  as property-tax countries.6 In
Hungary, locally-levied income taxes do not exist, (although the transfer of the central income tax
OIn  the Netherlands,  which shares  with Ireland  and Italy (and Hungary)  the distinction of obtaining
less th1an  10% of local revenues  from local taxes, no distinction is made between prope,  .. y and other
tax sources, and the rather insignificant local taxes are classified  as "other".-7-
accounted for  12% of local revenues  in  1991) and propertY  taxes contribute less than 1  % of local
revenues.
17.  Four  conclusions  are suggested  by the range of outcomes  sketched  in Table  2.  First, national
governments  clearly exercise  considerable  discretion in deciding how large a role local governments
play, the extent to which local activities are  financed  from local  revenues,  and  the types of taxes levied
by local govemments.  Second, countries influenced by British traditions (Canada,  U.S., Australia,
ireland) are those in which local governments  rely most heavily  on taxes on real property and least
heavily on income taxes.  Third, since no country seems  able to raise much more than 10% of total
national taxes from property taxes, local tax revenues  are likely to exceed  this proportion only when
local governments  have access  to eithL sales or income  taxes.
18.  Finally, property-tax countries tend to  have either less important local governments (as
evidenced by  a smaller overall expenditure share) (Ireland, Australia) or local governments more
dependent on intergovernmental  transfers (Canada,  U.S., U.K.).  In the five property-tax countries,
local taxes on average  constituted only 30% of Incal revenues  (including grants), compared to an
average of 45%  for income-tax countries.  Local governments may be well-established  in these
countries, but they are not particularly  responsible"  in the sense  of financing a greater proportion of
expenditures  from local taxes.
19.  Developing country comoarisons  of  Hungary's subnational  government sector with  some
developing  countries are also striking.  Figure  1 below shows, for a variety of countries,  the relative
importance of  the  subnational fiscal sector in  overall national finance, and the  degree of fiscal
autonomy which the sector has, as measured  by the importance  of its *own revenues' in total local
revenues. With respect to the share  of local spending  in total spending,  the subnational  sector in
Figure  1:  Suhnational  Finance: Revenue  Independence  and
Scale  of Subnational  Sector
Subnational  government spending
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Hungary  is, at 25%, not insignificant. Moreover,  because  genAral  government expenditures  are such
a large share of GDP in Hungary, local government expenditures  in terms of GOP,  at 14 percent in
1990, are in line with the EC  average  {higher  then in Belgium,  France,  Portugal,  Spain). With respect
to  the  degree of  revenue autonomy, Hungary's subnational governments are relatively revenue
dependent, with  own-source revenues  only 17% of their total revenues (30%,  including the  PIT
transfer). This compares  with the subnational  sector in countries  such  as Korea,  and Indonesia,  which
are also large in the overall financial picture but are not self-financing, although Hungary's localities
are comparatively much more transfer-dependent  than these two.  This is also consistent with the
picture given  by the OECD  comparisons,  which showed Hungary's  localities  to be transfer  dependent.
At  the  other  extreme  are countries  such as  Chile, Kenya and  Sri  Lanka, whose subnational
governments' importance  in the overall  fiscal picture is small, but which are self-financing.
11.  The Status Quo: Exoenditures.  Revenues  and Resource  Manaoement
(a) Expenditures
20.  Under  the new Act, localities have certain reauired  tasks.  These tasks include: (i) supply of
potable water; {ii) primary education; (iii) basic health and  social services,  including social assistance;
(iv) public cemeteries; and  (v)  ensuring  the rights of national and ethnic minorities.  The Act also
defines a range of other expenditures which are determined to  be within their scope of  "general
comretenn  e*, but which are not mandatory.  Localities can undertake any task that has not been
explicitly assigned  to another level of government or body, in accordance  with local preferences.
21.  The aeneral  exDenditure  competencies  speci-ically  granted  to localities  are outlined in Box B.
The performance  of these tasks is discretionary, and relates  inter alia to the revenue  capacity of each
local government  and its preferred  tax/expenditure  mix. Table  3 shows local  expenditures  across  major
expenditure categories in  1981-91.7  By far the largest expenditure category is education (35%),
followed by  health, housing, and social welfare (see  Figure  2).8
22.  Within the education  sector, pre-primary  and primary  education are mandatory functions for
all localities  (the existence  of a primary  school and  a general  practitioner  appear  to define the minimum
Figure  2  ExDenditure  by Tvoe. 1990
Other  Expenditures  (r.0%)  General  Public  Services  (5.4%)
Other  Economic  Affairs  & Serv.  (4.5%)
Transport.  & Communications  (10.0%)
Rec.  Cult.  & Religious  Attrs  (4.5%  Education  (37.5%)
Housing  & Commun.  Amenities  (4.6%)- 
Social  Security  &  Welfare  (6.0%)
Health  (20.7%)
7Disaggregated  expenditure  data is not available  for 1991.
8The  following discussion  of local governments'  expenditure  responsibilities  draws on Davey,  Nov.
1990,  Imimeo). The reader is referred  to Davey  (pp. 10-12) for additional information on expenditure
responsibilities  of local government in water supply, communal  services  and public transport.-9  -
Box B General  Expenditure  Comoetencies  of Local Government
l  (i  local development,  resettlement,  the protection of the (built and natural)
environment,
(ii)  housing management;
(iii)  water management  and the drainage  of rainwater, sewage,
(iv)  the maintenance  of public cemeteries,  the maintenance  of local public roads and
public areas, local mass  transportation;
(vi)  garbage  collection and settlement cleaning;
(vii)  local fire protection and local tasks of public security;
(viii)  cooperation  in local energy supply, in solving problems  of employment;
(ix)  kindergartens,  primary  education, health care and social services;
(x)  supporting  cultural, scientific, artistic activities and ethnic minorities;
(xi)  ensuring  the enforcement  of the rights of national and ethnic minorities;
(xii)  facilitation of the establishment  of the communal "healthy way of life".
scale of a village: see paragraph  52 of the LSGA.  Pre-primary  education and after-school day care
represent  a significant fraction of total education  outlays. A centrally set fee schedule  applies  to such
services,  but is cited by some localities  to cover less  than 10% of total costs. 9 Secondary,  technical,
and vocational schools, while not rilandatory, are typically financed by county level governments  or
larger towns.  Each  of these functions is supported  to varying degrees  by the central normative grant
which is channelled  to the locality providing  the service (not the residence  of the student). Educational
facilities supported by non-budgetary  institutions--e.g., a church- or an enterprise-based  school, of
which there are many, do not receive  budgetary support.
23.  In the health field, localities  act as agents of the Social Insurance  Fund (SIF)  providing health
services, including,  in the  larger towns,  hospitalization. They  provide health care services as
determined by the  MOSW, and are reimbursed for the cost of  providing the  services as well as
medicines. Investment outlays are also a local responsibility, and financial support is available  from
central investment grants (see  paragraphs  54-55).
91n addition, central guidelines  exempt certain families from paying fees--families  with more than
3 children, for example, pay reduced  fees. This confusion of social objectives and financial policy is
of concern to localities whose view is that they are in a better position to identify those in need.- 10  -
Table  Expenditures  by Type. 1981-91
(Ft. billion)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1 #b6  1986  1987  1988  1989
Total expenditure  108.2  118.4  125.2  130.6  149.3  157.6  176.4  201.4  252.9
General  Public  Services  10.2  12.3  7.5  7.5  7.8  11.5  13.0  13.6  13.3
Public  Order  and SafLty  1.0  1.0  - --  --  --  --  --  3.0
Education  27.6  30.1  33.7  36.5  41.3  45.2  58.2  68.2  79.4
Health  18.1  19.8  21.5  22.8  24.7  26.6  31.5  36.6  48.4
Social Security & Welfare  2.6  2.9  4.4  5.2  6.1  6.9  7.7  9.8  17.7
Housing  & Commun.  Amenities  23.9  25.5  24.7  24.2  27.6  26.3  28.3  32.3  16.5
Rec. Cult. & Religious  Affrs.  5.2  5.0  5.6  6.0  7.0  10.2  5.2  4.5  12.8
Fuel  and Energy  3.5  4.6  1.9  2.4  3.2  2.4  3.3  4.1  1.3
Agricult. Forestry, Fish, Hunt.  .5  .5  .7  .9  .8  .8  .9  .4  2.7
Mining, Manufc. & Construct.  .7  .8  1.2  1.0  1.1  1.3  .4  .5  3.7
Transport. & Communication  5.6  6.1  9.5  10.8  10.9  12.2  13.4  13.6  27.9
Other Economic  Affairs & Serv.  8.4  8.9  9.5  9.5  6.2  4.8  8.6  12.8  20.7
Other Expenditures  .9  .9  5.0  3.8  12.6  9.4  5.9  6.0  5.5
Memo: Capital Expenditures  36.9  38.2  40.0  39.0  40.5  43.2  51.3  54.7  58.6
Percentaaes
Total expenditure  108.2  118.4  125.2  130.6  149.3  157.6  176.4  201.4  252.9
General  Public  Services  9.4%. 10.4%  6.0%  5.7%  5.2%  7.3%  7.4%  6.8%  5.3%
Public  Order and Safety  0.9%  0.8%  --  - - 1.2%
Education  25.5%  25.4%  26.9%  27.9%  27.7%  28.7%  33.0%  33.9%  31.4%
Health  16.7%  16.7%  17.2%  17.5%  16.5%  16.9%  17.9%  18.2%  19.1%
Social  Security & Welfare  2.4%  2.4%  3.5%  4.0%  4.1%  4.4%  4.4%  4.4%  7.0%
Housing  & Commun.  Amenities  22.1%  21.5%  19.7%  18.5%  18.5%  16.7%  16.0%  16.0%  6.5%
Rec. Cult. & Religious  Affrs.  4.8%  4.2%  4.5%  4.6%  4.7%  6.5%  2.9%  2.2%  5.1%
Fuel  and Energy  3.2%  3.9%  1.5%  1.8%  2.1%  1.5%  1.9%  2.0%  0.5%
Agricult. Forestry,  Fish, Hunt.  0.5%  0.4%  0.6%  0.7%  0.5%  0.5%  0.5%  0.2%  1.1%
Mining, Manufc. & Construct.  0.6%  0.7%  1.0%  0.8%  0.7%  0.8%  0.2%  0.2%  1.5%
Transport. & Communication  5.2%  5.2%  7.6%  8.3%  7.3%  7.7%  7.6%  6.8%  11.0%
Other Economic  Affairs & Serv.  7.8%  7.5%  7.6%  7.3%  4.2%  3.0%  4.9%  6.4%  8.2%
Other Expenditures  0.8%  0.8%  4.0%  2.9%  8.4%  6.0%  3.3%  3.0%  2.2%
Memo: Capital Expenditures  34.1%  32.3%  31.9%  29.9%  27.1%  27.4%  29.1%  27.2%  23.2%
Source: GFS: 1981-89.
24.  Housina  is also a local responsibility.  The Local Self-Government Act  transferred the
ownership of properties  previously owned by the "Local Councils" to their constituent localities
(LSGA,  paragraph  nos. 1 and  98), including  parks, recreation  centers, utility companies  and  their lands,
commercial  enterprises  owned by councils and  other businesses. The soon to be passed Property
Transfer Act will transfer the stock of public housing units (social  flats) and commercial  buildings to
local governments.
25.  With the transfer of assets, maintenance  on these houses  and properties  has become a local
responsibility; however, rents remain fixed by the central government, and are well below market- 11 -
levels.  The losses incurred as a result of this policy by the local housing maintenance  corporations
(IKV) were, until 1990,  partially offset by central government subsidies. These subsidies have been
fully phased  out in 1991.  For Hungary's  cities, the phasing  out of the residence  subsidy  and the fiscal
implications of  the  housing transfer could be considerable.  One view is that  localities may be
encouraged  to sell  housing  rapidly  -so  reduce  the recurrent  costs or the budget;  alternatively, they may
be encouraged  to undertake potentially costly improvements  to the properties, in hope o'  a higher
future sale  price. Indeed,  many localities  appear  to be  active in development  of servicing  vacant urban
land.
26.  Responsibility  for social welfare and social assistance  has also been  transferred to localities
under the Act.  Responsibilities  include the management  of a variety of "social care facilities" such
as old age and handicapped  homes; the normative grant helps support the ongoing maintenance  of
these institutions.  Localities also finance home-care  services for the aged and handicapped, also
supported through the normative  grant.
27.  The central government provides assistance  through the SIF for unemployment,  retirement
pensions, and similar types of assistance. 10 Local governments  are then responsible  for meeting the
needs  of those who are inadequately  served  by the central welfare system. Residual  responsibility  for
old age, family and child assistance  and other forms of "safety net" assistance  for those not coveted
by the  statutory  social welfare systems thus  lies with  the  localities, making them,  in essence,
responsible  for front-line poverty alleviation.  The nature or extent of their responsibilities varies
according to the type of need: the central government has laid out guidelines  for minimum income
levels of e.g. pensioners,  and the unemployed. Local governments  are responsible  for establishing
need, determining  eligibility, establishing  assistance  levels, and funding the resultant outlays.  There
may therefore be substantial differences between localities in the levels of welfare provided as well
as in the eligibility criteria used.  In a small village visited, the local government council made the
determinations  on the basis of applications  brought by needy  villagers, given  its budgetary resources;
in larger towns, there appears  to be a more formal process  involving social workers and the MOSW.
The possibility of additional demands  on central resources  to enable localities  to fulfill these tasks in
a manner which appears  to be just, should  also not be ruled out.  These issues  are discussed  further
in Part B.
(b)  Local  Govemment  Revenues
28.  The Local  Self-Government  Act (paragraph  81) provides  for a range of sources  of finance for
local governments. These  include:
(i)  five local taxes assigned  to the subnational  governments,  plus revenues  from duties and
fees set by the center;
(ii)  a share, currently set at 50%, in the center's personal  income tax collection, allocated
on a derivation (residence)  basis to each locality (plus some  additional PIT for equalization);
(iii)  a "normative grant" from the center, whose total amount is fixed annually in the State
Budget, which is allocated across localities according to a combination of per capita and
expenditure  oriented weights;
"'For a full discussion  of the social welfare system in Hungary, see "Social Security Reform in
Hungary", IMF, Washington, D.C., 1991.- 12 -
liv)  targeted matching and non-matching  grants for investment,
(v)  profits from entrepreneurial  activities;
(vi)  proceeds  from the disposition of rental and commercial  properties; and
(vii)  borrowing to finance investment  or meet overdrafts and budgetary shortfalls.
The relative importance of these revenue sources in 1990 and 1991 is shown in Table 4; each is
described  in greater detail in the following paragraphs.
(i)  Local  Taxes
29.  The Act on Local Taxes defines the taxes assigned  to  localities.  Passed  by Parliament  in
December  1990, the Act assigns  five taxes to local government. These are (i) the business  tax; (ii)
communal  tax (poll tax); (iii) property tax on land; (iv) property tax on buildings;  and (v) tourism tax.
The base, rates and exemptions  of these five taxes are laid out in Table 5.  With the exception of the
business  tax, these taxes basically  extend the pre-existing  'local taxes" collected  and administered  by
the local councils under the previous system.  A major consideration  in assigning  these taxes to the
local government sector appears  to have been the objective of full "independence" and a complete
separation  of taxing functions as between local and central  governments:  the possibility of building on
the strengths  of a superior  central tax administration,  and a broader  central tax base,  accompanied  by
devolution or a system of surcharges appears to have been unacceptable  in the current political
environment.
30.  Localities may levy any or all of these taxes:  For 1991,  the transitional year between the old
system and the new, the old local taxes will continue to remain  in place, at centrally mandated  rates
lower than the present maxima  unless the new, equivalent tax replaces  it.  (These  pre-existing taxes
are  described  below in the discussion  of other revenues).  It is expected  that by end-1991,  when the pre-
existing taxes expire, localities  will have chosen  the taxes to be introduced under their new revenue
authority and established  their rates.  In order to maintain nominal  revenues  at 1991  levels,  the new
taxes will have to yield at least as much as the pre-existing  ones. The original  MOF budget estimate
was that for 1991,  new local taxes would yield approximately  three times the old.
31.  The choice of tax(es), exemptions  and the rates (subject to the provisos below) is left to the
discietion of localities. The first proviso is that two taxes may not be levied on the same "object"."1
The second is that  the pre-existing centrally-mandated  preferences and exemptions may not  be
restricted. Third, locally set rates may not exceed  the centrally mandated  maxima  set forth in the Act.
All local taxes may be  deducted by individuals  and businesses  from the central government's PIT and
corporate  income tax as costs.
32.  In implementing  these new taxes, local governments  appear  to be grappling  with a number
of issues. The overall  national level of taxation was thought to be very high, and localities  were loath
to overburden  residents  with new taxes, for example,  citing significant rent arrears  as evidence  of low
capacity to  pay.  There were also concerns that  higher local taxes would cause calls on social
assistance  to go up. Administration and  collection also  appeared  to be an issue, with many localities
1 I This is interpreted in a variety of ways by local government, but appears  to mean  that the same
base  cannot be  taxed twice:  a vacation home,  for example,  might be  taxed as a "property"; under  the
tourist tax; or under the communal  tax but not both.- 13 -
Table 4  Local Government  Revenues
1990  1991
Billion Ft  %  Billion Ft.  %
Revenues  Estimated  Budgeted
1.  Own revenues"  51.1  (17)  65.2  (17.71)
of which Local  taxes  n.a.  n.a.  21.0  (5.7)
II.  Shared  personal  income  tax  74.&  (25.7)  46.9  (12.7)
of which PIT equalizing  funds  4.5  (1.6)  7.0  (1.9)
111.  Grants  113.2  39.0  189.3  51.4
(i)  Normative  grants:  (74.0)  (26)  147.0  (39.9)
of which:
per capita based  --  --  o8.3  (15.8)
expenditure  norm-based  --  --  88.7  24.1
(ii)  Specific grants  (29.0)  (10.0)  23.5  9.6
of which:
targeted  grants  - (6.2)  (1.7)
addressed  grants  --  - (11.8)  (3.2)
grants for disadvantaged
localities  - --  (5.0)  (1.4)
other grant  fundsk'  - --  (12.3)  3.3
IV.  Social  Security Fund  Transfers  44.1  15.1  63.1  17.1
V.  Credit, bonds & borrowing  4 5  )  4.0  1.1
Total  288.2g/  100  368.5  100.0
a/  Includes  asset sales, profits, fees, old taxes and duties.
b/  Unitemized  grant flows (residual  of budget totals for grants (Ill) less normative  and specific
grants.
c/  Excludes  'Balance  from previous year' of Ft. 5.9 billion.
Source:  Ministry of Finance,  and Peteri and Bukova, "The Economic Characteristics  of Local Governments  in
Hungary," Budapest  (mirneo)  1991, p. 15.Table 5  Local Taxes. Tax Base  and Rates
Base  of the  Maximum Rate
tax-assessment  of tax  Exemptions
1. Tax on buildinas/Prooertv
A. Useful  area of the  - All poor social flats
building in m2:  300 forints/m2  - All properties  less than 1  OOm 2
year  - 25 m2 per person  living space
- All 'temporary  lodgings"
- Garages  less than 16m 2
B. "Corrected  sales  value' of the-  - Properties  owned by any income-
building/i.e. 50 percent of  3 percent of  tax exempted entity (churches,
the assessed  value as per the  value  foundations, non-profit organi-
Act on Duties 1/  zation, historical buildings,
educational,  health care)
- All properties  with prior
exemptions
11.  Tax on Undeveloped  Plots and Land
A.  The area of the plot in M
2;  or  100 forints/m 2
B.  'Corrected  sales  value" of the  1 percent  of value  - Land  owned by transport
plot A/  companies
- Land  owned by
Telecommunications  Company
111.  Communal  taxes
A.  Communal  tax on private nersons
Premises  serving dwelling  3000 forints per
or other purposes  and  year per premise
downtown plots
B.  Communal  tax on entrepreneurs
Average  number of people  2000 forints annually
employed  (proprietors  per person  employed;
included)  by the entre-  if the activity is not
preneur.  carried out during  the
whole year, the tax has
to be calculated by months
IV.  Tax on Tourism
A.  Tourists and non-permanent  Daily 100 forints per  - Children  under 16;
residents,  for more than  per person over the  - Students
48 hours.  first 48 hours: to  - Employed  relatives
be collected by hotel  - Tenants in social institutions
or home-owners.
B. If the taxpayer owns a  Annually 300 forints
building in the self-govern-  per m 2 of the build-
ment's territory suited for  ing's basic area
recreation  or relaxation
V.  Tax on Gross  Receints/Local  Practice of Industry
The Gross sales-receipts  of  3 pro mil. per year  All final-level retail sales
products sold or services  of the base of the
performed,  net of VAT paid.  tax; if the activity
is carried out with a
temporary/occasional/
character, max. 5000
5000 forints per day.
a/ Corrected  value = 50% of government-determined  "assessed  price", which corresponds  to 50% on average
of actual observed  market price.- 1  ; -
cor -dering the exemption  of small business.  There  was mach  confusion about  the meaning  of "double
taxation" as defined under the Act, and the legal status (and therefore the taxing authority) of the
largest self-government--Budapest--was  not clarified until mid-year.' 2 At  mid-1991,  it appeared  that
very few--only 50 of some 3100 localities--had  introduced  an  of the new taxes: Budapest  and some
of  the larger municipalities appeared  to  be opting for the business tax,  but it  had not yet  been
introduced.
33.  (a)  Business  Tax.  The business  tax is a gross turnover tax levied at all levels exceot retail
sales,  at a maximum  rate of 0.3%.1t may be levied  cn all enterprises,  public  and pri  Mte,  on gross sales
revenue net of VAT and other consumption taxes.  Localities wanting to levy this tax may obtain
information on the gross sales of enterprises  in their jurisdiction from the APEH (Tax Administration
Office).
34.  (b) Communal  Tax.  This can be levied ,.  t  -er of two forms: on household  dwellings or on
businesses. If on dwellings, it is payable  (by  the occupant)  at Ft. 3000--per dwelling, regardless  of the
number  of inhabitants;  in this form it is suitable  for localities  which have  a large number  of government
owned "social flats"  and which cannot therefore rely on property taxes for revenue.  If levied on
enterprises, the communal tax is payable (by the enterprise)  at a maximum rate of  Ft. 2000  per
employee.
35.  (c) Land  Tax.  This is essentially  a property tax on unimproved,  privately owned land. It may
be levied at a maximum rate of Ft. 100 per m
2 ,  or 1% of the "corrected value" of the land, where
"corrected value" is defined as  50% of  the  government-determined  "assessed value", which  is
equivalent in turn to about 50% of observed  market values. Publicly-owned  land used  for purposes
which are not exempt from income or other taxes is also  taxable.
36.  (d)  Progertv  Tax on Buildinas. Local governments  can levy property taxes on all privately-
owned buildings, such as flats, summer houses, garages,  workshops,and other residential housing.
The tax--if levied  on the value and  not the area--is  similarly levied  on a base  of "corrected value" or the
property in question, i.e., at 25% of market values.' 3 The tax base also suffers from a number  of
exemptions,  many of them running  well into the next century: for example,  improvements  to a property
(such  as a bathroom  or new roof), under current  law, exempt the entire property from tax for 10 years.
Property  tax office records,  in some municipalities  at least, show widespread  exemptions,  and almost
exclusive  reliance on area measures,  not values.
37.  (e) Tourism  Tax.  The tourism tax is an extension  of the eariier "tourism fee", which could be
levied only in resort areas; the present tax can be levied by all localities, and is charged at a rate of
Ft.  100 per night for each night spent in a holiday hotel or hostel/accommodation,  or according  to the
area (in m
2 ) at a rate of Ft. 300 per m 2.
12Budapest  is comprised of  "Budapest" and 22 districts.  The municipality's imposition of the
business  tax (which had been  agreed  would be subsequently  shared  with all the districts) was thwarted
by a ruling of the Commissioner  of the Republic,  which deemed  only the districts, but not Budapest
to have taxing rights.  Subsequently,  Budapest  was permitted to proceed with  the imposition (and
sharing)  of the business  tax as originally planned. This paper  does not address  the special problems
of Budapest,  which is a special  case of local government in Hungary.
"With over 50% of housing  in private hands, market  transactions  take place  with some  frequency
although it is not clear to what extent recurds are maintained.- 16 -
38.  Estimated Local Tax Yields are shown in Table 6.  The yields assumed in this table were
calculated  by ths MOF,  based  on national  aggregates  of  the local tax bases,  as derived from a variety
of sources. The CSO  census  of residential  property and  the housing  census  was used  as tthe  basis  for
the estimates  of the property (land  and building)  tax and  the communal  tax on social flats.  APEH  data
on enterprise  gross  sales  and VAT payments  provided  the oasis  for estimating the yield of the business
tax; tourism taxes paid in past years in municipalities where it was permitted to be levied; and labor
force data on employees  provided  the basis  for estimating the communal  tax on entrepreneurs. These
aggregated  estimates were used because  the brief time available  for the drawing up of the local Tax
and 1991 Budget Acts did not allow for more detailed  escimates  based on disaggregated  data from
localities.  Ideally, estimates should have been derived from localities' existing tax  and property
records.  In their absence, the estimated yields can only  be considered very tentative,  possibly
inaccurate near term orders  of magnitude.
39.  The assumption  underlying  the estimated  yields is that each of the some 3100 localities will
levy the newly authorized  taxes at rates  equivalent to 20% of the maximum  rates specified in Table
5. This yields a total estimated  yield of Ft. 21 billion,  assuming  that these  taxes were implemented  and
Table  6  Estimated  Local  Tax  Yields:  1991
Taxes  on households  Taxes  on  EntreDreneurs  Total  Potential
Tax Type  Tax  base ix)Rate  (=)  Tax  Yield  Tax  Base  (x) Rate  (=)  Tax  yield Maximum  Yield
Ft. il  Ft. bil  Ft. bil
1.  Buildings  (in  million  m
2)  301  300 Ft/M 2 9.000  1201  300 Ft/M 2 36.000  45.000
of which: houses  10  300 Ft/M 2 3.000  --  - - 3.000
2.  Land (mllion  M
2 )  605  1  00 Ft/M2 6.000  705  100 Ft/M2 7.000  13.000
3.  Communal  Tax
Social  flats (in  mil)  12  3.000  Ft/  3.000  3.5 mil.  2000Ft  per  7.000  10.000
per  dwelling  employees employee
4.  Tourism Tax  - 8004  - - 800
5.  Business  Tax  --  - --  9.0003  0,3%  27.000  27.000
Subtotal  - - 18.800  - 77.000  95.800
Source:  Ministry  of Finance,  Dept  of Local  Finance,  mimeo.
1. Data  on  tax base  is estimated  from the CSO  census  of property.  This  shows  there  to be  2.5 million  housing  units
with an  average  size  of 67m 2; Of the 167 million  m 2 of tax base,  10  million  m2 is assumed  to be  taxable  as housing,
and  20 million  M2 taxable  as  other  property  (garages,  etc.).
2. Data  on number  of social  flats is taken  from  census  of Property.
3. Amount  shown  is for the full year 1991.
4. It is assumed  that all localities  levy  the tourism  tax at the  rate currently  imposed  by the  settlements  permitted  to
do  so under  the pre-existing  regime.
5. Based  on CSO  Census  of Property  data  showing  land  owned  by entrepreneurs  and  land  owned  by individuals.- 17-
introduced  effective January 1991.  As of the mission's visit in June 1991, only a very few localities
had implemented  any of the above taxes.
(ii) Local PIT share
40.  Local  governments  are projected  to derive some 13% of estimated  total revenues  in 1991  from
their share of the PIT. Consideration  was given in the course of the preparation  of the Act on Local
Taxes to  ceding or sharing a variety of taxes with  the localities; because  of  the unequal spatial
distribution of revenues  from taxes such as VAT, sales  tax or enterprise  tax, as compared  to the PIT,
it was determined  that the PIT should be the basic  shared  tax.  (In these discussions,  derivation was
assumed  to be the only basis  for sharing  the corporate  tax and  the VAT.  No consideration  was given
to  a formula allocation to distribute the ceded tax.)  In 1990, localities received 100% of the PIT
collected two years prior.  Their share has been fixed in the 1991 Budget at 50% of total revenues
collected, with  the remaining  50% share added to the total available  under the "normative grant'.
These proportions will henceforth  be determined  annually, in the Budget Law, as voted and approved
by Parliament. For administrative  reasons,  the tax is paid to localities  two years in arrears,  the central
tax administration  requiring  this much time to sort returns  according  to the location of the taxpayer's
residence  (which may differ from the taxpayer's work place  or the tax office location).  Localities in
1991 received  Ft. 46.9 billion, compared  to Ft. 169.5 billion of PIT budgeted  to be collected in 1991.
41.  Since  there remains  some unequal  spatial distribution of PIT revenues,  the 1991  Budget  Act also
guarantees  that each local government will receive  at a minimum,  Ft. 5000 per capita (in towns) and
Ft. 3200 per capita (in villages)  from the PIT. In 1991, this  Ft. 7 billion equalization
supplement was intended  to ensure  that all localities, even poorer ones, receive at least 90% of the
average  per capita PIT  share, while in 1990 the Budget  Act had set it to provide each locality with no
less than 75% ot the average. The "PIT equa:,zation  supplement" is received  by 89% of localities,
almost all of them with  fewer than 2000  inhabitants, and is financed from general government
revenues;  i.e., it does not come out of the 50% PIl share  allocated to the normative grant.
Oiii)  Grants
42.  Localities  receive  four types of grant from the central government. The  first, and  most important
is the so-called  "normative grant' which is unconditional  in nature and  intended  broadly  to redress  the
vertical imbalance  in the present  fiscal system. The second  and  third types, introduced  in 1991,  consist
of so-called 'targeted'  grants for  investments in a prespecified list  of  investment activities; and
'addressed  grants' for completion  of specific investment  projects. These  grants, voted by Parliament,
replace  similar grants which were channeled  through, and administered  by the local councils. Finally,
there are grants for "distressed  areas".
43.  (a) The Normative  Grant. As of 1990,  local governments  receive  a "normative  grant" from the
center. This grant represents  some 39% of total local revenues,  and is localities' single  most important
source of funds (See  Table 4).  The grant is fullv unconditional in nature, in keeping with the "full
autonomy" of local governments  in respect of their expenditure  and economic  management,  although
its allocation across localities  is in large part a function of specific expenditure  categories. The grant
is paid in 12 equal monthly installments, to the locality's agent bank.
44.  Neither the overall magnitude  of the normative  transfer nor its allocation  is set forth in the Self-
Government  Act, which prescribes  only that a grant must be given, and that a formula, rather than a
discretionary  approach,  must be used for allocat,ng  the grant funds.  In this respect it is an important
improvement  over the previous  system in which local expenditures  and the revenues  to support them
were the matter of bargaining  between the local councils and their subordinate  localities.  It is also-1 8 -
distinguished  from the former system in that the localities  now see the transfer as a "right" as distinct
from a "subsidy".
45.  Since the introduction of the Local Self-Government  Act in 1990, the design of the normative
transfer and its amount have been subjuct to experiment. In 1990, localities received 100% of the
11988)  PIT (equivalent  to 58% of the contemporaneous  PIT). This benefitted the
relatively better off localities  since it is distributed largely  on a residence  basis.  The normative grant
was a relatively  smaller  proportion  of local resources.  In 1991,  50% of the PIT was added  to the transfer
pool; simultaneously  with this enlargement  of the pool, the n'Jmber  of norms governing  its allocation
was Increased  from about 12 to 22, to include, for example  kindergartens,  primary schools and a de
minimis amount (US$ 1.20 per -apita) for 'culture  support" for theaters, in effect, decreasing  the
proportion of total funds allocated on a residence  basis and inc;reasing  the share distributed on  the
basis of expenditure  needs. 14
40.  The addition of these norms has to some extent been dri-en by the need to  accommodate
political interests.  (See  Annex Table 4 for a list of 1990 norms; 1991 norms are shown in Table 7.)
More importantly, there are major philosophical  differences between local and central government
about the functions of these norms: localities take the  view, not surprisingly, that  all mandatory
expenditure  functions defined in the Act should be supported by either central grants or delegated
revenue  capacity (e.g., the PIT). The center  takes  the view that they should  not be financing all locally
assigned  expenditures or, alternatively, this is in fact being done, and cites its estimates (discussed
above) of the local tax yields to show localities  have adequate  financial basis.
47.  Normative  Transfer: Amount.  The amount of the normative  transfer is fixed each year in the
Budget  Act, and is fully discretionary,  although certain principles  are followed.  The approach  taken
in both the 1990  and the 1991  Budget  Acts appears  to have begun  by estimating the aggregate  level  of
local expenditure (as deemed  appropriate by the central government--in  1991 it was assumed  to be
the same  percentage  of GNP  as 1990),  and  subtracting  from this expenditure  target, revenues  accruing
to localities  from other sources, namely: PIT share;  own tax collection (as estimated by the MOF) 15;
targeted grants, addressed  grants; social security "pass-through' funds; revenues  from fees, duties
and other centrally regulated  sources. The balance  remaining  is then fixed, as a first approximation,
as the central normative  transfer.
48.  At the same time, the expenditure  needs  of the localities  are assecaed,  and increased  costs of
service provision are estimated to arrive at an estimate of the adjustments required  in the norrms  to
account for e.g. inflation.  While the "norms" are thus, in principle, intended to stay index-linked,
should such automatic increases  generate a transfer level which, from the center's perspective, is
macroeconomically  imprudent in light of other demands,  further adjustments  may be made  to the per
capita/lump  sum transfer elements  (or  to the norms)  to maintain  the total within the bounds  consistent
with the State Budget's "carrying capacity".
49.  In 1991,  the normative grant was almost doubled in nominal terms over the 1990 levels, as a
result of the transfer to the grant pool of 50% of the PIT, the addition  of new norms and the upward
adjustment of other existing norms. (The  PIT  share  directly allocated  to localities  was cnrrespondingly
reduced.) Total grants  and PIT  together  increased  by 27% at a time when recorded  inflation was 29%.
'4A  variant of the basic reform recommendation  made in part B illustrates the implications of
allocating PIT to  localities on the basis of a simplified grant allocation formula (see discus6:on  of
Alternative II).
15See  earlier discussion  of the MOF  methodology of estimating yields.- 19-
This contributed to an overall Increase  in total estimated local resources  of 26%.1e For the future,
there is no guarantee  that either the overall  resource  growth, or the normative  grant wi;l be maintained
in real terms, as this is decided annually in keeping  with the capacity of the Budget.
50.  Allocation Formula  of Normative Grant. The manner  in whicth  the grant was allocated in 1991  is
outlined in Table 7.  There  are essentially  two elements  to the formula: (a) The first element consists
of "lump sum" transfers to each locality of Ft. 2 million per annum, plus Ft. 2000  per permanent
inhabitant of the locality.  This is intended  essentially  to provide a financial basis  for small towns, and
to provide  some degree  of 'equalization";  (b)  The second  element  consists of twenty-two expenditure-
related  weights, relading  to localities'  expenditures  on  their main  areas  of responsibility,  sueh  as primary
schools, old age care, handicapped  care, etc.  Allocations  are made  only for "budgetary institutions";
where schooling or care is provided, e.g., by an enterprise  or church, no allocation is made.
51.  On average,  these normative  weights cover some 60% of the average  total costs,
nationwide, of providing the services.  However, the proportion of costs covered is differentiated
across  services: the Ft 44,000 grant for secondary  schools  covers  some 90% of the service  provision
cosis, while for primary schools  the proportion is less than 50%; for old age homes, the normative
amount covers more than full cost.  The rationale behind the differentiation relates to the assumed
local priorities in service provision: For services which are provided largely to  non-residents  or for
services  which the central government  assumes  mignt otherwise get low priority (handicapped  care,
etc), fuller coverage  is provided.
52.  In addition, there appear  to be differences in service provision costs as between larger towns
and villages: these imply  additional variances  in the proportions of total costs covered by
the normative  elements.  Generally  speaking,  the norms cover a smaller  fraction of cost in cities such
as Budapest,  on the grounds that their own resource  mobilization capacity is commensurately
greater. MOF  intends  to establish  these costs more accurately  and adjust  the normative  elements  more
closely by type and size of locality--in spite of the unconditional  nature of the grant--so as to improve
the perception  of equity and transparency.
53.  (b)  Taraeted Grants.  While  the  normative grants  are for  operation and  maintenance
expenditures, targeted (matching) grants are made available  to  localities undertaking investments
consistent with central government priorities.  Under ihe Local Self-Government  Act, localities have
a right to grants for all investments meeting the criteria set forth in the law (1391 LSGA, paragraph
85).  The matching requirement  differs by sector, ranging  from 25% to 60%: in education  for
example  the grant finances  only 40% of total expenditures. Thebe  matching requirements  are  not fixed
by law.  Grants are allocated on a competitive basis, within the overall limits set for targeted grants
in the annual  Budget  Act.  Localities  forward requests  to MOI, which weeds out those not conforming
to the criteria established  in the Law.  In 1991,  of the 2800 requests  recaived  amounting  to Ft. 15.8
billion, some Ft. 8.5 billion met the criteria set forth in the Budget Act, but MOI put forward only  Ft.
6.2  billion, consistent with  the amounts allocated in the  Budget, (1.7%  of  local revenues).  A
parliamentary  compromise was reached whereby the eligible, but unfunded investments would be
funded in the 1992 budget.  It is not clear whether this carry-forward will be viewed as an addition
to the investment  grants required  next year  or as a subtraction  from those grants--thus  postponing  the
problem still further, but this potentially open-ended  guarantee  of investment grant finance needs  to
be addressed,  and is discussed  further in Sections  I and VI of Part B.
16  The expenditure  "capacity norms" themselves  were adjusted  by 16% (see  MOF; "State Budget,
1991,"  "Public Finance  in Hungary" Series).-20-
Table 7  Normative Grants
Allocation Criteria
1991
Per Capita  Total
Expenditure Norms  Amount  Amount (000 Ft)  %
1.  Lump sum grant to Village municipalities  2 Mi'lion Ft.Jj  6 804  3.97
2.  Lump sum grant per capita  2 00OFt per inhabitant/per person  21 096  14.41
3.  Matching grant per Ft of tourist
tax collected  2Ft./lFt.  fee  770  0.53
4.  Communal services and activities  1400 Ft/inhabitant/per person  14 776  10.10
5.  Subsidy for economically inactive pop:
social tasks  3000 Ft/per inactive person 2/  13 822  9.44
6.  Child-care (in institutions)  210 00OFt per child  6 042  4.13
7.  Homes for elderly  147 00OFt per person in home  6 786  3.96
8.  Day-home care for elderly, handicapped  24 00OFt per person  1 188  0.81
9.  Other homes for elderly,handicapped  40 00OFt per inhabitant/per person  110  0.08
10.  Institution for young handicapped
and retarded children  172 0OOFt  per child  1 468  1.00
11.  Kindergarten (owned by municipalities)  16 00OFt per child  6 662  3.87
12.  Kindergarten for nationalities & minorities  6 00OFt per child  70  0.06
13.  Elementary/primary schools  30 00OFt per student  33 938  23.19
14.  Elementary music schools  19 00OFt per student  1 383  0.94
1  5.  Mentally handicapped  at elementary
schools  66 00OFt per student  I  729  1.18
16.  Education at secondary schools  44 00OFt per student  5 471  3.74
17.  Education at vocational secondary schools  64 00OFt per student  10 895  7.44
18.  Skillee worker training schools  33 00OFt per student  6 879  4.70
19.  Workshops for apprentices & students
at training schools  36 00OFt per student  1 286  0.88
20.  National, ethnic, and bilingual education  14 00OFt per student  676  0.46
21.  Residents of dormitories and hostels
(elomenter,  secondary)  63 00OFt per student  4 566  3.11
22.  Local culture end public education  100 Ft per inhabitant/per person  1 060  0.72
23.  For maintenance of theaters  450 Ft per viewers  894  0.61
24.  Lump sum grant for counties, for education
and other activities at regional level  60 million per county  1 000
146,360  100.00
Source:  'Public  Finances in Hunjary,  No. 77, Budapest, 1990.
1/  For municipalities with population over 200: for towns less than 200, amount
is Ft.  10,000 per capita.
2/  Population 0-17 and 60-above.- 21 -
54.  (c) Specific (addressed)  Grants. These  grants are intended  to finance completion  of ongoing
investments  initiated during the earlier  regime. As such, it is the ministry under whose jurisdiction (in
the original Plan)  they were first  initiated which makes  the request for completion  funds to the MOI,
not the locality as such.  Consistent  with this, there is no matching requirement,  but the funds must
be  spent only on the intended  investment. Eligibility  criteria are broadly  defined  to include  projects  that
are large, of regional importance,  and serve a diverse  population. The local assembly  is accountable
to MOI for the expenditures  and  O&M is the subsequent  responsibility  of the local government. As this
is seen  as a transitional financing device, the Local Self-Government  Act does not guarantee  funds to
be available  under  this head (paragraph  85). As Table 8 shows, Ft. 12 billion was allocated in the 1991
Budget  for such grants--3.2% of total local revenues,  but this amount will presumably  decline in the
future.
Table 8  Addressed  arants in 1991
in million Ft
Water-management  496
Medical  service  5620
Education  and cultural services  546
Debt management  925,5
Other  4227
Total  11,814
Source: Ministry of Finance  (from Peteri, op. cit.)
55.  (d) Grants for "Distressed Localities".  The 1991  Budget  also allocated Ft. 5 bill for localities,
*who through no fault of their own", cannot achieve basic budgetary balance.  By  MOF's criteria,
heneficiaries  appear  to include localities  whose population  structure (old  age pensioners;  unemployed)
in,plies a limited tax base or PIT share.  These funds are intended to meet only current account
shortfalls, and are for municipalities which cannot meet even minimal maintenance and ongoing
expenditure.  Funds may not be used for  investments or infrastructure; localities whose budgets
include investment  expenditures  are not eligible. The maximum  allowed each locality is Ft. 150,000
(small localities with  population less than  1000\  or Ft. 200,000  (with  population above 1000).
Requests  for such grants were accepted by the MOF  beginning  in April,
based  on expected  first half results, with 480 applications  received;  of these, 184 were accepted,  with
Ft. 2.6 billion of the Ft. 5 billion for the year  as a whole being allocated  (1.4% of local revenues). (See
Annex table 3.)
(iv)  Qther Revenues
56.  (a)  Rents  and Income  from DisDosition  of State  Assets.  Local  governments  receive  income
also from sale of state property and from rental of flats owned by the locality.  Rents are
fixed by the central government  at present,  and  rental property  is typically managed  by a locally  owned
property management  company (IKV). Neither expenditures  on maintenance,  nor the rental income
appears  on the local  budget: all rents  accrue  to the IKV and  are  earmarked,  effectively, for maintenance
and other expenses  associated  with the IKV activities which may include property development  and- 22 -
rehabilitation. The Housina  Act to be passed  by Parliament  in 1992,  is expected  to allow localities/IKVs
to set rents.
57.  Localities also receive proceeds  from the sale  of housing.  Housing sales are administered
through .he IKV which receives  a fee for service; sales  proceeds  accrue to the local budget. As shown
in Table 4, the revenues  from disposition of housing  assets remains minimal; the yet to be passed
Prooerty  Transfer Act and transfer of government housing  will give localities  greater flexibility in the
housing  market. Discussions  with some  local governments  indicated  that the developmental  and  sales
activities were viewed as a significant future source of income.  In others, there was considerable
concern  about the costs of maintenance  and  possibility  of 'fire-sales'  of their housing  stock. Presently
many of the housing  sales  are being  financed  by local governments  at highly subsidized  interest rates.
There is a need to develop financial instruments  to reduce  the initial cash-flow cost to homa buyers
but at a lower economic cost than the current practice.
58.  Localities  and their agencies  also receive additional revenues,  albeit still minor, from the
rental or sale of commercial  roerties;  from the sale of locally-owned  enterprises  and from the sale
and rental of plots.  Table  9 outlines the local agencies  to which, under the present  arrangements,  the
rental or sale proceeds  accrue.  Data was not available  on proceeds  from these sources.  In broad
terms, rents accrue  to the IKV; sales  of small  plots, and small  or communal  enterprises  and  commercial
properties accrue directly to the municipal budget; while sales of major enterprises  or commercial
properties ("significant privatizations") are managed  by the national State Property Agency (SPA),
which shares  the proceeds  with the locality and  uses  the proceeds  accruing  to the central government
for the reduction of the national debt.
59.  (b) Duties. Fees  and Pre-existina  Taxes. In addition  to the taxes defined Lnder the new Act
on Local  Taxes, localities will continue to levy a range of centrally regulated  taxes and fees,
licenses, duties, and penalties.  Among these are the vehicles tax  or licensing fee, a specific levy
whose revenue capacity is encumbered with  a large number of  exemptions.  Fees are paid on
inheritances,  property transfers, and gifts, at rates ranging  from 5-10% of the value of the transfer.
Land  transfers pay a reduced rate of 2%.  These fees are shared between the county and the local
government, and  represent one  of  the  few  independent sources of  revenues of  the  county
governments.
60.  Fees  are also paid for use of facilities of public institutions, (books, meals,  dormitory rents,
library fees, after sc'hool  day care, etc.).  Set by the central government, these latter fees typically do
not cover the costs of providing  the service. The issue of user fees will be taken up in greater detail
in Section II of Part B in conjunction with discussion  of local tax capacity and revenue autonomy.
61.  (c)  Profits from  Entrepreneurial  Activities.  In addition to  their income from  rentals and
property sales, localities can and do own commercial  and (to a lesser  degree)  industrial enterprises,
from which they can receive  dividends,  or the proceeds  of sale/privatization. While the revenues  from
privatization  remain  limited in scope  at the present,  localities  appear  to be  optimistic about  their abilities
to enhance  revenue  from this source. One vehicle is to establish  joint ventures with a  domestic or
foreign partner, or another  state enterprise,  using local assets  as the locality's equity share. In those
localities well endowed with land, this appears  to be the preferred  equity contribution, and localities
appear also to  see potential in developing  and servicing empty land so as to enhance  its value as
equity.  Tourism lodges,  hunting parks, recreational  facilities and golf courses  we,re  cited as examples
of such ventures-in-process. Localities which have inherited important real properties  see similar
potential in developing these as contributions to  joint ventures, with  potato processing, bakeries,
construction, wood-products among  the range  of such enterprises  encuuntered.- 23  -
Tabie 9  Local  Government Assets:  Disposal/Sale'Revenues a/
Administered  Proceeds  Budgetary
Asset  by:  Retained by  Statue  Notes
1. Residential Housina
(a) Rentals  IKV  IKV  Off municipal  Rents controlled by
budget  central gov-
ernment.  Local
control  over rents
awaits passage  of
Housing Act.
(b) Sales  City council  or local  * Locality  1/  - Sales proceeds  Sales prices
assembly determines  - IKV obtains  on budget  confined  to
whether to  sell  fees for  - IKV's fees off  'corrected'  value
handling  budget  =  25%  market
sale  value
2.  Commercial Propertv
(a) Rental  IKV or a municipal  service  IKV  Off municipal
enterprise  budget
(b)  Sales: <  1000m
2 City council or  local  Locality  - Sales proceeds
assembly decides whether  to  IKV obtains  on budget
sell  fees for  IKV's fees off
handling  budget
sale
(cl  > 100Gm 2 State Property Management  50/60  sharing  Local proceeds
Agency  by SPMA &  on budget
Locality  SPMA proceeds:
off  budget
3.  Enterprises Sales
(a)  Communal anterprise  locality  locality  On budget  Includes utilities
transport,  garbage,
parks, etc.  baths
(b)  Non-communal  SPMA  S0% locality  On budget  owned  by locality
enterprise  60%  SPMA  Off budget  as result of  1940's
national-
ization
(c)  Budapest's  District  > 1  00Om
2 SPMA  ni  Under pre-
enterprises  < 1  00om
2 Locality  ni  privatization
program
(d)  Enterprise profits  Locality  18%  dividend  On budget
end dividends  to locality
4.  Plots:
(a) Sales  Locality  Locality  On budget
(b) Rental  ni  ni  ni
1/ In Budapest, 40%  of proceeds of Housing sales go to the Budapest Housing Development Fund (BHDF); 60%  to the  19 districts.
ni  - no information
2/  In  Budapest,  sales  proceeds  and rental  income  may  not  apply  as  t'iown  in  this  table,  as there  are frequently  different
arrangements.- 24  -
62.  In contrast to  taxation, entrepreneurial  activity was seen  by local governments  as generating
stable dividends for the budget, providing the locality with  access to technology which might be
diffused more broadly, and access  to export markets and  foreign contacts. Localities appeared  to feel
the necessity of engaging  in such  ventures  themselves;  simply providing  the conditions in which local
enterprises  might flourish was not seen as likely to bring "private" enterprise  to their region.
63.  The properties which will accrue  to the localities with the passage  of the Progertv  Transfer
Act  will give localities important new scope  to use newly acquired  properties in this manner  (or to
obtain revenues  from their sale). Section  11  of Part  B outlines issues  and recommendations  relating to
local government asset  ownership and entrepreneurial  activity.
(v}  Borrowina
64.  The Local Self-Government  Act (para. 88) grants localities unlimited borrowing authority.
Bond  issues  and  bank loans  are the only financing sources  available  at present,  and there is at present
no "bank for local finance", or other  organized  window for local borrowing.  Borrowing can take a
number  of forms:  short-term borrowing for liquidity management  (of up to 3% of total expenditures)
can be initiated by the local mayor; financing would come  from the local financial  institution and would
carry market interest rates.  Long-term borrowing, to finance infrastructure, investments, property
improvements or  projects--requires  the  approval of  the  local  assembly.  Localities interviewed
suggested that such borrowings would be sought from banks and that these would carry market
interest rates, and  medium term (5 years)  maturities. Bonds  were also  cited as a source of 'unds, and
one municipality indicated having issued  them in the past to fund a particular  project.'7 In obtaining
loans, localities  are permitted under the Self-Government  Act to mortoaae  properties owned by them
as collateral for loans, with the exception of so-called 'core  properties", such as streets and public
parks and areas.  (These  are defined in the Self-Government  Act, para. 78.)  County guarantees  of
local borrowing- common in the past--remain  possible  in theory, but are not likely to be forthcoming
in practice, since counties no longer have  secure sources  of revenue  and  their role as a guarantor has
correspondingly  been  weakened.
65.  The present  levels of indebtedness  of some localities  is striking, relating for the most part to
borrowing undertaken  in the past for projects in the investment  plan of local councils.' 8 These loans,
approved  under the 'credit plan' of local councils in the earlier  regime,  have become  the responsibility
of the new self-governments,  and represent,  in a number of them, a major burden on the capital
budget.  In three municipalities visited, the "capital budget" consisted entirely of such debt service
payments.
66.  Data on borrowings since  the inception of the Local  Self-Government  Act are not available  at
the aggregate  level. Based  on the mission's  limited experience,  it appears  that some  use is being made
of the borrowing authorities, although in most localities it appears  to be cautious. There was some
evidence that certain localities are borrowing to finance payments on old debts coming due.  Issues
relating to capital finance and local borrowing are discussed  in detail in Section VIl of Part B.
'7Data  on aggregate  bond  issues  or issuing  activity of localities  since  the passage  of the 1990 Local
Self-Government  Act was not available.
'8Under the earlier  system, repayments  due on any borrowings approved  under  the national  credit
plan would also be guaranteed.- 25-
(vi)  User  Fees. Benefit  Charoes
67.  Therb appears  to be some, albeit limited, use of benefit charges for municipal services in
certain localities, Connection  charges  for water, gas  and sewerage  were encountered,  although it is
not clear how widespread  the practice is, nor to what extent localities  follow full cost recovery  in their
pricing rules.  Section VIII of Part  B discusses  user fees and cost recovery  in more detail.
Municipal  Budgetina  and Accountina
68.  Municipal  budgets in the past were required  to follow a standard  format, showing both capital
and  current revenues  and  expenditures. Since  the passage  of the Local  Self-Government  Act, localities
can no longer be compelled to follow this format, although thev are required  to report to the local
county information agency, in a recommended  format.
69.  There  appear  to be  significant shortcomings  in current  local budgeting  procedures. As in many
countries where socialist-style accounting  procedures  are in place,  revenues  include proceeds  from
borrowing, as well as proceeds  from salP- -f assets, so that it is difficult to distinguish recurrent from
non-recurrent sources of financing. It is also difficult  to identify investment expenditures, as these
appear  in some cases under current expenditure  heads, and 'capital expenditures' include payments
for debt service. Total outlays on individual expenditure  heads  are also difficult to discern, as gross
revenues  and expenditures  are shown under every budgetary head with no netting.
70.  In addition, the long-term planning  function appears  largely absent, as does the development
of a financing plan or long term strategy for investments and their financing.
71.  The budget function needs to be significantly strengthened  in Hungarian  local finance.  A
number  of aspects are inconsistent  with international  practice  for local accounting. It is important also
to ensure that, although localities may have full independence  with  respect to their finances, that
budgeting  is done in a consistent, unified manner  across  all of the approximately  3100 localities.
PART  B:  ISSUES  AND  ALTERNATIVES
72.  Almost invariably  countries  assign  more expenditure  functions to local governments  than can
be  financed from the revenue  sources  allocated  to those governments. The result of this mismatching
of functions and finances (sometimes  referred  to as "vertical imbalance")  is that local governments  are
always dependent upon transfers from higher levels of government--often the more so the more
significant the  expenditures with  which they are charged.  Another pervasive problem of  local
government finance is  'horizontal  balance," or the  need to  cope with  the  reality  that  all local
governments  are not created equal. In even the smallest  country, there are relatively big cities and
small cities, heavily urbanized  municipalities  and rural municipalities,  rich regions and poor regions.
73.  Designing fiscal institutions to cope with this complex reality is a complex task, and the
resulting design is usually equally complex. Sections III and IV below sketch some  guidelines  for the
design  of local expenditure  and revenue  structures.  Sections  V and VI then undertake  the same task
for  intergovernmental  transfers.  Such transfers inevitably constitute an important source of local
government finance, even when, as in Hungary, the model is closer to fiscal separation  of different
levels of government (the "layer cake" model)  rather than their integration  (the "marble cake" model).
Local governments  may, subject to some  important qualifications  discussed  below, be separated  from
detailed  central control over their expenditures  and  revenues. However,  the dependence  of all modern- 26 -
fiscal systems on general  income  and sales  taxes means that they cannot be both important and  free
from dependence  on central transfers.
74.  Part B also  discusses  issues  and outlines options or recommendations  in the following areas:
local finance  in  the  macroeconomic context  (Section I);  the  role of  the  localities in  property
management,  entrepreneurship  and  privatization  (Section  II), capital investment  finance, and  borrowing
(Section  VIl); and  the other requisite  for sound local finance, greater reliance  on user  charges (Section
Vill).  Annex I explores  some of these issues  empirically.
I.  Local Finance  In the Macroeconomic  Context
75.  Local governments' major responsibilities  are allocative and to a lesser degree,  distributive.
Nonetheless,  the structure of the subnational  fiscal system can have important effects on national
stabilization policy.  As a oeneral rule, there is little reason to  worry unduly about the effects of
subnational  governments  on economic  stability.  Exceptions  are when local governments  are allowed
to run deficits that are, in the end, directly or indirectly financed by emissions  by the central bank. 19
Detailed  consideration  of  the  factors  determining  local  expenditures, local  revenues,  and
intergovernmental  transfers--and  of the (usually limited)  extent to which these factors reflect local as
distinct to central policy choices--is  required before any policy inferences can be drawn about the
stabilization  impact of the local financial  structure. Thus, the simple observations  that in a given year
some proportion of the total general government  deficit is attributable to the deficit recorded  at the
local level, or that central transfers to  local government account for a certain percentage of the
consolidated  deficit, convey little information.
76.  Given the assignment  of expenditures  and revenues  in Hungary,  central transfer will continue
to be laroe.  Localities presently depend on transfers for 83% of their total receipts (including PIT,
normative and other grants and social security), and local own taxes and fees account for 7% and
1  0% respsctively  of total revenues. While budgetary  flexibility is obviously desirable  from the central
government's short-run point of view, it is a mistake to view central transfers to local governments
as constituting an  entirely 'compressible'  portion of the national budget. What is required  is a system
that is certain, transparent  and meets the needs  of both central government and localities.
77.  Many of the services provided by local governments constitute essential infrastructure for
Hungary's  future development  and it is impractical to think that most of the small local governments
created in Hungary can ever finance the provision of such services  at an adequate  level out of their
own resources,  either now or in the foreseeable  future.  Central  grants to local governments  will thus
remain an important expenditure  item in the central government  budget.
78.  In these circumstances,  some countries have opted in favor of establishing  a total which is
formula-driven,  e.g. a specified percentage  of total national revenues,  or a particular national tax or
taxis.  This approach  represents  a compromise  choice in which the center gives up some degree  of
revenue  but also insulates  itself from ad hoc and possibly escalating  demands  from localities, while
localities avoid discretionary  cutbacks in local transfers to meet stabilization objectives, with all the
expenditure dislocations  that this implies.  For Hungary,  regularizing  the overall size and distribution
1 9This has occurred in countries as diverse  as Argentina, Brazil  and China. See "China: Revenue
Mobilization and Tax Policy", IBRD,  1989 and "China:  Financial  Sector Review", IBRD  1990 and A.
Shah, "Macroeconomic  Balance  and the Division  of Powers in Brazil", WPS  No. 587, IBRD, 1990.- 27 -
of the transfer, and strengthening  local finances by broadening  the local tax base  to improve local tax
yields, represent  priority reform.
79.  In addition, the possibility that local governments' open-ended  expenditure  responsibility  for
"social assistance"  might lead them to recur to the central government  for additional  funds should  also
be  addressed. Within the present  political system and  Hungary's  macroeconomic  constraints,  this can
only  be done imperfectly, by  giving  additional weight within  the  grant formula,  to  equalization
objecti.es.  Specifically, one might want to  give more weight to those expenditures required to
maintain social assistance  at nationally  desirable  minimal levels. However, in light of the fact that the
normative  grant is unconditional,  there is no suarantee  that localities  would spend that money in the
desired  fashion.
80.  Finally,  the central government may also want to rein in its open-ended  obligation to provide
finance for  local  investments on  a  (matching) grant  basis (see Section VI  below).  While an
accommodation  has been reached  for 1991  to achieve consistency with the 1991  budget ceilings,  a
resolution should be explored for the longer term which is consistent both with  macroeconomic
constraints  of the central government,  and  the efficient financing of investments  by local governments.
II.  Prooertv  Manaaement,  Ownership  and Asset Sales/Disposition
81.  (a) Entrepreneurial  Activities and Ownershig.  An important factor motivating the Report's
recommendations  to give localities  some expandable  source of revenue other than the current set of
local taxes is the even less desirable path which localities appear to  be pursuing of real estate
development  and business  entrepreneurship.  There is considerable  danger  that the soon zo  be made
decisions on  property transfer will  give full  scope to  the  entrepreneurial ambitions in  the local
governments,  and  that, exploiting  their new-found property  rights, driven by the pressure  to "activate'
idle property,  and faced with  the  difficulties  of  selling property or  businesses in  the  present
environment, the  country  will  soon be awash with  many local government owned  businesses
undercutting  both private competitors and  their own tax base,  while falling prey to the "developmental"
opportunities and projects that will undoubtedly  be offered to them.
82.  It is important to recall  that in the market  economies,  the rate of small  business  failure is high:
statistically only 20% (one in five) of such businesses  survive their first three years, and there is no
reason  to expect that localities  in Hungary  can successfully  defy these odds. Pressures  will arise  once
again to subsidize local business,  to maintain employment, and the role of the government in the
economy will not have diminished.
83.  Most importantly, this entrepreneurial  activity by localities  is fundamentally  inconsistent with
the orivatization drive, and represents  a bottleneck to true decentralization--that  is, decentralization,
not from the state to local governments,  but to the private sector.  Local  government entrepreneurial
activity represents  neither privatization nor decentralization.
84.  In sum, the business  of government is not business,  and the more rapidly the risks of such
activity  are understood by  localities the  better for both them and the Hungarian economy.  The
introduction of an improved  framework for local finance may provide a suitable occasion for moving- 28  -
towards this by -emoving  the pressures  all localities are feeling at present faced as they are by the
prospect of declining  central transfers in real  terms and a relatively inadequate  local tax base. 20
85.  (b) Asset Sales  and  Disposition. Many local  governments  are using  proceeds  from asset  sales
to finance  their current operations,  an approach  that is clearly unsustainable. In many localities, asset
sales, sometimes  at very low prices, are viewed as an attractive substitute for, and are delaying the
development  of, a more robust local taxing capacity, while stripping localities  of valuable  properties. 21
While asset sales  can yield 'revenues"  in the near term while the stock lasts, they do not represent
a permanent  source of funds, and localities  should  take steps soon to develop their capacity to raise
recurrent revenues  (This is discussed  in Section IV below). The revenues  from asset  sales might, for
example  be used to finance new local investments: this would essentially  change the form that the
locality's assets take (from e.g., housing  to local amenities)  but would leave  the locality's total asset
base  unchanged.
Ill.  Assianina Functions  to Local  Government:  Expenditures
86.  While local governments may have some effect on stabilization policy and some role in
distributive policy 22, their major economic role is clearly with respect to the allocation of resources.
From  an efficiency point of view, the basic rule of expenditure  assianment  is to assign  each function
to the lowest level of government  consistent with its efficient performance. So long as there are local
variaticons  in tastes and costs, there are clearly efficiency gains from carrying out  public sector
activities in as  decentralized  a fashion  as possible. From  this perspective,  the only services  that should
be provided  centrally are those for which there are no differences in demands  in different localities,
where there are substantial "spillovers" between jurisdictions that cannot be handled in some other
way (by contracting, or by grant design),  or those for which the additional  costs of local  administration
are sufficiently higher to outweigh its advantages. In short, most public services  should probably  be
delivered  at the local level, with local decision-makers  deciding what services  are provided,  to whom,
and in what quantity and quality.
20How to limit local business  involvements,  and how this is best enacted--whether  in an Act of
Parliament  or some other regulatory means--remains  outside the scope of this work.
21See  D. Newbery;  'Reform in Hungary:  Sequencing  and  Privatization";  European  Economic  Review.
No. 35, 1991; pp 571-580.  His  argument  against  a rapid,  approach  to sales  is that many of the assets
may have been  financed with debt (localities  have  substantial  liabilities, as  noted above),  in which case
the proceeds  should be used to  pay off this debt, rather than burdening present and future local
taxpayers with debt service. Even where there are no liabilities, it may be distributionally attractive
as well as economically  efficient (less  dead-weight  loss)  to raise  revenues  from privatization  than from
taxes.  In a high-tax economy such  as Hungary's,  the distortion of additional taxes may be quite high,
since  the distortion rises  with the square  of the tax rate. The prima facie efficiency case  for obtaining
revenues  from appropriate  non-tax sources  is thus also high, and also rates high in equity grounds.
22Since local governments are governments as well  as service agencies, they are inevitably
interested  in the distributive as well as the allocative  effects of their policies. Income redistribution  at
the local level will of  course be severely limited by the openness of  the local economy so local
governments  may be concerned  with distribution, but not be able to accomplish  a great deal.- 29  -
87.  In the  . se of  Hungary, for the  most part, the expenditure functions assigned to  local
governments  appear  bothb  logical  and in line with those found in most countries. This issue  is therefore
not  discussed further here, except to  emphasize  the  need to  develop a system of  uniform and
informative local budgeting  coupled  with timely expenditure  reporting.  Logically, however, given the
very small size  of many Hungarian  localities,  there ir a strong case  for assigning  some services,  e.g.,
secondary  education and hospital care to large units, as is done for example in some Scandinavian
countries. (See  Box C.)
Box  C
The Need  for Larner  Local  Governments
The  average  population  of Hungarian  localities  is only  3482 (2834,  excluding  Budapest),  2368,  or
74%, of these  villages  have  less  than  2000 inhabitants.  As in other  countries,  many  of these  local
governments  are  simply  too small  to provide  efficiently  all the  public  services  demand?d  from  them.
Hungary  may  have  something  to learn  in this respect  from the  experience  of other  countries.
In Finland,  for example,  wlkere  the  average  population  of a commune  (local  government)  is 10,700,
the 460 communes  are organized,  on  a voluntary  basis,  in a number  of municipal  federations  to provide
particular  services.  There  are,  for instance,  100 such  federations  in the health  care  field (and  it has  been
proposeJ  that this number  be  further  reduced  to 21). These  federations  are under  the control  of the
communes.  In addition,  the regional  agencies  of the  central  government  are  responsible  for such  activities
as highway  construction  and  maintenance,  environmental  protection,  and  tax collection  and  may  also
collect  taxes  on  behalf  of the communes.
Similar  special  purpose  municipal  federations  exist  in other  Nordic  countries  to provide  such
services  as  health  care,  transportation  for commuters,  and  certain  types  of education.  In addition,  all  the
Nordic  countries  also  have  so-called  "secondary  communes",  county-like  bodies  with their  own elected
government,  which  are responsible  for providing  certain  services  to an  area  encompassing  a number  of
communes.
A similar  "two-tiered'  structure  of local  government  exists  in most  countries  under  a variety  of
names  and  with numerous  variations  with respect  to its degree  of independence  from  the central
government  on the one  hand  and  from  the primary  or lower-tier  level  of local  government  on  the other
hand.
Source:  Lars  Soderstrom,  'Fiscal Federalism:  The  Nordic  Countries'  Style,"  in R.  Prud'homme,  ed.,  Public
Finanr,e  with Several  Levels  of Government;  (The  Hague/Konigstein:  Foundation  Journal  Public  Finance,
19911).
IV.  Revenue  Assianment: Issues  and  ontions
88.  The Choice  of Local  Taxes. The essential  purpose  of local taxes is to finance locally-provided
collective  public goods  for local residents. (See  Box D, 'The Benefit Model  of Local Finance"). If such
goods are truly "public" in the sense  of accruing  equally to all residents of the jurisdiction (including
not just final consumers  but also businesses)  and if redistribution  to other
than national  standards  is not an aim of local public policy a  if administrative (and  compliance)  costs
are left out of account, the best source  of local revenue  might perhaps  be  an equal  per capita levy such
as the poll tax, which also has the virtue of being economically  neutral or efficient in the sense  of- 30  -
|  ~~~~~~~~~~Box  D
The Benefit Model  of Local  Finance
The essential  econorric role of local government  is to provide to local residents  those public
services  for which they are willing to pay.  Local  governments  must be accountable  to their citizens for
the actions they undertake  to the extent those citizens  finance those actions.  Similarly, as developed
below, local governments  must be accountable  in some sense  to the central government  to the extent
they are financed by transfers.  Accountability is the public sector equivalent  of the 'bottom  line' in the
private sector,
Accountability in this sense  clearly requires  that local governments  should,  whenever possible,
charge  for the services  they provide, and, where charging  is impracticable,  they should finance such
services  from taxes borne by local residents,  except to the extent that the central government is, for
reasons  to be discussed,  willing to pay for them.  Public  sector activities are unlikely to be provided
efficiently unless  the lines of responsibility  and accountability  are clearly established. On the one hand,
local governments  need  to be given access  to adequate  resources  to do the job with which they are
entrusted; on the other, they should also be held responsible  to those who provide these resources  --local
residents  or central governments,  as the case may be -- for what they do with them.
In principle, local governments  should  therefore not only have access  to those revenue  sources
that they are best equipped  to exploit-such as residential  property taxes and user charges  for local
services--but  they should also be both encouraged  and permitted to exploit these sources  as fully as
possible. Unless  local governments  are given some  degree  of freedom with respect  to local revenues,
including the freedom to make mistakes  for which they are accountable,  the development  of responsible
and responsive  local government  will remain  an unattainable  mirage.
There are of course  dangers in permitting local governments  even limited freedom. One danger in
the eyes of some is that they will not utilize fully all the revenue  sources  open  to them, thus allowing the
level and quality of public services  in some areas  to deteriorate  below the standard considered  desirable.
But this is not a real problem. If the service in question is really one of national importance (e.g. research)
or one in which there is a strong national interest in maintaining  standards (e.g. poverty alleviation), it
should be nationally  funded at least in part and its achievement  monitored. If it is not a matter of national
interest, why should  the national government  be concerned? If the local electors do not like what their
local government  does, or does not do, they can 'throw  the rascals  out" at the next election. The
freedom  to make mistakes,  and to bear the consequences  of one's mistakes,  is an important component
of local autonomy.
Another danger,  more salient from an economic perspective,  is that local governments  may
attempt to extract revenues  from sources  for which they are not accountable,  thus obviating the basic
efficiency argument  for their existence.  To counter this inevitable  tendency, central governments  should  in
principle  deny or limit access to taxes that fall mainly on nonresidents  such as most natural resource
revenues,  pre-retail  stage sales  taxes and, to some  extent, nonresidential  real property taxes.
Another way to counter  this problem  to some  extent may be to establish  a uniform set of tax
bases  for local governments  (perhaps  different for different categories  such as big cities, small towns, and
rural areas),  with a limited amount of rate flexibility being permitted in order to provide room for local
effort while restraining unproductive  competition and unwarranted  exploitation.- 31 -
giving rise to no excess  burden.  In practice, however, differential local poll taxes are easy to evade
by moving. Even those who do not flee may be hard to tax: the low efficiency costs of the poll tax
seem likely to be  purchased  at the expense  of high  administrative  and  compliance  costs.  There is also
reason  to believe  that some residents--property-owners,  people  with school age  children,  or whoever--
benefit more than others from the provision of local public goods.  That is, while there may be no
reason to levy specific benefit taxes there may be good reason  for some local residents  to pay more
than others.
89.  If, for example, the demand  for local public goods is income elastic, a benefit case can be
made for a local income  tax--or, more feasibly given the high administrative costs of separate  local
income taxes, a local surcharae on the central income tax.  If the  enjoyment of  such goods is
associated  with consumption (rather  than residence),  a benefit case  can similarly be made  for a local
tax on consumption,  which would in practice almost certainly have to take the form of a retIai
sales  tax.  And finally, if the benefits of local public goods are  enjoyed  in proportion  to the value  of real
property there is obviously a case  for a local prooerty tax.
90.  In practice, the fiscal situation facing most central governments  in developing  countries is
such that they are unlikely to give local governments  direct access  to either income or consumption
taxes (with the occasional  exception of cumbersome,  low-rate gross receipt taxes of various sorts),
thus often leaving the groperty tax as the only significant local tax, whether or not one thinks the
benefits from local provision of  collective goods and services are in fact  distributed in relation to
property values. Some  of the implications  of this choice, and the case  for allowing local governments
access  to the income  tax, are sketched briefly below.
9l1.  (a)  Propertv  Taxes. There are important constraints on the use of property taxes for local
finance (see tox  E):  First, although  the administration  of the tax can certainly be improved  in most
countries, there will  always remain severe problems in administering it  in a horizontally equitable
fashion, particularly  when prices  are changing  rapidly. Second,  the temptation to indulge  in politically
painless  but economically  inefficient "tax exporting' means  that severe constraints  should be placed
on the degree  to which local governments  are permitted to tax businesses  if the property tax is to be
an economically  desirable  source of local revenues. Third, both because  of its faults and its virtues,
heavy reliance  by local governments  on the property tax probably  ensures  that they will also  continue
to be heavily dependent  on intergovernmental  grants to finance thoir activities.
92.  Despite  these political and administrat;ve  problems,  the property tax remains a significant
source of revenue  for local  governments  in many countries--particularly,  of course, those in which
it has been  well-established  historically. And, there are good reasons  for taxing real property  both as
a local tax and as a tax in general. Although relatively  expensive  to administer,  such a tax scores  quite
well in terms of both its efficiency and its equity aspects.  Moreover, if levied at the local level, a
property tax can serve as a good means oi financing local public goods.
93.  However, there are three important provisos: First, an  adequate  national  framework and law
should be established  to prevent  unwarranted local manipulation  of the base and  rate structure and in
particular undue loading of the tax  burden on nonresidents.  Second, local governments must be
provided  sufficient technical support xo carry out their role in the administrative  process. Third, local
governments  must be permitted to vary their tax rate (e.g., annually),  such rate flexibility is essential
if the tax is to be adequately  responsive  to local needs  and decisions.
94.  (b)  Income Taxes. The OECD  experience  summarized  in Part  A suggests  that some form of
local income tax, generally  levied as a supplement  to national income  taxes is the obvious alternative
(or supplement)  to property  taxes. If more  local "own-sourca" revenue  is desired--either  to expand  the- 32  -
Local  Prooertv  Taxes: Some  International  Experience
While  a large  number  of countries  depend  on property  tax revenues,  this is not always  an easy tax to
implement.  As experience  in a number  of countries  has shown  in recent  years,  there  is  often widespread
resistance  to the property  tax, especially  when too much  revenue  is sought  from this source.  The recent  U.K.
experience  with the poll tax  and  the earlier  so-called Proposition  13' movement  to limit property  tax rates  in the
U.S.,  illustrate  the strength  and  political  importance  of resistance  to the property  tax.  Dislike  of the property  tax
seems  to result  in part  from the visibility  of the tax and  in part  from  certain  inherent  problems  in its administration.
Local  taxes  on real  property  are  more  visible  than  other  taxes  for several  reasons.  First,  unlike  the
income  tax, the property  tax is  not deducted  at source  but generally  has  to be paid  directly  to the municipality  by
taxpayers  in periodic  lump  sum  payments.  Taxpayers  who pay  taxes  directly  to government  tend  to be more
aware  of the size  of their  tax bill  than those  whose  take-home  pay  is reduced  by weekly  or monthly  tax
deductions.  The  need  to make  such  periodic  large  payments  may  well add  to the accountability  and  responsibility
of local  governments,  but it also  greatly  increases  the sensitivity  of taxpayers  to even  nominal  increases  in taxes.
Secondly,  the inelasticity  of the  property  tax has  a similar  effect. Since  the base  of this tax does  not
as a rule  increase  automatically  over  time, the periodic  nominal  increases  in property  tax bills  needed  to maintain
real  revenues  when  price  levels  rise require  increased  tax rates.  In  terms  of  political  accountability,  this need  to
confront the people  with the cost  of government  again  represents  a virtue  of the property  tax; again,  however,
the downside  is the heightened  visibility  of nominal  tax increases  and  the accompanying  political  resistance.
Thirdly,  local  property  taxes  of course  finance  such  municipal  services  as education,  roads,  garbage
collection  and  snow  removal.  The  quantity  and  quality  of  these  services  (or  their  absence)  is thus readily  linked  to
the property  tax. When  potholes  develop  in their street,  taxpayers  are  understandably  quick  to question  the taxes
that supposedly  finance  street  repair.  Once  again,  the very feature  that makes  the property  tax a good  source  of
local  government  revenue  in principle  makes  it especially  vulnerabla  to political  resistance.
Other  problems  result  from property  tax administration.  As a rule,  property  is supposed  to be assessed
on the basis  of its  market  value,  usually  defined  as  the price  struck  between  a willing buyer  and  a willing  seller  in
an arm's length  transaction.  In reality, however,  discrepancies  usually  arise  between  assessed  values  and  market
values  within classes  of property,  between  classes  of  property,  and  across  municipalities  for both  political  and
technical  reasons.
Within-class  inequity  is perhaps  the most  significant  frr -n  a policy  perspective  because  it is the most
visible.  For  example,  two single-family  houses  each  worth $100,000  may  be assessed  at very different  ratios  of
market  value  depending  on their  location,  the size  of the lot, the age  of the structure,  and  other  factors. Centrally-
located  properties  and  older  properties,  for instance,  are  generally  relatively  under-assessed  compared  to  suburban
and newer  properties.  Since  taxpayers  can easily  compare  their  property  taxes  with those  of  similar  properties  in
their  neighborhood,  such  discrepancies  lead  both to specific  assessment  appeals  and  to general  pressure  for tax
relief.
Single-family  homes  are  usually  under-assessed  relative  to apartments,  and  residential  property  generally
is under-assessed  relative  to commercial  and  industrial  property.  There  is no justification  on benefit  grounds  for
the higher  taxation  of non-residential  property. Indeed,  one  could  argue  for lower  tax- i on non-residential
property  because  such  properties  as  a rule  use fewer  services  (e.g.  education).  Taxing  non-residential  property
also  facilitates tax exporting,'  thus  breaching  the important  principle  that
(in the absence  of spillovers)  local  taxes  should  be paid  only bY  local  residents.
Finally,  assessed-to-market  value  ratios  may be  higher  in one municipality  than another,  especially
when  assessment  is done  by the municipalities  themselves.
Some  assessment  biases  result  from problems  inherent  in the estimation  of market value. Where  a
property  has recently  been  sold  its market  value  may be  easily  determined,  but where  a property  has not sold  for
several  years  and in particular  where  it has some  unique  characteristics,  the determination  of market  value  is an
inherently  difficult task. Moreover,  when  property values  are  changing  rapidly  even  annual  reassessment  (which  is
too costly  to be practical)  would  mean  that assessed  values  are  always  out of date.  Assessed  values  are  thus at
best only  a rough estimate  of true market  value  and  hence  always  vulnerable  to appeals.- 33 -
size  of local activities or to make local  governments  more  self-reliant--  OECD  experience  suggests  there
is much to be said for supplementary  "piggybacked" local income  taxes. (See  Box F.)
95.  Such income  taxes, like the property  tax, would be  transparent  and hence in principle satisfy
the criteria of political responsibility  aed accountability. However, the fact that income tax revenues
tend  to  grow elastically, while good news for  local officials,  suggests that,  if  reducing size of
government  is a goal, increased  reliance  on local income  taxes should be viewed with mixed  feelings.
On the other hand, since an income  tax is usually  perceived  as more progressive  than a property tax,
it scores  higher than the latter on equity grounds.
96.  (c} Other  Taxes. It is especially  important to provide adequate  f;exibility to exploit good locai
tax bases  to avoid creating a situation in which the only flexibility available  to local governments  in
their struggle to cope with budgetary pressure  is by exploitinn  such economically  undesirable  sources
of revenue  as local business  taxes (which are not really local'  because  they are paid in whole or part
by  nonresidents) o;,  even worse,  profits derived from  ownership of  local business enterprises.
Enterprising  municipalities  should  not be encouraged  to develop  local monopoly enterprises  in order to
secure the revenue  they need  to function.
97.  Finally as emphasized  in the  "benefit model" approach  to  local taxation (see Box D), an
important concern in designing  local taxes is to ensure  that the access  of local governments  to taxes
that may be  exoorted is restricted so that the link between  local taxing and local expenditure  eecisions
--required  for efficiency--is retained.
Local Own-Source  Revenues:  An Evaluation,  and Some  Recommendations  for Hunaarv
98.  Two basic principles  of local revenue  assignment  are: (i) Local own-source revenues  should
ideally oe sufficient  to  enable at  least the  richest local governments to  finance from their  own
resources  all local services  primarily benefitting local residents;  and (ii) Local revenues  should
be  collected  from local residents  only, preferably  in relation to the perceived  benefits  they receive  from
local services.
99.  Unfortunately, the five new taxes assigned to local governments in Hungary fall short of
achieving  these aims.  In combination,  these levies are most unlikely  to produce  sufficient revenue  to
even come close to the first  of these two  objectives, all of them breach  the second objective, and
several  of them suffer from other inherent  design  problems. Much the same  can be said with respect
to local revenue  from "charges" and (to the extent they will continue under the new system) the old
"duties".
100.  ' trenoths of Present Taxes.  The local tax  which is both desirable  in principle and has a
significant revenue  potential  but only in the lona run is the grooertv tax.  Unfortunately,  at present  the
only information  many (if not all) local governments  seem  to have  on which to base  such  taxes is area-
-and even with respect to area the exemptions  specified  in the law (and carried over from
the old system) ensure  that not much revenue  is likely to be collected  from this source  for some years.
Moreovet, not only is the rate differential established  in the law between vacant and built-up property
questionable,  but local governments  are not given the freedom  to set their own (uniform) tax rate on
residential  property that they need if this tax is to become  a mainstay  of responsible  local finance. On
the other hand, the ability of local governments  to tax business  property should of course be severely
restricted to restrain tax exporting.  Both some recasting of the present national  framework for local
property taxes and, most importantly, substantial national assistance in developing an adequate
valuation base for such taxes are necessary  if the property  tax is to become  an important component
of Hungarian  local finance.- 34 .
Local  Income  Taxes:  Examoles  From  OECD
The concept  of a local  tax, as  opposed  to a national  tax, seems  clear. In  reality,  it is not. A 'truly
local*  tax, for example,  might  be  defined  as one  (i)  assessed  by local  governments,  (ii)  at rates  decided  by
local  governments,  (iii)  collected  by local  governments,  and  (iv)  with its proceeds  accruing  to local
governments.  In the real  world,  however,  many  taxes  have  only  one  or two of these  characteristics.
The present  Hungarian  income  tax, for example,  accrues  in part  to local  governments,  but its rates
are  set by the national  government,  which  also  assesses  and  collects  it.  Such  a tax might  be  considered
to be  either  a local  tax or a central  government  grant  allocated  to local  governments  in proportion  to the
amount  of national  income  tax collected  locally. On  the other  hand,  the Canadian  income  tax, which
accrues  in part to the provinces  (more  accurately,  to those  participating  in the  tax collection  agreement),  is
also  assessed  and  collected  by the national  government  for the most  part; but  the provinces  themselves
set the  rates  of 'their'  tax.  In effect,  the provinces  have  contracted  (for  a small  percentage  of the
amounts  collected)  with the  national  government  to take  advantage  of its comparative  advantage  in tax
collection.  While  this tax is still a "hybrid",  since  the determination  of the  tax base  is entirely  in the hands
of the central  government,  it is usually  considered  to be  a provin%  al rather  than  a national  tax.
The  best-known  examples  of local  income  taxes  are  those  in the five Nordic  countries  (Denmark,
Norway,  Sweden,  Finland,  and  Iceland).  In  these  countries,  with some  important  variations,  the local  tax
is basically  levied  at a flat, locally-established  rate on  the same  tax base  as  the ,.dtional  income  tax and  is
collected  by the  central  government.  In contrast,  in Belaium  (as  in most  Canadian  provinces)  the local
surcharge  is levied  as a percentage  of the  national  tax liability  rather  than  the national  tax base. A similar
system  exists  in Switzerland,  where  most  cantons-the  i,,termediate  level  of government--allow  local
governments  (communes)  to levy  surcharges  at locally-established  rates  on  the cantonal  income  taxes--
taxes  which are,  incidentally,  like  most  U.S.  state  income  taxes,  in no  way harmonized  with the central
income  tax.
Less  well-known  is the urnique  system  of local  income  taxation  in J&Han.  Corporations  are
subjected  to a municipal  tax assessed  largely  on  the basis  of national  corporate  taxes  paid  in the previous
year,  with the  tax base  being  allocated  to the different  jurisdictions  in proportion  to the number  of
employees.  In addition,  corporations  are subject  to a progressive  municipal  "enterprise"  tax based  directly
on income.  Perhaps  the most  unique  feature  in Japan  is that  all these  taxes  are  assessed  and  collected
locally.  In 1984,  taxes  on corporations  yielded  16% of municipal  tax revenue  in Japan  and  taxes  on
individuals  yielded  34%. In  addition,  municipal  governments  obtained  an  additional  33% of their  tax
revenue  from a "fixed  assets  tax' levied  on assessed  values  determined  by the municipalities  in
accordance  with national  government  guidelines.  With some  variations,  the general  picture  is the same  for
Japan's  secornd  level  of local  government--the  prefectures.
Gerran municipalities  also  receive  significant  revenues  from an  even  more  complex  tax on
businesses  (aewerbesteuer)  levied  in part on  profits, in part  on payroll,  and  in part on  property.  When  this
enterprise  tax is applied  to individuals  operating  businesses,  its rate varies  with the category  of business
activity  (as  is also  true  with the local  taxe orofessionelle  in France).  Individuals  are also  subject  to both  a
progressive  local  income  tax on the  same  base  as  the national  income  tax and  a poll tax (like  the soon-to-
be-abolished  British  "community  charge")  levied  at a nationally-determined  per  capita  rate  which  varies
with the size  of the municipality.  Only  the latter,  however,  is levied  on nonresidents  working  in the
municipality.- 35 -
101.  Two other sources  of local government revenue,  in contrast, deserve much more attention
than they seem to have so far received. The first is the taxation of motor vehicles.  At present, it
appears  that this base  is not generally  exploited in Hungary. In  many countries, vehicles  are subjected
to taxes designed  to some extent to offset the social costs attributable  to vehicles. While such taxes
should  probably be  designed and  imposed uniformly  throughout  the  nation to  avoid obvious
administrative  groblems,  there is no reason  why these revenues  should not be assigned  in part to the
local governments  in which the vehicles are registered.  Further discussion  of this topic, however,
would require  fuller consideration  of road finance than has been  possible  in the present  study.
102.  In some ways the most important source of local own-source revenues  that needs to be
further developed  is user  charges for services  provided  to specific and  identifiable persons  (or groups)
by local governments. Fiscal  pressures  are increasingly  inducing local governments  in Hungary (as  in
nearly all market economies)  to impose such charges,  e.g., on the parents of pre-primary  children.
What is needed is a thorough review of  these and other local fees and charges from  the dual
perspective  of both local government finance and the various services  affected such as education,
health, and housing. This issue  is discussed  further in Section VIl below.
103.  Weaknesses  of Present  Taxes.  The only new local tax with  much revenue  potential in the
near future is the tax on business  turnover. Although the goal of some localities in levying this tax is
to "chargew enterprises  for the use of local infrastructure, user fees and the property tax are a less
distorting way of achieving  this aim. While  the present low-rate tax on business  turnover is not likely
to do much economic damage,  such a cumulative  business  tax of course  produces  precisely  the same
kind of tax cascading  as Hungary  has tried to eliminate  at the national  level by adopting  a VAT.  This
problem, and the resulting loss of competitiveness, will become more serious if,  as is likely, the
increasing  pressure  on local finance leads  to rate increases in the turnover tax irn  the future.  More
seriously, as presently designed,  with the explicit exclusion  of retail sales  from the tax base,  this tax
encourages  both tax exporting  and local attempts to manipulate  the tax system for incent;ve reasons.
Tax exporting is of course the  antithesis of  rational local finance, and local fiscal  incentives to
production  have a dismal record  throughout  the world, so neither  of these features of the turnover  tax
is desirable.
104.  The high proportion of sociai housing  in Hungary--a  proportion  that will undoubtedly  decline
but is likely to remain significant for some time--suggests that an argument can also be made for
levying some form of local communal  tax on public housing  tenants. 23 Although it seems  likely that
the new 'communal'  tax  will  prove more difficult  to administer in Hungary's increasingly mobile
society than seems  to be generally  realized,  such  a tax, while it is never likely to yield much revenue,
may thus have a minor role to play in local finance for some  time.  As in the case of the property tax,
however, local  governments  should  probably  be  given considerably  more  leeway  in specifying  the rates
of such taxes than is now the case.
105.  Perhaps  the least desirable  tax in the new package  is the tourist tax.  Tourist establishments
(including second homes and cottages) should of course be subject to general local business and
property  taxes.  But there is no reason  at all to encourage  fiscal irresponsibility  by making it especially
attractive  (through the  "bonus* feature in the normative grant--see item 3  of  Table 7) for  local
governments to impose taxes on nonresidents-  they need to be restrained from such actions, not
encouraged. There is also no justification for allowing local taxes as a deduction from the central
government's PIT  for .indivicuals,  just as there is none  for allowing deduction of other costs of living.
231t is assumed  that social assistance  and general  income support are provided  primarily through
national  channels: the communal  tax on social flats is consistent both with this assumption,  and  with
the view that local governments  shou'd not misprice  their services  for distributive reasons.- 36 -
Doing  so introduces  a bias against  user  charges,  which are presumably  J3= so deductible. (Of course,
both charges  and taxes should be deductible  from business  income.)
106.  Need  for Fundamental  Reform of Hunaary's Local  Taxes.  In the long run, the potential for
greater own-source  revenue  of Hungarian  local governments  thus seems  to lie in the more systematic
development  and exploitation of the potential for local charges  and the development  of an adequate
basis for local property taxation, perhaps combined with  some local revenues  from vehicles.  In
addition, at least for the immediate  future, severely damited  local access  to business  taxation through
something  like the present low-rate tax - preferably extended  also to retail sales, and uniform across
all activities - may prove necessary,  at least until the property tax system is adequately  developed.
107.  However, since even the richest local governments  can never be expected to finance most
of their expenditures  from local sources,  local governments  will have to have direct access  to one of
the national  tax bases,  such  as the VAT or the PIT. Since  under  the present  system they already have
access  to the PIT, and  the PIT is in fact the most logical of all national taxes so far as sharing with
local governments  is concerned  (see  paragraph  94), the proposals  later  in this section assume  that this
will  continue.  In effect,  in  one of  its variants, the  reform proposed is to  remedy the  inherent
inadequacy  of the local  tax base  by changing  the nature  of local access  to the PIT. Since  the proposed
change in the PIT can only be understood in the context of the proposed  change in the normative
grant, it is discussed  in Section V below.
V.  Design  of the lnteraovernmental  Transfer System
108.  Transfers  in many ways constitute the heart of subnational  finance. In themselves,  transfers
are neither good nor bad: what matters are their effects  on policy outcomes such as allocative
efficiency, distributional  equity, and macroeconomic  stability.  Intergovernmental  fiscal transfers play
several distinct roles in countries with  decentralized  governmental  structures. (See Box G, "Basic
Objectives  of Transfers"). In the first place,  such  transfers  are used  to 'close  the fiscal gap", i.e., they
generally  constitute the principal way in which such countries achieve "vertical fiscal balance", that
is, ensure  that the revenues  and expenditures  of each level of government are approximately  equal.
Second, transfers are used to  achieve "horizontal fiscal balance"  ("equalization") among local
governments.  Thirdly, tranzfers can be used to stimulate local fiscal effort, that is, to  encourage
localities  to raise their own resources. (In addition, transfers can be used to influence local spending
decisions  in accordance  with central preferences,  as discussed  further in Section VI below.)
109.  Ii)  Closino the  Fiscal Gao.  For various reasons, both  economic and political,  central
governments usually have much greater revenue-raising  capacity  than  do  local  governments.
Intergovernmental  transfers are one  mechanism  by which some  of the revenues  accruing  to the central
government are transferred to finance the deficits of lower levels of government.  Of course, such
fiscal gaps may also be closed, and vertical fiscal balance  restored, by transferring revenue-raising
power to local governments,  by transferring  responsibility  for expenditures  to the central government,
or by reducing  local expenditures  or raising  local revenues. In all countries, however, as noted above,
there invariably remains sufficient mismatch in the revenues  and expenditures  assigned  to different
levels of  government for  an important balancing role to  be assigned to  intergovernmental  fiscal
transfers.
110.  Three important characteristics  of this process deserve attention: First, all transfers from
higher-level  to lower-level  governments,  no matter  what they may be label!ed,  help close  the fiscal gap
opened  up by the original  unbalanced  assignment  of expenditures  and revenues. Second,  irrespective
of how such transfers  are made--for  example,  on an equal  per capita  basis  or on a derivation basis  (that- 37  -
Box G
Basic Obiectives of Transfers
There are four basic economic rationales  for intergovernmental  transfers:
(i)  The first  rationale is  to transfer  resources (even to the  richest local governments)  to close fiscal gaps arising from
the  assignment of revenues and expenditures.
(ii)  The second rationale is to provide local governments with  sufficient  resources to  enable them  to provide a
specified  bundle of public  services and to respond adequately  to incentive grants.  Such transfers  should generally be
based on measured fiscal capacity  and, depending on the extent  to which  value is attached  to local autonomy  per so,
may  be either unconditional  or conditioned  on the perfo.mance of the specified  services.
(iii)  The third rationale is to face  local decision-makers with  (socially) correct  prices with  respect to externalities
arising from their actions.
(iv)  The fourth  rationale is to  maximize the impact  of central expenditures in certain areas by inducing  local
governments to spend from their own  resources as well.
The last two rationales  imply that transfers  should take the form of  matching grants,  with  the rate of  matching
dependent on such factors  as the degree of  central interest  and the estimated price and income elasticities  of local demand
for the services in question (see 8ox  M).
In addition to these economic arguments,  there are of  course important  political arguments  for transfers  in all
countries.  It may  be necessary, for  example, to transfer  some resources to jurisdictions  that do not,  strictly  speaking, need
them in order to make it p,olitically feasible to transfer  needed amounts to other jurisdictions.  It may  also be essential to
transfer  resources simply  in order to keep some economically non-viable local governments alive for  political  reasons - to
salvage regional pride, to provide jobs for local supporters,  or for some other reason.  In both these cases, the  main design
problem is to minimize any collateral damage to the presumed economic objectives,  both by achieving the  political  ends in
as cost-effective  a way  as possible and by trying  to ensure that the design of  such transfers  offsets  the good  features of
other transfers  as little  as possible.
In general, rules are more conducive  to the  attainment  of economic policy objectives  than discretionary  actions.  Even
bad rules may  at least have the virtue  of clarity  and predictability:  if  transfers are the  least predictable  source of local
government revenue as has been true  at times  in some countries, they  are unlikely to achieve any objective  very  efficiently
or effectively.  On the  other hand,  it may at times  be quite sensible for central governments  in effect  to make individual
contracts  with  particular  local governments  - though preferably for a period of years rather  than on an annual  basis and
preferably  in an open and agreed fashion.  Given the diversity  of many countries and the usual political  necessity to have
nominally uniform  laws, only such a contract  approach may be able to provide the  necessarily non-uniform  terms  needed to
secure the  desired outcomes at least cost.
The main substantive  aim of a well-designed  transfer  program is to get the prices right  in the sense of facing  local
decision-makers with  the full consequences of their actions.  The first  step in getting  the right  incentives  from
intergovernmental  transfers  is therefore,  as argued in Section IV, to establish the local public  finance  system itself  as much
on a benefit  basis as possible. Ideally, local own-source revenues should come entirely  from  local texpayers.  Local
governments should not  have access to taxes  that they  can export to non-residenta (except to the  limited  extent  such taxes
may offset  the  provision of  local public goods  that lower  production costs).
Given such a system, the  next  step .s to recognize that  (in a non-federal system)  local authorities  must fundamentaliv
be responsible to the  central authorities  or, more accurately,  to taxpayers at large, when  they  are spending central funds.
There is thus in principle  little role for completely unconditional  transfers - except, of course, to the  extent  that  such
'transfers'  are not really transfers  at all but  rather simply  central collection of local taxes,  as discussed earlier.  Since
unconditional  ta -r.sfere  in this system  are essentially motivated  by politics,  the concern in these cases should primarily to
limit the damage done to policy outcomes:  for example, transfers that simply finance  local deficits  or that  are entirely
discretionary  in nature are invariably  bad.
On the other hand, transfers  intended to encourage spending on a specific  local service, whether  because it
generates externalities or  because it  is more efficient  to administer the service locally, should generally require some local
contribution  (matching)  and should of course  be conditional on the performance  of the service in question in accordance
with  specified standards.  Both the determination  of the  appropriate matching rates and the  extent  of central  support  and
monitoring  of local perfo-mance  are obviously  matters for close concern and study  with  respect to each specific  program
(see Box M).- 38 -
is, returning revenues  to their presumed  point of origin)--care  must be taken to ensure  that they do not
impact adversely on such presumed central policy goals as poverty alleviation and public sector
efficiency. Third, in principle, vertical fiscal balance  in an  accounting  sense  may be  said  to be achieved
when expenditures  and revenues  (including transfers)  are balanced  for the richest local government,
measuired  in terms of its capacity to raise resources  on its own.  Fiscal gaps may still remain, of
course, for all poorer  local governments,  but vertical fiscal balance  (between  levels of government) will
nonetheless  have been  achieved: what remains  is the important problem  of achieving  horizontal  fiscal
balance  among localities.
111.  (ii}  Eaualization. Horizontal  fiscal balance  has attracted much attention in the literature on
fiscal federalism  and multi-level  finance. Equalization,  as it is usually  called, has proved  a controversial
policy  objective  in  many  countries,  not  least  because it  is  a  concept  with  many different
interpretations. For example,  if horizontal  fiscal balance  is interpreted  in the same  gap-filling sense  as
the vertical fiscal balqnce  discussed  above,  this implies  a level of transfers sufficient to equalize  actual
expenditures  of each local government. Such "fiscal dentistry" makes no sense, however.  Making
up all gaps between actual outlays and actual own-source revenues  for all local governments, like
equalizing  the actual outlays of local governments  in per capita terms (that is, raising all to the level
of the richest local government),  ignores  differences in loccl preferences  for public and private goods.
Such equalization  also  ignores  local  differences  in needs,  in costs, and  in own revenue-raising  capacity.
Moreover, equalizing actual outlays clearly discourages  both local revenue-raising  effort  and local
expenditure  restraint, since  under  this system  those with the highest  expenditures  and  the lowest taxes
get the largest transfers.
112.  For these reasons,  in all countries with formal systems  of equalization  transfers, the aim is
either to equalize  the capacity of local governments  to provide a certain level of public services or to
equalize  actual service  performance  by local governments. Transfers  in some systems might be
conditioned  on both capacity and performance,  by requiring  the specified package  of services  to be
provided. Alternatively, in a "truly'  federal  system in which local preferences  are  assumed  to dominate
national preferences  for local public goods, such transfers should in principle be unconditional--even
if the result is that local governments  reduce their taxes or build municipal palaces rather than pay
school teachers, as the national  government might prefer.
113.  The cavacitv anproach  aims to provide local governments  with sufficient funds (own-source
revenues  plus transfers) to enable them to deliver a centrally determined level of service. 24 It does
not require  service provision  to  a set standard. Differentials in the cost of providing services  may or
may not be  taken into account. Transfers  based  solely on  capacity measures  do  nothing to ensure  that
the recipient governments  will in fact use  the funds they receive  as the central government  might wish-
-unless grants are conditional.  This approach  broadly characterizes  the Hungarian  system, although
(as emphasized  below), it does not include any explicit measure  of capacity.
114.  The service verformance  criterion adjusts the transfer  received in  accordance with  the
locality's need for the aided service (it may allow for  cost differentials) and is in  principle more
attractive to central governments  and those concerned  with  maintaining service standards in e.g.,
education or social assistance. (Elements  of this approach may also be detected in the Hungarian
system.)  The level of service to  be funded is determined centrally and the transfer can be made
conditional on the provision of that level of service.  Unfortunately, this approach  suffers from the
2 Secause  such  capacity-based  transfers  generally  take into account  measures  of potential  revenue-
raising capacity (such as taxable assessed  values, equalized  to adjust for differences in the ratio of
assessed  to market values in different localities, or the so-called 'representative  tax system") no
disincentive  to fiscal effort is created.- 39 -
same disincentive  effect on the revenue  side  as equalizing  actual  outlays, since  that government which
tries least again gets most--unless  an adjustment  is made  for differential fiscal capacity (see  below).
115.  How equalizing  either approach  is in practice  depends  on how the standard  of services  to be
finenced is set.  Full horizontal fiscal balance (full equalization)  will be achieved  only if the revenue
raising capacity assumed by the grant is set at level which could be afforded by the richest local
government:  otherwise, the disabilities  of below-average  localities relative to those that are above
average  will obviously remain.  The only exception to this statement is when the positive transfers
required  to bring those below the average  up to the average  are financed by negative transfers from
those above the average  (as in the finanzausaleich  of Germany  or the Danish  local government grant
scheme). As the discussion  of the latter in Boxes  H and I show, however, even such "self-financing"
equalization  schemes  may leave  substantial differences between localities.
116.  (iii) Fiscal  Effort.  While the evidence  is far from clear, there is some empirical  support for the
commonly-expressed  belief that transfers often tend to discourage  local fiscal effort.  Nonetheless,  it
is generally not appropriate  to include "fiscal effort'  explicitly in a transfer formula.  (This could be
done, for example,  by having transfers related to the difference between the effective tax rate in the
recipient municipality and the average national rate.)  First, the  measurement  of  fiscal effort  is
considerably  more complex  than is usually  realized. If, for instance,  tax bases  are sensitive  to tax rates
(so that the base declines  if the rate is increased),  then the usual  measures  overestimate  capacity in
low tax-rate areas. And by the same  token they will underestimate  the effort needed  to increase  taxes
in such areas.
117.  More importantly, putti,ig  too much weight on fiscal effort  in allocating grants unduly
penalizes  poorer  areas. The problem  in poor areas  is that their capacity (tax base)  is too low, not that
their tax rate  are too low.  Most fiscal effort measures  inevitably reward the richer governments,
which find such tests easier  to meet.  Imposing  such an additional penalty on the poor in a transfer
program seems hard to justify.  In these circumstances,  the implicit inclusion of an "average" fiscal
effort target in the grant formula constitutes sufficient recognition of the possible  disincentive  effects
of transfer on effort.
Reformina  National  Transfers in Hunaary: Some  Recommendations
118.  A number  of changes  seem desirable  in the present structure of Hungary's central-local  fiscal
transfers. Proposals  with respect  to the design  of matching  grants and the revision  and development
of the "targeted" grants are outlined in Section VI below. This section focuses on the most important
source of local revenues  at present, the so-called "normative grant."
119.  As presently  structured, this grant has  three important characteristics. First, the total amount
to  be distributed to local governments is entirely discretionary.  Second, the grant is completely
unconditional: local governments  can spend the money however they see fit.  Third, its distribution
formula contains both "equalization" and "need" components". As shown in Table 7, the per capita
component  represents  the former, while the second,  and larger,  part of the grant is largely  distributed
by measures  of expenditure "needs", particularly with respect to education.
120.  A Case  for Conditionality? In principle,  there seems  little rationale  for such large  unconditional
grants to so many small local governments. The central government and taxpayers in general have
a legitimate interest in what is done with grants to local governments.  Moreover, the nation as a
whole also  has a legitimate concern to ensure  that services  such as education  and health are available
throughout the country at minimum standards.- 40 -
Horizontal  Fiscal Ecualization  in Denmark
The scheme  of local government grants in Denmark  clearly separates  the "vertical" and
'horizontal'  functions of grants.  The size of the first component  of the general grant--there  are
also a number  of selective grants--is determined  in accordance  with national budgetary needs.
This component  is then distributed to localities (communes)  in proportion to the relation to the
ratio of their actual tax base  to the average  tax base in the Copenhagen  metropolitan region. If
their tax base exceeds  that in Copenhagen,  of course they will receive no grant.
A more unusual  feature of this scheme  is that the equalization  (horizontal)  component of the
grant is financed outside of the central government  budget: the additional positive grants needed
to raise  the capacity of poorer localities  to the pre-determined  standard  are financed by 'negative
grants" (in effect, taxes) on richer localities. No attempt is made  to eliminate completely
differences in either capacities  or needs, but 52% of capacity differences (taking all local taxes
into account) and 35% of need differences (calculated  in relation to age structure, etc.) are
eliminated  in this way.
The basic equalization  grant formula (simplified by omitting a correction for regional wage
differentials) may be written as follows:
g 1i =  b1(y  -yi)ei/y.  +  b2(Zi -Zm)
where b, and b2 are parameters  ( =  .52 and .35, respectively),  gi is the grant received by the ith
locality, y, is the average  tax base in the Copenhagen  metropolitan  region, y, is the tax base in the
ith locality, ei is the actual expenditure  in the ith region, z; is the calculated  expenditure  need in the
ith region, and zm is the calculated  average  expenditure  need. The results of this calculation are
corrected as necessary  to ensure  that the positive and negative grants balance  and there is no
need for additional central government  financing.  (There  is, however, an extra grant for localities
with less than 85% of the national average  tax base.)
An important advantage  of the Danish  system is that it separates  the level of the general
grant to local governments  from the eaualization  feature of the grant:  the former can then be
varied in accordance  with the needs of national stabilization  policy (and such other features as, for
example,  the appearance  of substantial surpluses  in local budgets) without affecting the latter.
Source: Soderstrom  (as cited earlier)- 41  -
Box  I
Horizontal  Fiscal  Eaualization  in Germany  1/
Germany's  approach  to governmental  equalization  is distinguished  by its "brotherly", as distinct from "paternal" nature. BV  this
is meant  that the richer  states help out the poorer-the transfer  does not come from the center. Since 1955, the law in various  forms
has incorporated  a state financial  settlement  designed  to offset differences  in taxable capacities,  but with some  allowance  for 'special
burdens"  facing particular states.
The actual settlement  is worked out as follows: first, the tax capacity  yardstick  of each state is calculated  by the addition  of
revenue  from (i) state taxes, (ii) the state's share  of the joint taxes according  to local yields,  and (iii) half of the property and trade
taxes of the municipalities,  also according  to local  yields.  Deductions  are then made  for any special  burdens  (extraordinary
expenditures)  facing a particular  state.  In this way the adiusted  tax capacity of each  state is determined.
Comparisons  of the adjusted  tax capacity for each  state are then made  with the average  tax capacity per capita of all states.
When  the average  tax capacity is multiplied  by the population  of each  state the result is the so-called  equalization  vardstick of each
state.  In calculating  the equalization  yardstick consideration  has  been given  since 1955, by way of an allowance  for population
density, to the higher  tax needs  of the City States and to the size of municipalities. Thus, in so far as tax-strong states also tend to be
states with relatively  high population  densities  (large  cities)--and  this is in fact the general  pattern--the  intensity of the financial
settlement  has  been somewhat  reduced.
Finally,  the financial settlement  yardstick  is calculated  for each  state as the difference  between its adjustment  tax capacity  and
its equalization  yardstick.
The way the settlement works  can perhaps  be illustrated  as follows in three steps. The adjusted  taxable capacity  is given  by:
fi)  ATC, =  TC, - S,
where  TCi  is the taxable  capacity of state i and Si is the
special  burden  of the state.
The equalization  yardstick for a particular state (Ei)  is given  by:
TCx (ii)  Ei  =  . wPi.
PxI
where  TC, = taxable  capacity of State a
Pi  =  population
TCx  where  x refers to the whole federal  area
Px
and W = the weight given  to "need" associated  with population
density.
The financial  settlement  yardstick is given  by:
(iii)  Y  =  ITci  - Sil - Ei
= (TCi - Si  -TCx  -.  wPi
Px
Y is therefore  positive  for a state with above-average  taxable capacity,  as adjusted  for special  burdens  and population  density, thus
requiring  payment  imo the pool. Y is negative  for a state with below-average  taxable  capacity,  thus implying revenue  entitlement  from
the pool.
States whose adjusted  taxable  capacities  exceeded  the equalization  yardstick  (i.e. those whose  taxable capacity  is computed  at
above  the federal  average)  are in effect surplus states and, as such,  are obliged  to transfer funds to the so-called  deficit states whose
adjusted  taxable  capacities  are calculated  to be below the federal  average. No  federal  grants, as such, are involved,  instead,  tax
revenues  are simply  redistributed  as between  states through  appropriate  allocations  in the budgets  of the financially  strong states. The
Federal  Government's  role is as intermediary  or broker--to  see  that the rules  set out in the equalization  law are adhered  to and that the
appropriate  transfers  are made  each year  in accordance  with these rules.
1/  Taken  from J.S. Hunter, "Federalism  and Fiscal  Balance".  ANU Press  1977.* 42 -
121.  There  is therefore a case  for at least limited conditionality, for instance,  by requiring  that the
grant furds  should be spent on e.g. education or health 25 or requiring local governments receiving
such grants to provide services of at least a specified quality and level.  Compliance  with any such
conditions  that might be imposed  could be  monitored  through  requirements  for uniform and  timely local
financial repor.ng and through periodic national  inspections  and audits of local facilities.  Although in
the current situation in Hungary it  is probably politically inadvisable to make major change in the
present unconditionality of the grant, at the very least the national government should make every
reasonable  effort to improve local financial reporting--for example, making the provision of financial
reports  a condition for receiving  grants--as  well as attempting to improve the information base  on the
provision of local public services.
122.  Size of the Grant.  The determination  of the total size of the normative grant also requires
further consideration. At present, this determination  is entirely up to the national government, which
annually proposes  a transfer in the context of national budget formulation.  As outlined in Section I,
many countries use a non-discretionary  mechanism  which fixes the size of the grant in a transparent
way.  This will have substantial  advantages  from the point of view of both central and local budgeting.
Since the  amount of the  local transfer is determined, the  central government is to  some extent
insulated from pressure to  increase its support of  local governments.  On the other hand, local
governments  can budget with much greater  certainty when they know that the total level of central
support will vary with, e.g., income  tax collections (distributed  in accordance  with a known formula)
than when they are totally at the mercy of discretionary  central policy.
123.  Re-Design of  the  Grant  to  Simplify  and  Incorporate Tax  Canacitv.  However  the
unconditionality of the grant and the determination  of its total are settled, the present distribution
formula of the normativ', grant should definitely be altered.  As noted above, at present there are
(basically)  two  elements in this formula: equalization (per capita) and needs. 26 A third  essential
element in  any general grant formuia is to  make some explicit allowance for the revenue-raising
capacity of local governments.
124.  To incorporate these three elements,  the basic formula of Hungary's normative  grant should
be altered to include revenue raising  capacity.  Some version of the following general  formula would
achieve  this:
Gi = eEi  - tR, ;  where:
G is the amount of the grant,
i refers to a particular municipality,
E is some measure  of expenditure  "need" (for example,  the present
normative grant formula, or need  defined in relation to population,
260f course, such legal requirements  are inevitably to some extent only pro forma.  The fungibility
of money  and  the ability of local  governments  to alter other expenditures  and  taxes mean  that requiring
a grant to be spent on a particular  activity does not necessarily  imply that tota  (centrally-funded  plus
locally-funded)  expenditure  on the activity has gone up proportionally.  Indeed,  in most cases it will
not.
26The "equalization" element in the PIT transfer, for simplicity, is not discussed  separately here
since in effect this component of the  PIT transfer can be considered as part of  the equalization
component  of the normative  grant.- 43 -
or any other indicator(s)  that seems  appropriate  and can be
satisfactorily measured).
e is an assumed  level of expenditure  for each unit of measured  need,
R is a measure  of revenue  capacity, and
t is the assumed  rate at which this capacity is tapped (or taxed).
125.  The simplification of the normative grant would involve a change in the present "eE", now
allocated on the basis of 24 norms  as proxies  for needs. With respect to tax capacity, and assuming
that the total grant above (G) is equal to the present  normative grant and that the "needs" measure
(eE)  is that of the present  formula 27, the introduction of the tax capacity element (tR) in this formula
has three important effects.  First, it  will  shift  grant funds from whigh-tax  capacity"  to  "low-tax
capacity" recipients. Second,  it will stimulate all recipients, regardless  of their estimated  tax capacity,
to tax that capacity at the assumed  rate because  if they do not do so, the grant they receive will be
reduced  precisely by the amount they fall below the assumed  rate.  Finally, if any recipient chooses
to levy higher  taxes than those assumed  in the grant formula, it gets to keep all the extra revenues--
that is, it is not "taxed"  by having its grant reduced  (in other words, it faces a marginal  tax rate of
zero).
126.  Clearly, critical elements in this formulation are the nature of the simplification, and the
measurement  of tax capacity (tR).  Several  ways of simplifying the grant were identified, and some
of them have been explored empirically (the results are presented in Annex I).  The relationship
between th.  present grant distribution and demographic  indicators (presumed  to have close fit  with
the existing  norms)  was explored  using  regression  analysis. These  regressions  suggest  that the present
grant distribution can be closely matched  using a simplified grant distribution formula based  on only
three variables: total population, the age cohort 0-18, and the age cohort 60 and above (see  Annex
I, Table II).  Alternatively, the grant could be simplified in a way that does n  match the present
distribution, but whose distribution better meets Hungary's objectives.
127.  Calculations  of tax capacity  are  difficult in any circumstances,  and  perhaps  particularly  difficult
in the case  of Hungary  today. Among the tax indicators one  might examine--if  data became  available--
are, for example, collections from the new duties, present PIT property tax and the 'turnover"/new
business  tax.  Moreover,  while there appears  to be considerable  information in Hungary on the basic
economic characteristics  of the new local governments  (population, its demographic  characteristics)
there is less available on their economic or tax  bases.  The Annex to this report explores some
alternative estimates of revenue  capacity, based  on regression. These employ PIT transfers (a proxy
for income levels), population and the industrial employment as independent  explanatory variables.
The 1989 'old taxes" are the dependent  variable,  taken as a proxy of taxes under  the new tax regime.
(See  Box  J: Estimates  of Tax Capacity). These  estimates  of tax capacity  suggest, broadly,  that smaller
localities  exploit (what little) capacity they have, while larger municipalities' taxes are less than their
capacity as estimated on the basis of these indicators (see  Annex I tables).  Further analysis, based
on more recent data would be necessary  to draw firm conclusions,  however.
27Both assumptions  can be changed  in any desired way without affecting the general argument.- 44 -
. I
Estimates  of Tax Capacity
The  estimates  of tax capacity  required  for implementing  a grant  formula  such  as that suggested  in the text are
estimates  of the ability  of localities  to raise  revenue  and not estimates  of the ability  of local  residents  to pay taxes. Both
the 'richness'  of the locality  relative  to others  and  its taxing  power  are  critical  to such  calculations. In the case  of
Hungary,  as shown  earlier,  the principal  tax instruments  available  to local  governments  are  limited (with the possible
exception,  developed  below,  of the personal  income  tax). An appropriate  measure  of local  capacity  might  include  direct  or
indirect  measures  of such tax bases  as property  values,  tourist  activity, business  turnover,  and  personal  income.
Two alternative  ways  of utilizing  such  information  are  the so-called  'representative tax system (RTS)  approach
and  the regression  approach. Both  use the same  information  but combine  it in a different  way to estimate  the revenues
that a given  locality  might  be expected  to collect, given  its tax bases,  if it levied  taxes at average  rates. Table  1 illustrates
the RTS  approach.
Each  locality  in Table  1 can be assumed  to tap each  of the three  tax bases-personal  income,  value  of retail  sales,
and  value  of property-for  revenue.  The  average  tax rate  for each  base  is derived  by calculating  the total revenues  from
that base  and  dividing  by the total value  of the base. Thus  the national  average  tax rate  to be applied  to personal  income  is
$18,000 +  $360,000 = 0.05 =  5 percent;  for retail  sales  the rate  is $7,500 +  $150,000 =  0.05 =  5 percent;  and  for
property is $17,500 -+- $350,000  =  0.05 =  5 percent.
Table 1  Tax  Base  and Tax Rate Data for  Three Hypothetical Localities
A  B  C
Tax  Tax  Tax  Tax
Tax  rate  Tax  Tax  rate  Tax  Tax  rate  revenue
Item  base  (z)  revenue  base  (x)  revenue  base  (x)  (USS)
Personal Income  60,000  0.100  6,000  120,000  0.050  6,000  180,000  0.033  6,000
Value  of retail  sales  50,000  ...  0  50,000 0.070  3,500  50,000  0.080  4,000
Value of property  200,000  0.040  8,000  100,000 0.055  5 500  50,000  0.080  4,000
Total  revenue  ...  ..  14,000  ...  ...  15,000  ...  ...  14,000
Per capita  revenue  f  ./  ..  . 4,667  ...  ...  5,000  ...  ...  4,667
Source:  Aaronson  and Hilley:  Brookings Institution.  fI  Assumes  3 residents per locality.
When  the average  rate  (5%) is  applied to  the value of  each base, the following  yields  can be expected:
Revenue  (dol lars)
Tax Base  A  B  C
Income  3,000  6,000  9,000
Sales  2,500  2,500  2,500
Property  10,000  5,000  2,500
Total  15,500  13,500  14,000- 45  -
(Continuedi  Box J
Estimates  of Tax CaDacity
Alternatively,  the  rearesslon aoproach would  essentially do the same thing, but  instead of determining  the  average degree of
exploitation  of the tex base by means of  the weighted  average of the actual taxes imposed, it could  be determined  by regression
coefficients  relating tax  collections  to indicators of the tax  capacity  (whici  would  include measures of the  tax  base.  A regression of the
following  sort would  be developed:
TC  - o'+  b1 (PCy) +  b2 U,  +  D3 POP +  84  1 +  S5 R
where,  TC  Tax collection
PCY  -Per  capita income
POP  - Population
U  - Urbanization
I  - Industrial output
R  - Retail sales, etc.
Coefficients  on these variables would  then be used to simulate/predict  the  expected tax  collection  in each locality  based on its income,
population  and retail sales, etc.  levels.  The estimated coefficients  on these variables could  then be used to simulate the  expected tax
collection in each locality  based on  its income, popula:ion  and retail sales, etc.  levels.
Problems in Capacity Estimation.  In practice,  a number of important  questions must be decided  before either  of these measures
can be calculated.  One such question concerns the scope of  the revenues to be taken into  account  in calculating  the  'potential'  revenue
base: taxes? natural resource revenues?  fees  and charges?  borrowing?  In principle,  it is clear that the  base used for  measuring capacity
should be as broad as possible, given the  substitutability  and interdependence of different  wsys  of  raising revenue.  The scope of the
base to be used in measuring fiscal capacity  Is Important  because excluding some items from  the base may render the comparison of
relative  capacity in different  jurisdictions  suspect.  The RTS approach is deficient in failinn  to recognize the  interrelated  nature of various
tax  bases.  In effect,  it  assume- that  different  tax bases affect  capacity in proportior. to their revenue productivity.  The possibility that
the capacity  to tax a given base will  be affected  by the  size of another  base is ignored.  In reality,  there are clearly trade-offs  between
different  ways of raising revenues.  In particular,  since measured tax  bases are not independent  of tax rates,  capacity  measures based on
a subset of possible revenues are not independent  of what  is excluded.
The size of the tax  base is also not  independent  of the choice  of tax rate.  For example, differential  property  tax rates may be
capitalized into property  values.  Under the RTS approach, the revenue that each jurisdiction  would  derive if  it  applied the national
average rate is estimated.  If a jurisdiction  actually  did apply those rates,  however, the  measured base would  be different  than it is.  Thus,
the RTS approach introduces  a systematic  bias Into the  measure of capacity:  it understates  the tax  capacity  for jurisdictions  with  above-
average rates and overstates  it for below-average rate jurisdictions.
Another  Important question that  arises with  respect to defining  an RTS base is how to weight  the bases Included.  The approach
used in Table  1 essentially calculates  arithmetically  the  average effective  tax rate for each base in localities actually  imposing the tax.
The alternative  approach is to determine the approptiate  tax  rate by regressing revenuea on some measures of potential  tax bases.  This
approach has two  advantages:  The first  advantage is that,  unlike the  'arithmetic'  averaging of  the RTb approach,  which  treats each tax
base independently,  regression permits  interdependence effects  to  be taken into account.  The second advantage  is that what  the RTS
approach in effect  does is to derive average measures and then use them to  derive marainal conclusions  about the  added revenues that
would  result from changes.  The results  of this exercise are of course strictly  meaningful only when  the base in the jurisdiction  under
consideration is itself average, which  is unlikely to be true in most jurisdictions.  Again,  the regression approach, which  directly  estimates
the  relationship between  bases and revenues at the margin,  is clearly  conceptually superior in this respect because it takes into  account
the  variation in total  revenues as bases vary, rather than treating  each hese independently,  as does the  RTS approach.
Finally, it  is important to  note that whatever  method is used,  it is simply not  possible to separate  fiscal capacity and differing
demands for public  services meaningfully  in these exercises.  The measures derived are alwa/,s  hybrids of,  on the  one hand, differences  in
the  level of desired services and, on the other,  of differences  in actual service levels relative to  desired levels.  Su' *  -neasures era thus
strictly  meaningful  as  capacity  measures only if differences  in the level of desired service are assumed to  be non-existent.  This
assumption  may perhaps not  be too  bad in practice  if  it can be assumed without  undue dis:ortion  that desired expenditure and revenue
-atterns  are similar.- 46 -
Three  Alternatives for ReforMing  Local Government  Finance
128.  Reform of Hungary's local finances should have two basic components:  strengthening local
own-source revenues and revising the normative grant to  simplify it  and incorporate a capacity
measure. Three variations of this "basic grant reform" are outlined below. Additional variations (and
computer simulation of results) would help letermine  whether the resulting distribution of the grant
is appropriate in light of Hungary's needs and the aims of the new local finance system.  (Some
preliminary  illustrations and simulations  are presented  in Annex I.) These  can and should be improved
and extended  as data become  available.
129.  All of the alternatives  contain the "fundamental  reform packagu"  of improving local own taxes,
simplifying the  normative grant and introducing a tax  capacity measure into  the  grant.  What
differentiates the three alternatives  set out here is the treatment of the PIT transfer.  Alternative I is
basically  to reform local taxes and to modify the normative  transfer to incorporate somit measure  of
tax capacity as described  above, while leaving the PIT transfer as it is.  Alternative II is a package
consisting of the  same own-revenue reforms and normative transfer reforms plus a proposal to
distribute the PIT transfer by the same formula as the grant.  Variant IlIl consists of the same own-
revenue  and normative  transfer reforms plus a proposal  to make  the PIT  a truly 'local"  tax.  These, in
summary  form are:
Basic  Reform Alternative I:
50% PIT (as  at present) + Grant [based  on revised  and  simplified normative  transfer which
incorporates  revenue  capacity"] + strengthened  local  taxes and  charges + other (matching
and equalizing)  grants.
Alternative II:
[50% PIT + grant] (based  on simplified transfer formula which incorporates  revenue
capacity) + strengthened  local taxes and charges + other (matching)  grants.
Alternative IlIl
(surcharge  on central PIT) + [normative  grant + equalizing  PIT  transfer] (based  on  simplified
transfer formula which  incorporates revenue capacity) +  strengthened local taxes and
charges +  other (matching)  grants.
The next paragraphs  set out the broad outlines of these options in more detail.
130.  Altemative I.  Strength  'ning local taxes and leaving the PIT unchanged,  Alternative I would
reform the distribution of the r  )rmati"e transfer in a number  of ways.  First, it would incorporate  tax
capacity estimates,  thus providing  some 'implicit) stimulus  to fiscal effort.  Second,  the transfer norms
(the eE) could be simplified or made more transparent and tailored to  localities' diffe:ent  cost
structures.  At present, there is some ambiguity regarding  just how the weights in the grant were
calculated  and chosen--not  only the relative importance  of expenditure  and per capita-relatad  weights
in the grant formula but also the extent to which the costs of specified services is covered.  One
possibility might be  to cover the local cost of provid&ig  each  designated  service as closely as possible.
Since no data was available  on these cost structures, no estimates were made of this approach  to
grant redesign. Alternatively, since the grant is unconditional,  it might be desirable  only  to simplify the
grant.  As  discussed earlier and illustrated in  the  Annex,  simulations of  the  impact  of  grant- 47 -
simplification on localities were explored. They hypothesis was that a similar equalization  outcome
couid be obtained  by a far simpler formula--one  that relies  on age  cohorts, for example.
131.  Simulations  are also  reported in the Annex that use  the tax capacity measure  based  on local PIT
collection, population and Industrial employment and a simplified grant formula based on  total
population and specific age cohorts described  earlier.  These first-round and very crude estimates
suggest  that Alternative I would favor that the smaller  and medium-sized  municipalities  (up to I 0,000
inhabitants). These would gain from Alternative I because  first, the simplified grant emphasizes  per
capita indicators, and second, because  their smaller tax capacity results in a higher central grant.
Grants to municipalities with  more than 10,000 inhabitants would fall because  their estimated tax
capacity is relatively greater.  The broad outcome of this alternative, is that simplification and tax
capacity introduce a slightly greater degree of eaualization  compared  to the present grant formula.
Whether  this is desirable  is not evaluated here.
132.  Alternative I.  Another approach  would be, following the nrecedent  set in 1991, simply to add
the remaining  50% of the PIT to the total normative  transfer and  then to distribute the combined  total
[i.e., all PIT +  grant] by the simplified needs/tax capacity formula set out above. 28 Conceptually,
the total size of the transfer in this formula (together with whatever conditional matching grants are
desired) in effect determines  the extent to which the "fiscal gap" is closed, while the terms of the
formula in effect determine  how horizontally  eaualizing  the transfer is with respect to both needs and
capacities. As with the distribution of the grant under Alternative I, many refinements  and variations
of this scheme  are possible. The simulations  in the Annex  explore  one such  variation, in which the PIT
and the current grant are allocated by the same (simplified)  formula incorporating tax capacity as
above.  The results suggest tentatively that this approach provides greater equalization than the
present system and than Variant I:  the grant distribution moves in favor of cities below  10,000
(benefitting those in the 5,000 range most), while those big cities with populations  above 100,000
lose compared  to the present  allocation. It is more equalizing  than a grant which is distributed on the
basis of norms, and a PIT distributed on the basis of origin.  This may or may not be desirable  or
appropriate. Further elaborations  in which other norms are used, for example,  may prove desirable,
as may computer simulations of the effects of such variations.
133.  Alternative 111.  Another refinement of the basic reform is to allow local governments  in effect
to impose  their own  income taxes, in the form of a surcharge  on the national personal  income  tax. 29
This option deserves  some attention because  it has two advantages  that seem important in Hungary
today: (i) this refinement may lower the level of income taxes in Hungary without exacerbating  the
budget deficit; and (ii) it could induce more efficient local expenditure  than would otherwise be the
case.
134.  Such advantages  do not come costlessly: One argument  against this approUch  is that it might
render  the already  difficult task of aoministering  the national  tax system even more difficult.  (See  Box
L for a discussion  of administrative aspects.) It would also require  an :merdment  of the Loeal Self-
Government  Act, which might not be politically popular. Nonetheless,  the prospect of achieving  bo.h
28Alternatively,  the PIT (or some percentage  of it such as the present  50%) could be aliocated by
a different formula--which could in principle be designed  irn  as many different ways as the ingenuity
of formula designers  would permit but there seems  no reason  to introduce further complication.
29Surct.arges  on other taxes such as the VAT or CIT are also possible: the PIT is preferred (a)
because  a tax imposed  on local residents  is more suitable for local finance  than either a CIT or a VAT,
(b) because  localities  already share PIT in Hungary,  and (c) because  it provides  localities with a more
stable tax base (wage income)  than the corporate  income  tax would do. and is administratively much
simpler  than a surcharge  or either CIT or VAT.- 48 -
a more efficient (and democratic)  system of local revenues  and  exDenditures  and a more efficient and
Igowr  level  of total expenditures  and  taxes is sufficiently attractive to suggest  that this alternative  may
deserve consideration.
135.  Again assuming  a reformed grant and strengthened  local taxes, the essence  of this approach
is to remedy the inadequacy  of the local tax base by supplementing  it, as at present, with  the local
share of PIT, W  to provide this share  in a (different) form which specifically encourages  local fiscal
responsibility  and  effort.  The central government  would create some  "tax  room" by reducing  personal
income  tax rates.  Local governments  could then take up this room if their expenditure  requirements
warranted It, jny  if local voters valued  the expenditures  which were to be financed sufficiently to be
willing to pay the taxes.
136.  Ignoring, for purposes  of explanation,  the two-year lag in the distribution of local tax revenues
(and  the equalizing  PIT  transfers)  the following illustration  of Alternative Ill shows how one could  mimic
the present PIT  transfer level perfectly.  First, the central government  would lower PIT  rates by half. 30
(Note  that the other 50%, the remaining  PIT,  could  still in effect presumably  flow to local  governments
via the normative  grant, as now.)  Local  government  could then levy a flat-rate surchage of 100% on
national taxes, thus in effect collecting their 50% PIT share  through the surcharge,  rather than as a
transfer.  The surcharge  would be collected by the national  government  and remitted to the localities.
The overall national/local  tax burden  would be unchanged.
137.  In this simple  case  which "mimics" the present  system, exactly the same normative  grant plus
PIT  transfer is paid  by the national  government  to local governments  in aaareaate  and  exactly  the same
PIT transfer plus normative grant is retived  by each separate local government.  Conceptually, in
terms of the formula set out earlier, WeE 1" would consist of the present normative grant received by
each locality slus the PIT  revenues  that would accrue to that locality Lf  it applied  a surcharge  equal to
100% (again  ignoring the two-year lag) of the national  PIT (so  that the total PIT paid by its residents
would be exactly the same as under the present system).  The present PIT transfer would then be
exactly equal to the 'tR'  capacity component of this equation.  In these circumstances, everyone
would end up in exactly the same  position as under the present system (see Box K).
138.  In reality, however, while the results  may look the same, the effects would be different.  First,
the local share  of the PIT would now really be a local tax.  Localities  would have to choose  the rates
they impose. If, as seems  likely, many of them would initially choose  to levy lower taxes, the result
would be both lower taxes in total and  lower expenditures,  since  the total amount (Grant  plus PIT  and
other revenues)  at their disposal  would of course be lower by the amount they do not collect.  There
is t'hus a strong incentive for localities to levy taxes at least as high as the taxes foregone by the
national government. On the other hand, since they now have to justify these taxes directly to their
voters there should be more incentive  to spend this money efficiently.
139.  Should  a particular  locality decide  to increase  taxes above the present local PIT "share", it will
of course be able to increase  its spending  accordingly  since there will be no reduction in the central
normative grant as a result of its additional tax effort.  Again, however, there will be great incentive
to ensure  that such additional funds are spent to the satisfaction of the voters.  These  incentives are
not present in the present  system.  Such a check on local spending  seems  especially  desiraole  in a
3OThe  "headi  aomn  created by a reduction in the national income tax rate could be less (or more)
than 50%.  This number  was chosen because  (ignoring  the two-year lag) it mimics the present 50%
PIT transfer.-49  -
Hvoothetical  Example:  Alternative  IlIl
The  example  below  shows  how  PIT  surcharge  (Alternative  l1l)  would  work. In the  present  system,  local  revenues
are  (broadly)  the  sum  of the normative  grant  and  the  PIT  transfer  (columns  1 and  2). The  center  retains  only  half  of its
PIT  collections  (column  5). In  the proposed  system,  local  revenues  (ignoring  other  local  taxes  and  other  grants)  are  the
sum  of the  normative  grant  plus  PIT  surcharge:  it is up  to the  locality,  not  the national  government,  to determine  the
total revenues.  Central  PIT  is unchanged  inasmuch  as  it reduces  its tax rate  to make  headroom.  Any increase  in local
PIT  will increase  local  revenues.
I.  Present  System
1  2  3  4  5
Memo Items:
Normative  Transfer  Total  National  Net PIT
Grant  of PIT  Rev.*  PIT  to Nation
(Col.  1 +2)  (Col.  4 -2)
Locality  A  100  50  150  100  50
Locality  B  120  30  IS0  60  30
300  160  80
II.  Proposed  System
Memo Items:
Normative  Local  Total  National  Net PIT
Grant  PIT  k/  Rev.  PIT a/  to center
surcharge  (Col.  1+2)  (Col.  4)
Locality  A  100  50  150  50  50
Locality B  120  30  150  30  30
300  80  80
*Assumes local  own taxes are zero, for simplicity
l  /  At 50% headroom
b/  Assumes  a 100% surcharge  on the national  PIT.
situation  like  that in Hungary  today in which central  transfers  are  likely,  for political reasons,  to remain
basically  unconditional.
140.  Alternative IlIl thus gives localities  access  to  a broad tax  base which can finance more
adequately  the extensive  range of services  they are supposed  to provide. Although localities'  fiscal
effort is stimulated  in a generally  desirable  fashion, it may result in a lower level of taxes in highly-
taxed Hungary. It s hould increase  the efficiency  of local  expenditures  whether  taxes go up, down, or
stay the same. There are no minor  virtues. However,  it represents  a major  change and will require
close  consideration  by the authorities  at all levels. It should also be  seen as a variant of the -kg  iI
reforms,  which is to strenoth local  taxes and  to simplify the grant.- 50  -
Administrative  Aspects of a Local Income  Tax Surcharoe
A number of administrative issues  may be raised  with respect to this proposal. However,  the
administrative  problem is much less than is sometimes  argued. The proposal  is neither that there be 3070
separately-administered  local income  taxes nor that there be any significant change in the present system
of national  income tax administration. In reality, the added  administrative  burden imposed by this system
is surprisingly  small and may well be judged worthwhile in view of its advantages.
Each  year each  local government  would establish  the income  tax surcharge  to be applied  for the
subsequent  year. Similarly, each year employees  would inform their employers  of their locality of
residence  as of a certain date such as December  31, just as they inform them of their family status.  The
wage withholding tables supplied  to employers  would obviously  be bulkier, but the administrative  task of
the withholding agent would be exactly the same:  assign  each employee  a code (family status, locality of
residence,  pay period)  and look up in the coiresponding  table the tax to be withheld under  that code from
the gross  wage paid. The amounts  thus withheld would then be remitted to the central government  in the
usual way.
Perhaps  the simplest way for the central government  to make payments  to localities  would be to
make 12 equal monthly payments  based  on the previous  year's PIT allocation  (or that of two years  ago if
the administration  of APEH  continues  to be as slow as it has been  to date), with an end-year  adjustment--
made by adjusting the payments  in the next year--once  all the numbers  are added up from different
withholding agents at the end of the year. Of course the annual  report from such agents would have to
aggregate  the taxes withheld with respect to each locality.
Apart from the need  to prepare  and consult more complex withholding tables, the only additional
tasks imposed  by this system would appear  to be (1) that employers  have to report taxes withheld by
locality once a year and (2) that the tax administration  has to add up for each locality the withheld taxes
reported  by different employers.
The system proposed  above should  work satisfactorily with respect to taxpayers  whose PIT
obligations  are entirely satisfied by final withholding by employers. For employees  who file returns,
however, for example,  because  they have more than one employer and are claiming refunds, or for
professionals  and others whose incomes  are not subject to withholding, the system would work a little
differently.  When the tax office receives  a return (for any reason),  it will enter the residence  locality code
--set  as specified  above for withholders--and  adjust the local as well as the national tax liability as
necessary. This small additional  tUsk should not give rise to any administrative problems,  provided the
computerization  of the income  tax is sufficiently advanced.  It should be emphasized,  however, that this
provision means it would not be practical  to launch  this scheme  for at least a year or two, i.e., in 1993.
Local income  tax liabilities computed  on the basis  of taxpayer returns would then have to be
aggregated  (which may in some instances  mean subtracted  from) with those computed on the basis of
employer withholding returns.  The total local income  tax assessed  (that is, the combination of the
adjusted  amounts  withheld and any new assessments)  for each locality would then be reported  to the
budget office and serve as the basis  for allocating  revenues  in the subsequent  year (or two years' time),
as set out above.  Note that subsequent  adjustments in assessments,  owing to appeals  and enforcement
actions for example,  could not be taken into account in this system.
In sum, the only way to make a system of local income  taxes workable in Hungarian  conditions is
(i) to leave all tax administration  up to APEH; (ii) to use the locally-determined  rates in combination  with
taxpayer  declarations  of residence  as the basis  for the initial calculation  of local income  tax revenues  by
APEH  on the basis  of employer return and direct taxpayer returns; and (iii) to leave all the business  of
paying  out the funds to localities, and adjusting these payments--which  would have to be made  initially on
an estimated  basis--to  accord with the final APEH  report up to the budget authorities.  Under  no
circumstances  should  the national tax office itself actually have to deal with the 3070 local authorities
other than to be informed, once a year, of the income  tax rate they propose  to apply in the subsequent
years.- 51 -
141.  Transition Issues. The amount of "tax  room' to be provided  to localities  and the phasing in
of the surcharge are important transition issues.  If one has concerns, for example, about whether
localities  will in fact implement  a surcharge,  it might be appropriate  for the center to impose  a notional
surcharge on behalf of the localities for the first one or two years, giving local communities time to
decide at what rate they want to set it.  Annex I explores  in an indicative fashion, the contribution to
total revenues  of a 100% PIT surcharge. 31  This ranges  from less than 10% of total revenues  in small
localities (who might not see a point in levying a surcharge)  to more than 20% for larger ones, who
would therefore probably have incentive to levy it.  In any case, for both administrative and legal
reasons  it would not be practical to introduce  such a local income  tax before, say, 1993.
142.  An additional  transition issue  relates  to the equalization  implications  of this option. It has  been
suggested  that there is something  inherently "bad" in equity terms about allowing local governments
direct access  to the income  tax.  Some  local governments,  for example,  reportedly  have no income  tax
base at present or have so little they may not gain much from the PIT surcharge. Some therefore
conclude that it is somehow unfair or inequitable  to let those local
governments  that have such a base  exploit it.  The logic of this conclusion is not apparent. The basic
unequal  distribution of local tax resources  is precisely  what the capacity element (tR)  in the proposed
grant formula is designed  to deal  with.  In  these poor localities,  revenue  capacity may be  close to zero:
accordingly,  the normative  grant they receive will be increased. Indeed,  the present  system with  50
percent of the national PIT flowing---without any effort on their part--to the richest localities is more
inequitable,  as recognized  to a limited extent by the PIT equalization  system. In the proposed  system,
such equalization  could be much more fully and fairly achieved  through the revised  grant formula.
143.  Some  preliminary  simulations  of the implications  of this further refinement  of the basic reform
(and assuming all localities impose  a 100 percent surcharge)  are presented in the Annex.  It is also
assumed  that the "equalization" PIT  grant is distributed  on the same  (simplified)  basis  as the normative
grant.  Not surprisingly,  the results are not very different from Alternative I, since the assumption  of
a 100 percent surcharge  essentially mimics this.  Allocating the equalization  transfers through the
revised grant formula (Alternative l1l)  is (very slightly) less equalizing  than allocating it directly to poor
localities (as in Alternative I).  However,  the difference is negligible  and could be offset by additional
variants of the grant formula. The assumption  of a zero surcharge--no  locality imposes  any surcharge
at all--is essentially captured by Alternative II, in  which the  PIT transfer disappears.  Also, not
surprisingly,  this variant is mo  equalizing  than the present  system, benefiting villages  and small  cities
(below 10,000) because  of the added  emphasis  on per capita indicator and revenue  capacity.
144.  An attraction of this proposal  for the national  authorities may be that the explicit dependence
of localities  on the PIT  strengthens  the already  strong case  for taking strong action at the national  level
to  prevent the erosion (and evasion) of this tax  base through such devices as paying nontaxable
allowances. The national government  has to do this in its own interests: this proposal  would give it
some 3070 vocal allies in the political struggle to do so.
145.  Combined  with  the basic reforms to local taxes and the transfer system suggested earlier,
allowing local governments  to impose  income tax surcharges  thus has four advantages. First, local
governments--at least the richer ones--have access to a  broad tax  base so that  they can more
adequately  finance out of local  resources  the extensive  range  of services  they are  supposed  to provide.
Second,  although  the revised  grant formula would encourage  local fiscal effort, the result would likely
be a lower level of income  taxes in highly-taxed  Hungary. Third, whether taxes go up, down, or stay
the same, the accountability of local governments,  and the efficiency of their expenditures,  should
31Again ignoring the two-year lag.- 52 -
increase.  Finally, adjusting the  parameters of the  grant formula permits any  desired degree of
equalization  and any desired  level of total central-local  transfers  to be accommodated. While some of
these advantages  may be secured  at least  in part without allowing local governments  direct access  to
the income  tax, the objective of lowering overall  income taxes can onlv be achieved  by these means.
146.  The proposal  as described  above and ignoring the two-year lag is budaet-neutral. In practice,
however, the two-year lag in the distribution  of PIT  revenue  to localities  means  the loss  of state budget
revenue  from a 50% tax cut would exceed  the gain from eliminating the PIT transfer.  To make the
proposal  budget neutral with a 50% tax cut, the local surcharge  would be 64% (equals  the 1991 PIT
transfer (Ft 46.9 billion) plus  the equalizing  grant (Ft 7.0 billion) in relation to 50 percent of total PIT
revenue  in 1991 (Ft 169.5 billion)].
147.  The transfer of equivalent tax capacity to the local level, while budget-neutral  for localities
also, will significantly alter their taxing and expenditure  incentives. The result should be both a more
efficient (responsible,  democratic)  system of local  expenditures  and revenues  and  a more efficient (and
lower) level of total expenditures  and revenues.
148.  Some Qualifications.  The principal  argument agair,st  local income  taxation is administrative.
Arguments that  local  income taxes reduce national fiscal  flexibility  or  induce inefficient  fiscal
competition or inefficient resource  allocation  are at best incomplete  and in general  misleading. Since
the functions local governments  carry  out are  essential,  as  they are  for the most part in Hungary,  these
expenditures  have  to be  financed  somehow, and  the local income  tax approach  seems  more likely than
most alternatives to free the national government from the responsibility of financing scnle such
services  while still leaving  it a free hand  to alter its own tax system as it sees  fit.  Moreover, assuming
the "benefit" model of local government is followed, such taxes simply constitute the price of local
public services  and have no adverse effects on resource  allocation or on fiscal competition.  On the
contrary, their allocative  effects are desirable,  as is the competition  they induce  in lower-cost provision
of desired  public services.
149.  Further  examination  of this idea  in the specific context of the Hungarian  tax administration  will
doubtless reveal both other problems  and perhaps  suggest other ways to get around them.  If this
alternative is to be developed,  such examination  is obviously required, as is further reference  to the
extensive experience  with local income  taxes in other countries.
VI.  Reformina  Investment Grants in Hunaarv
150.  Local governments  in Hungary receive three types of grants (described  in Part  A):  specific
(targeted)  grants  for investment,  "addressed  grants  and  gap-filling (deficit) grants. The most important
of these grants and the  only ones which constitute a permanent feature of the  system are the
matching targeted grants.  Matching grants (see Box M)  have important economic and fiscal
advantages  in terms of both allocative efficiency (spillovers)  and the efficient use of scarce  central
government  resources  to attain desired  levels of ce.tain services. In addition,  while of course rendering
local governments more susceptible to  central influence and control, matching grants have the
important  political  advantage of  introducing an  element  of  local  involvement,  commitment,
accountability, and  responsibility  for the aided  activities. Moreover,  properly-designed  matching  grants
may contribute to  equalization  (horizontal fiscal balance)  and, like all other transfers, they help to
resolve  any basic fiscal mismatch (vertical  fiscal balance)  problem. Unfortunately, neither  theory nor
the available  empirical studies provide clear guidelines  to assist in determining  the precise matching
rate appropriate for particular expenditure  programs, let alone how those rates should be varied in
accordance  with the characteristics  of different local governments.- 53 -
Box M
Matchino  Grants
In what is called a matching  (conditional)  grant, the central government  pays only part of the cost of certain
expenditures  carried  out by local  governments. Several  rationales  for such transfers  may be distinguished,  each  with
different implications  for program  design.  The  rationale  with the strongest  basis  in the economic  literature  is that the
benefits  from the local activity in question  may spill over  to other jurisdictions,  that is, provide  benefits  to localities
other than those  which decide  whether to undertake  the activity.  Since  such external  benefits  will not be taken  into
account  by any particular  local  government  in deciding  how to spend  the funds at its disposal,  in general  too little such
externality-intensive  activity will be undertaken  unless  the local government  receives  a unit subsidy  just equal  to the
value  at the margin  of the spillover  benefits. The  correct matching  rate (m), or the proportion  of the total cost paid by
the central government,  should  thus be related  to the size  of the spillovers. This rate may perhaps  decline  as  the level
of expenditure  rises,  if the externalities  diminish. Conceivably,  it may also  vary across  localities  ;t there are reasons  to
expect  greater  externalities  in some  places  (upstream  as opposed  to downstream  localities)  than in others.
No country anywhere  has achieved  full equalization  of local fiscal  capacities. A uniform  matchirg level
offering, in effect, the same  'price'  to different local governments  will therefore  in reality discriminate  against  poor
regions. Indeed,  even  if revenue  bases  were fully equalized,  there might still be grounds  in terms of need  or cost
differentials  for including  some  additional  equalization  in matching  grant formulas. For example,  per capita  grants  for
roads  in sparsely  populated  and mountainous  regions  should  generally  be larger  because  the per capita  cost of achieving
any particular  standard  of road  service  will obviously  be higher.
A quite different rationale  for matching  grants  may arise  from the existence  of a severe  central  government
budget  constraint. If the central government  wishes  to use its scarce  budgetary  resources  to attain given standards  of
expenditure  on certain services  provided  by local  governments,  it should  pay only as much  of the cost as is needed  to
induce  each  local  government  to provide  that level  of service. With a grant of 'm'  percent  of cost, (am' may be
anything  up to 100% of cost) the effective price  to the locality is 'I-m'.  To ensure  maximum  total (local  plus central)
expenditure  on the service  in question,  given  the size  of the central government  contribution,  the optimal  way to
allocate  a given  total transfer  among  localities  will then be inversely  to the price  elasticity of local demand  for the
service  (assuming  no cross-price  elasticity effects).
For these  reasons,  matching  grants should  as a rule be inversely  correlated  to the income  level of the recipient
government. The purpose  of such transfers  is essentially  to ensure  that all local governments,  regardless  of their fiscal
capacity,  can provide  a similar level  of certain specified  public  services  to their residents.  Note that this approach  differs
from the general  equalization  argument  discussed  earlier  for three  distinct reasons:
(1) specific  services  are  designated  - perhaps  because  they are thought to entail spillovers,  perhaps  because
they are considered  especially  meritorious;
(2) the specific  level of service  to be provided  is also  established;
(3) the payment  of the grant is conditioned  on that level of the specified  services  in fact being  provided.
The  idea is simply  to set the price of the service,  (1  -m), to each  local  government  in such a way as to
neutralize  differences  in capacity by varying  the matching  rate, (m). Ideally,  of course, information  on both price  and
income  elasticities  is needed  to achieve  this goal. The higher  the income  elasticity, the higher  the matching  rate  needed
for low-income  recipients  (to offset the higher  local  expenditures  on the aided  service  in higher-income  areas),  and the
higher  the price elasticity,  the lower the matching  rate  needed  to achieve  a given level of total expenditures. In
practice,  there is thus a case for varying  the matching  rate  inversely  with income  levels  even  when only the incentive
effects (and  not the distributional  effects) of matching  grants  are considered.- 54 -
151.  The central government  may want to restructure the system of orants to identify more closely
both the degree of spillover and the central-local relative priorities (see  Box M).  Moreover, as noted
in Section VII below, the government may want to extend finance on a loan rather than grant basis
to encourage  cost recovery. With respect to the addressed  grants and distressed  area grants, it is the
mission's understanding  that these are  transitional devices. The addressed  grants--if not transitional--
should be combined  with the targeted grants program, and subjected to the same  matching principles
described  above.  The revised  normative grant system proposed earlier should adequately  replace the
distressed area grants.  Finally, the  split  between grants for  investment and grants for  current
expenditure  (and the implicit division of responsibilities  between MOF  and MOI)  requires coordination
between normative grants and investment grants.
VIl.  Borrowina. Capital Financino,  and Other Issues
152.  With the reform of the revenue system and abolition of the earlier system of credit planning
and central guarantees  of local investment  finance, Hungary's municipalities have entered a very new
world. Their low levels of investment financing, reflecting in part a large backlog of unmet needs, the
limited revenue  base  that can be pledged  for repayment--only  6% of total revenues  is from local taxes--
anid  the unrestricted borrowing authority gives cause for concern. The combination of unconstrained
borrowing and open scope for entrepreneurial  activity  on the part of localities may be a particularly
regrettable mix. Localities' access  to credit should  be constrained  in some way.  In  the well-developed
financial systems of higher income  countries,  such constraint could be expected  to come from financial
markets, which would  make underwriting a local government debt difficult,  unless the  localities'
financial strength was certain.
153.  Appropriate modalities for capital financing and borrowing could include  a number of options.
In most countries, localities do borrow, albeit ;. restricted ways.  These include (i) bond finance (quite
unusual in developing  countries because  of the thinness  of capital markets and absence of long term
finance); Oii)  borrowing from the commercial  banking system; (iii) from a central government loan fund;
or (iv) borrowings from a 'municipal  development  bank' capitalized  by the center.  Unfortunately, the
experience with  such banks has been quite negative, with  poor repayment records leading to weak
institutions and incentives for  localities not to  repay. 32 In most  countries, whatever the  option
chosen (see Box N), the central government or its agency sets parameters  for local access to credit,
not least because,  from a macro-economic  point of view, it is generally  not desirable  to increase  overall
public sector borrowing. Which of these options  and what type of controls are  appropriate  for Hungary
would need  further study.
154.  While user charges  are most likely to be viewed by hard-pressed  local officials as a potential
additional source of revenue, their main economic value is thus to promote economic efficiency by
providing demand information to public sector suppliers and by ensuring that what  the local public
sector supplies  is valued  at least at (marginal)  cost by citizens. This efficiency objective is particularly
important at the local government level since  the main economic rationale for local government in the
first  place is allocative efficiency.  There is thus a presumption that, whenever possible, local public
services  should be charged for rather than given away (unless, of course, they are pure public goods
or the explicit intention is redistributive). Indeed,  one rationale  for utilizing the residential property tax
as a source of local finance is precisely  because  it is believed  that, however roughly, property values
bear some relation to services  provided  by local governments. Unfortunately, in most countries much
less use is made of charging at the local  level than seems  desirable,  and many of the charges  that are
levied are poorly-designed  from an efficiency point of view.
32See  Ken Davey, 'Municipal  Development  Funds  and Intermediaries",  PPR  WP No. 32, for a review
of experience  and approaches.- 55 -
Box  N
Local Borrowing
The major task of a local government  is to provide local public services  to its residents. The
benefit model  of local finance (see  Box B) suggests  that, to the extent possible,  people  should pay for
public  services  in relation  to the benefits  they receive.  To the  extent  that benefits  from some  projects  are
enjoyed  in the  future,  it is therefore  both  fair and  efficient  for future  residents  to share  in the  cost of
financing  such  projects.  Borrowing  for local  capital  projects  thus has  a sound  theoretical  base. Moreover,
borrowing  is often  the  only  practical  way to finance  large  capital  outlays  without huge,  and  undesirable,
variations  in local  tax rates  from  year  to year. There  is thus  a strong  case  for financing  capital  projects  at
the local  level  through  debt  finance.
For  three  reasons,  however,  local  access  to capital  markets  is restricted  in many  countries. First,
the central  government  uses  debt  finance  as  a stabilization  tool, and  it does  not want local  governments
acting  in such  a way as  to counter  its policies.  Second,  local  borrowing  may  in some  circumstances
crowd  out private  sector  borrowing  which  might  be  considered  to be  more  economically  beneficial  to the
country. Third,  to the extent  central  governments  wish  to avoid  local  governments  becoming  bankrupt
they in effect implicitly  guarantee  local  government  debt,  so that local  government  borrowing  becomes  a
potentially  open  (and  destabilizing)  door  to the national  treasury.  While  none  of these  reasons  provides  a
particularly persuasive  argument  for restricting local borrowing, since the alleged  evils thus averted can be
handled  more  directly  and  efficiently  in other  ways,  the upshot  is that in virtually  every  country  local
government  access  to capital  markets  is strictly  controlled.
Among  the methods  used  to control  local  borrowing  are  (i) permitting  borrowing  only  for
approved  capital  projects;  (ii)  requiring  prior  approval  of local  taxpayers  for borrowing  above  a certain
amount;  (iii)  requiring  prior  approval  of central  authorities  for borrowing;  (iv)  restricting  the amount  of debt
to some  percentage  of local  revenues;  and  (v) permitting  borrowing  only  from a ce,ttral  "municipal  fund."
All such  restrictions  obviously  reduce  local  autonomy.  On  the  other  hand,  it is also  common  to provide
some  capital  assistance  to local  governments,  either  in the form  of matching  grants  or explicitly  or
implicitly  subsidized  borrowing  conditions.
155.  Assuming localities are given full ability to set user fees, the central government might also
consider replacing some part of  investment grants to  localities with  loans.  Greater reliance on
borrowing has the advantage  of favoring self-financing projects, which would put resoonsibility  tor
decision-making  with the local government  where it belongs,  and reduce  the burden  on the center and
general  taxpayers.
Vil.  User  Charnes
156.  Finally,  much more importance  should  be  given  to user  charges  in helping  to finance  Hungary's
local governments. The importance  of user charges (see Box 0) is greater than the relatively small
amounts  of money most countries collect from this variegated  group of leviies. To the extent that a
local government is viewed primarily as a provider of services  and the benefits of those services  can
be attributed specifically to  individual citizens, properties, or businesses,  the appropriate policy is
clearly to charge the correct (roughly, marginal  cost) price.  Only thus will the correct amounts and
types of service be provided  to the right people,  that is, those willing to pay for them.- 56 -
Box  0
User  Charaes
The role  of user  charges  in local  finance  deserves  explicit  consideration.  At least  three  types  of
local  "user  charge"  revenue  exist  almost  everywhere:  (1)  service  fees, (2)  public  orices,  and  (3)  specific
ber,efit  charges.  Since  the  terminology  in this area  in different  countries  is often  confused  and
idiosyncratic,  each  of these  terms  warrants  a brief  explanation.
By 'service fees"  are  meant  license  fees  (marriage,  business,  dog,  vehicle)  and  various  small
charges  levied  by local  governments  essentially  for performing  specific  services  - registering  this or
providing  a copy  of that - for identifiable  individuals.  In effect,  such  fees  constitute  cost reimbursement
from the private  to the public  sector:  indeed,  in some  budgetary  systems,  such  cost recoveries  are  netted
out and  only  net (of recoveries)  expenditures  are  shown. Charging  people  for something  they  are required
by law  to do may  not always  be  sensible  - for example,  if the  benefit  of (say)  registration  is general  and
the  cost is specific  - but on  the whole  there  is seldom  much  harm,  or much  revenue,  in thus recovering  the
cost  of providing  the service  in question.
In contrast, public  [rices".  are  the revenues  received  by local  governments  from the sale  of
private  goods  and  services  (other  than  the cost-reimbursement  just described).  All sales  of locally-provided
services  to identifiable  private  individuals  - whether  public  utility charges  or admission  charges  to
recreation  facilities  - fall under  this general  heading.  In  principle,  such  prices  should  be  set at the
competitive  private  level,  with no  tax or subsidy  element  included  - except  when  doing  so is the most
efficient  way  of achieving  public  policy  goals,  and  even  then  it is best  if the tax-subsidy  element  is
accounted  for separately.
The  final  category  of charge  revenue  encompasses  'specific benefit  taxes." Such  revenues  are
distinct  from service  fees  and  public  prices  because  they  do not  arise  from the provision  or sale  of a
specific  good  or service  to an identifiable  private  individual.  Unlike  "prices"  which are  voluntarily  paid  -
although  like  "fees" which  are  paid  for services  that may  be  required  by law - taxes  represent  compulsory
contributions  to local  revenues.  Nonetheless,  specific  benefit  taxes  are (at least  in theory)  related  in some
way to benefits  received  by the  taxpayer.  In contrast  to such  general  benefit  taxes  as  fuel taxes  levied  on
road  users  as  a class  or local  taxes  in general  viewed  as a price  paid  for local  collective  goods  (see
below)  - specific  benefit  taxes  relate  to the  specific  benefits  supposedly  received  by specific  taxpayers.
Examples  abound  in local  finance:  special  assessments,  land  value  increment  taxes,  improvement  taxes,
front footage  levies,  supplementary  property  taxes  related  to the  provision  of sewers  or street  lighting,
development  exactions  and  charges,  delineation  levies,  and  so on. Most  such  charges  are  imposed  either
on  the assessed  value  of real  property  or on  some  characteristic  of that property  - its area,  its frontage,  its
location.
157.  The first rule of local finance  should  therefore  be: "Wherever  possible,  charge". For  efficiency,
charges  should be levied on those who receive  the benefits: the direct recipients, whether businesses
or "things"  (real property) should there 'ore  be charged.  In view of the substantial importance of
locally-provided intermediate goods to  business, some local taxation ot  business may  thus be
warranted. Studies in different countries  have shown that the distributive consequences  of charging
for local public services is not necessarily  regressive. In any case, attempting to rectify fundamental
distributional  problems  through inefficiently pricing  scarce  local resources  is almost always a bad  idea,
resulting in little if any equity being purchased  at a high price in efficiency terms.- 57 -
158.  What does this mean for local governments  in Hungary? While it is beyond the scope of this
report to address  these issues  in detail, at the sectoral level  it is clear that fees, benefit levies and user
charges for locally provided  services  could be more fully exploited. The basic principle of allocatively
sensible  local finance is that local expenditures  should, wherever possible, be financed on a benefit
basis.  Where specific private beneficiaries  can be identified (e.g. property owners abutting public
improvements  or recipients of day care in schools)  and there is no overriding  distributive argument  or
"externalities"  to the contrary, beneficiaries  should pay the economically  correct price for what they
receive,  whether in the form of fees, user  charges,  or special  improvement  levies or contributions. To
the extent that local governments  are free to set such charges,  they should be strongly encouraged
to do so: any centrally mandated  fees implemented  by localities on behalf of the center should also
emphasize  cost recovery.ANNEX I
SIMULATIONS  ON LOCAL  TRANSFERS  IN  HUNGARY:  SIMPLIFYING  TEE  NORMATIVE
GRANT  AND  INCORPORATING  REVENUE  INCENTIVES
Introduction
1.  As a part of the process of decentralizing public finance in Hungary, an
important change was made in 1990 in the central government's method for making
grants  to  municipalities.  Hungary  terminated  its  decades-old  line-item,
supplementary budget  transfers.  As outlined  in Part A, these  changes were
intended to  give localities  greater  autonomy in  expenditures and  to  broaden their
revenue base.  Under the present system, "normative  grants" and transfers of PIT
revenues constitute the major source of  local budgetary revenue.  The grant
formula and transfer system are complex:  A major thrust of the recommendations
of the World Bank mission to Hungary in June 1991 (described  in Part B) was the
reform of local transfers of revenue from the central government.
2.  The purpose of this Annex is to illustrate, using Hungarian data, some
possible approaches to reforming the system of transfers.  Through regressions
and simulations based on data supplied by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior
(MOI) for some 3100 local governments, this annex explores and illustrates the
broad implications  of  the basic,  reformed grant  design  proposed in  the  main text.
Three versions are explored.
(i)  The  basic  grant  reform' to  be  explored  is  a  combination  of  the
simplification of the normative grant, and the introduction  of revenue capacity
into the grant formula.  (No  change is made in the PIT transfer nor in the PIT
equalizing grant.)  The hypothesis was that it is possible to substantially
simplify the grant, using far fewer indicators, without substantially changing
the allocation of grant among local governments.  As the subsequent discussion
indicates, the  results  suggest that  simplification  is possible  and  revenue
capacity, based on these estimates, works in favor of smaller, less well off
municipalities.
(Li)  A second  variant of this is also explored, under which both the PIT and
the  normative  grant  are distributed  by  the  simplified  formula  and  revenue
capacity  is also  factored  in.  The  expectation  is that  this  will  be more
equalizing than the present approach, in  which PIT is allocated on the basis of
origin, and in which richer localities presumably collect more PIT tax.
(iii)  A  third  variant  of  the  basic  reform  is  also  explored,  in  which
localities are  assumed  to impose  a  PIT surcharge  which replaces  their present PIT
transfer,  and  where  the  grant  and  the  present  equalization  payments  are
distributed on the simplified basis.  (Revenue capacity is also factored in.)
'The  "basic reform" in full is  to (i)  reform local  taxes, (ii)  simplify the
grant and (iii) to incorporate revenue capacity while improving user charges,
local borrowing and management of public assets.
*  This Annex was prepared with the research assistance of Gabor Peteri of the
Hungarian  Institute  of  Public  Administration,  Budapest.ANNEX I
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The hyoothesis  is that this is less equalizing than when a  larger grant  is
distributed, but this may be desirable if strong weight is put on tax effort.
3.  It should bo smphasized that these simulations are only exercises, and are
only  indicative  of  broad  directional  effects.  Data  gaps  and  substantial
additional work remain.  The intent is to explore and illustrate.  It would be
possible to undertake additional analysis, if  desired as data become available.
Indeed,  these  simulations  reflect  barely  the  first steps  in any  necessary
preparations for any new changes to the local transfer system in Hungary.  Many
questions remain.  First, the uncertainty of fiscal data raises many questions:
(i)  we have left out counties, which were excluded from these calculations for
lack of data; (ii)  there are many proxy estimates in the data, and, absent data
on tax bases, especially incomes and profits, retail sales, the calculations of
capacity  and  simulations  employing  these,  can  only  be  thought  of  as  very
tentative.  Second, the three variants are only some of the many that could be
explored of the  basic reform.  They arc,  explored and  presented here in  the spirit
of illustration; to indicate  what might be refined  by  way of further  work, should
this prove to be of interest.
4.  The paper is organized as follows:  After describing available data bases
(Box I), Section A  provides a  brief  summAXry  of the  alternatives  and their
simulated  results.  Then, estimates of  aran'_  sir.lification and revenue capacity
are presented in Sections B and C.  bha6d on these results, simulations are
discussed under Section D: the combined effects of simplified grants with tax
capacity  (Alternative I) are discussed first, followed by the total revenue
simplification with representative  tax capacity estimates. (Variant  II),  and the
PIT surcharge approach, (Alternative  III).  Finally Section E is a summary with
some concluding remarks.
A.  The Basic Reform and Its Variants:  The Implications in Brief
5.  The alternatives defined in the paper are basic variants on the present
grant design.  The "basic  reform" (I)  is built on a simplified grant design and
on estimates of local revenue capacity.  Simplification is a move from present
"capacity" norms  for distributing the normative grant  (the equalizing  grant
remains distributed  as befora)  toward a grant  allocation  according to  real
indicators such as demographic variables.  Simulations with simplified grants,
show  the  consequences for  differsnt localities  of  maintaining  personal income  tax
as is,  simplifying  the normative  grant  and introducing  representative  tax  capaci-
ty based on various indicators based on regressions on the "old" local taxes.
As Table A  shows,  (and as discussed in detail later in the tex-) under the
assumptions used, this approach benefits smaller and poorer localities relative
to larger  ones.  Different measures of "simplification",  or "tax capacity"  would
yield different results.
6.  The second variant is basically a means of distributing more by the grant
formula-  the  variant,  simplification with  representative  tax  capacity  is
measured as  if PIT transfers  (equalizing and other) were added to normative
grants (essentially, all PIT and all of the transfer is allocated by  formula).
As Table B shows,  the direction of  the effect is  more equalizing than the current
grant,  since PIT distributed on a "needs" basis  (as under the revised grant
system) benefits poor localities more than PIT distributed on an origin basis
(present system).  (Table  B)  Simulations illustrate that changing the grant's
allocation by simplification and by incorporating tax capacity reinforce each
other.  Compared with the ?resent system, transfers would be deflected  from
larger municipalities (cities) to smaller ones.
7.  The effects of Ontion III are calculated under the assumption of a 100
percent local surcharge together with simplified grant formula  which applies to
the normatiie grant and the equalizing transfers.  The results are difficult to
distinguish from variant I; the outcome is only slightly less equalizing thanANNEX I
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this  alternative,  mostly because  PIT  equalization grant  is  distributed by formula
instead  of to  needy  municipalities directly. However,  greater equalization could
equally well have been achieved--assuming it is desired--by modifying the grant
distribution formula further.  In actual operation, the PIT surcharae would
probably  enlarge the  budgets of larger  municipalities, as  their present PIT  share
is  higher.  This partially compensates cities for  their "losses"  as a result of
Box  I  Fiscal  Infonnation  and Statistical  Sources
Four data  bases were used.
(a) The  first  consists  of  data  on  3.069  municipalities,  and  includes  data  for  all  24  elements  of
the  normative  grant  and  the  absolute  amounts  of  PIT  and  PIT  equalization  grants  in  fiscal  year  1991,  as
provided  by  NOI  on  diskette  to  the  mission.  These  local  data  cover  all  information  used  for  central
fiscal  planning:  23  municipal  norms,  total  normative  wrants,  50  percent  of  the  cersonal  income  tax
collected  in  1989,  and  the  PIT  ecualizing  grant.  As  simulations  are  focused  on  municipalities,  county
local  governments  were  excluded,  although  they  received  special  normative  grants  and  grants  for  public
services  provided  at  county  level  (for  exaptle,  child  care,  elder  care).  Thus,  normative  grants  in  the
data  base  are  9v  percent  of  total  normative  grants  (Ft.  146  billion).  These  fiscal  data  differ  from
those  approved  by  the  parliament  in  1990.  The  grants  actually  approved  reflect  different  measurements
of  capacity  indicators.  (These  were  changed  during  the  first  quarter  of M19 when  NOI  and  the  new
municipalities  corrected  them.)
(b) Demoaranhic  and  entlovment  data  for  1989  are  based  on  the  Central  Statistical  Office  Local
data  base  (TSTAR).  As  not  all  of  the  latest  changes  in  administrative  status  are  shown  in  the  new
municipal  statistical  codes,  3.032  local  goverrnments  were  characterized  by  Cso  data. (The
municipalities  disintegrated  in  1990-91  were  mainly  the  smatler  ones,  so  this  loss  has  little  effect  on
regression  results.)  Demographic  and  emrployment  data  for  1989  (TSTAR)  were aggregated  by  munici-
palities,  according  to  their  administrative  status  in  1990.  The  greatest  loss  of  data  occurred  here  so
that  onLy  988  units  were  used  in  running  the  regressions.
(c) The  municipal  fiscal/tax  revenue  data  are  for  fiscal  year  1990  and  are  based  on  a  "sample"  of
the  earlier  1,586  local  goverrinents  existing  in  1990  (their  number  nearly  doubled  in  1991).  These
1.301  munic!palities  enconpass  85  percent  of  the  population  living  outside  Budapest  and  79  percent  of
the  settlements  (i.e.  local  goverrnents)  in  1991.  Revenue  data  for  1990  include  the  former  "regulated"
revenues,  including  100  percent  of  PIT  collected  in  1988;  grants  (normative,  equalizing,  specific);
locally  imposed  revenues  including  "old"  own  taxes,  and  Social  Security  Fund  transfers.
The  fiscal  data  were  originally  in  Symphony,  but  the  requisite  groupings  and  estimates  were  done
on  files  converted  to  dBase.  Regressions  were  calculated  by  SPSS,  which  can  read  converted  dBase  files.
the new grant design. Inthe smallest  municipalities, where the PIT ratio is  low,
a locally levied tax (surcharge)  could be increased  only with political losses.
Here  some kind of equalization on PIT differences is required.  It is more
equalizing than the present system, in that villages gain relative to cities
(Table  C).  These can be compared with revision under present system, Table D.ANNEX I
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8.  Before presknting the detailed simulation results, some caveats should be
mentioned.  First, it is  essential to recall that all three variants rely on the
Table A  Estijates on O2tion I
a/By Administrative  status
Municipalities  Total revenue  Option I as % of
______________________________  estimate  (mill.Ft)  total  present  rev.
City  110,163.7  85.2
village  62,269.8  108.  C
Average/Total  172,433.1  92.4
b/By Reoions
Regions  Total revenue  Option I in %
________________________  ,..estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
North-Transdanubian  22,981.7  92.2
South-Transdanubian  25,712.9  88.2
Transdanubian (subtotal)  48,694.6  90.0
Duna-Tisza  32,083.9  100.4
Plain  33,043.9  95.7
Great Plain (subtotal)  65,127.8  98.0
North  21,727.0  91.5
Budapest  36,884.1  87.2
c/By Nunicioalitv  size
Number of population  Total revenue  Option I in %
estimate (mill.Ft)  of total rev.
- 1999  25,104.4  99.7
2 000  - 4999  23,948.2  114.7
5 000  - 9999  15,069.7  107.7
10 000  - 49999  39,320.1  88.7
50 000  - 99999  14,056.7  80.0
100  000  - 54,934.4  85.0
Option I: PIT +  simplified grant+equalizing grant-representative tax
capacityANNEX  I
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Table  B  Estimates  on ODtion  II
a/By  Adminlstrative  xtatus
Municipalities  Total  revenue  Option  II in %
estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
City  104,062.4  80.5
Village  68,371.1  119.4
[  Average/Total  172,433.4  J  92.4
bLBv  Re@ions
Regions  Total  revenue  Option  II  in %
estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
North-Transdauiubian  23,708.2  95.1
South-Transdanubian  26,887.2  92.2
Transdanubian  (subtotal)  50,595.5  93.5
Duna-Tisza  33,414.6  104.6
Plain  35,109.1  101.8
Great  Plain  (subtotal)  68,523.7  103.1
North  22,976.5  96.8
Budapest  30,337.8  71.8
c/Bv  Municipality  size
Number  of population  Total  revenue  Option  II in %
estimate  of total  rev.
(mill.Ft)  _
- 1 999  27,428.9  108.9
2 000  - 4 999  26,565.4  127.4
5 000  - 9 999  16,136.3  115.3
10 000  - 49 999  39,808.3  89.8
50 000  - 99 999  13,978.3  79.6
100  000  - 45,516.2  70.4
option  II:  simplified  grant  +  [PIT+equalizing  grant]-representative  tax
capacityANNEX  I
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Table  C  Estimatea  on Option  III
a/Bp  Administrative  status
Municipalities  Total  revenue  OptionIII  in %
-____________ __  estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
City  111,507.8  86.2
Village  60,926.3  106.4
Average/Total  17,,433.4  92.4
b/By  Regions
Regions  Total  revenue  OptionIII  in %
l  ______________________________  estimate  (mill.Ft)  of t-tal  rev.
North-Transdanubian  23,336.9  93.6
South-Transdanubian  25,347.6  86.9
Transdanubian  (subtotal)  48,684.5  90.0
Duna-Tisza  32,018.9  100.2
Plain  31,992.9  92.7
Great  Plain  (subtotal)  64,011.7  96.3
North  21,526.8  90.7
Budapest  39,210.4  90.4
c/By  Municipality  size
Number  of population  Total  revenue  OptionIII  in %
estimate  of  total  rev.
(mill.Ft)
- 1 999  24,064.0  95.5
2 000  - 4 999  23,489.3  112.6
5 000  - 9 999  14,716.4  105.2
10 000  - 49 999  38,685.0  87.2
50 000  - 99 999  14,535.7  82.7
100  000  - 56,943.1  88.1
Option  III:  PIT  surcharge  +  simplified  (grant  +  equalizing  grant]-
representative  tax  capacityANNEX  I
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Table D  Total local revenues
1991 Estimates
a/By Administrative  status
Municipalities  Total  revenues
_________________________________  (mill.Ft)
City  129,300.1
v  illage  57,233.3
Average/Total  |  186,533.4
b/By Regions




Transdanubian  (subtotal)  54,078.8
Duna-Tisza  31,956.1
Plain  34,528.6
Great Plain (subtotal)  66,484.7
North  23,745.3
Budapest  42,298.3
c/By Munici]alitv  size
Number of population  Total revenues
|  ______________________________  _  . .(mill.Ft)
- 1 999  25,179.9
2 000  - 4 999  20,879.0
5 000  - 9 999  13,992.3
10 000  - 49 999  44,329.3
50 000  - 99 999  17,570.9
100 000  - 64,628.7
Total revenues =  PIT +  normative grant +  equalizing grant.ANNEX I
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same "building blocks"--the estimates of simplication and tax capacity.  The
estimates of grant simplification and tax capacity--essential building blocks
for all three alternatives--are presented in Section B below.  These are only
estimates and reflect only one of many possible approaches and estimates.
Second, the municipal revenue data used here cover only 50 percent
of local revenues.  Simulations incorporating revenue capacity are also built
on estimates (since "old" local revenues were used to estimate revenue
capacity).  Third, grant data do not include transfers from the Social
Security Fund, specific grants, other grants, or normative grants at county
level.  These grants to counties, in particular, modify the municipal public
service network, because the distribution of functions between municipality
and county functions is decided locally and differs from county to county.
Thus, any change in grant design will have to be adapted to reflect these
differences.  (The  relatively small number of county local governments,
however, affords a possibility for other, program-oriented grants at this
level).
9.  The basic reform of simplifying the grant and promoting revenue effort has
been explored here.  There are two parts to the exercise.  First, establishing
whether the grant can be "simplified", and second, estimating "tax capacity".
Both are estimated on the basis of the regressions described below.  The
implication of these modifications to the grant design are then simulated and
results briefly discussed in Section D.
B.  Simplification of Normative Grant Design
10. Normative grants are now allocated by a formula, based on 24 different
indicators: Some five of them are need indicators such as population, age
group of population, expressing municipal needs and resulting in "lump sum"
transfers.  The other nineteen indicators reflect the capacitv of local public
institutions (e.g. school enrollment, persons resident in homes for elderly).
In 1991 the latter "capacity norms" allocated 60 percent of the normative
grants while the population need norms allocated 40 percent.
11. Simplification of the normative grant design means a significant decrease
in the elements of the formula and a shift from the capacity norms toward a
need indicator based allocation model. 2 The arguments for a normative grant
are evident: there is no discretionary treatment of municipalities, no
discrimination by administrative status or counties; they are technically
easier for central fiscal planners than the previous municipal line item
incremental budgeting approach.  The first step toward simplifying the
normative grant system is to determine the linkages between capacitv
(students,  beds, etc.) of local public institutions and "consumers"
(youngsters, elderly) of those services.  Then, (it is hypothesized)
indicators of local "needs" based on "consumers", can then be substituted for
capacity norms without major shifts in grant allocation.
2It should  be  noted  that  these are  not  simply  formalistic
changes,  but  help  to  transform  the  logic  of  central-local
relations.  A capacity-based grant design follows, and re-enforces
the present, existing structure of municipal services and public
institution  network, preventing major funding  shocks to the system.
By contrast, a model built on real indicators, which reflect local
needs, genera%-es  a higher level of equality.  By implication, it
may  imp'2y  cutbacks or  stresses for certain  local budgets which
currently receive significant funds.ANNEX I
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12. Thus, to simplify grant design, the first question to be answered is how
strono is the connection between local public institutional capacities and
poipulation  age arouMR, within the same municipality?  The results are shown in
Table 1.  The correlation coefficient discloses a significant linear
connection between these selected capacity indicators and demographic data.
The number of students and parallel age cohort of 0-18 year-olds shows a
strong correlation (r  =  0.998) (Equations 1-3).  The coefficients shows that
Table 1  Rearessionst selected Capacity norms (D)  against age
cohorts by  municipalities. 1991
B 1 B 2 B 3
i:'quation  No.  Age  Age  Inactive
Dependent  cohort  cohort  population
variable  Constant'  [0-18]  [60-X]  (0-18,60-x]  F 2
Equation 1  - 31.445  0.795  0.9962
Student 2 (-3.981)  (890.321)  __  __
Equation 2  -117.700  0.919  0.9853
Student 3 (22.019)  (450.245)  __  -_
Equation 3  - 16.861  0.889  0.9945
Student4 (-1.585)  (739.533)  __  __
Equation 4  1.247  0.036  0.9839
Social  (1.753)  __  (430.224)  __
inst.5  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Equation 5  - 3.427  0.019  0.9873
Social  (-5.413)  __  __  (485.006)
inst. 5 IIIII
--  Not  applicable
Note:  N=3,032
IT-statistics  are in parentheses below regression coefficient.
2Xindergartens, elementary schools, secondary schools, vocational
training,skilled workers training schools.
3Same as (#2),  without Budapest.
4See (2)  +  kindergarten for nationalities and minorities, music schools,
handicapped elementary school, workshops for apprentices, bilingual
education, dormitories.
5Child-care,  day home care for elderly, handicapped; homes for elderly,
institutions for young ha. i.capped.ANNEX I
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for every 1,000 youngsters (in age cohort 0-18) there are e.g., 889 B 1 "units"
of educational institutions (students, rooms in dormitories, etc.) (equation
3).  Negative constant values can be interpreted as the range of population in
that age cohort, where there are no public institutions.  Put another way,
public services are offered even when the population exceeds a minimum level.
(Using  equation (3)  the range where y < 0 can be calculated for schools and
related institutions, for example, as  16.861/0.889 =  18:  From a fiscal
point of view, fiscal point of view, only a  group of 18 or more 0-18 year-
olds would be eligible for a central budget education grant at municipal
level).
13.  When Budapest is dropped out of the sample, there is a significant
difference in coefficients. An increase in the capacity coefficient shows the
weight of Budapest in the sample and the peculiarities of its educational
services.  In regression equation (2),  table 1, B 1 is higher, than in equation
(1), expressing a higher percentage of the age cohort enrolled at these
schools.  The higher 'B 1' coefficient in the sample including Budapest means
there are more educational services in Budapest, which makes the value of 'B 1'
closer to '1' (i.e., 100 percent supply in this group of services).  Some of
the students enrolled at secondary schools run by Budapest's municioalities
commute to the capital from neighboring localities.
14.  The number of rooms in social institutions (capacity)  and the age
cohort 60-X (inactive  population) or the age cohort (0-18] +  [60-X]  are also
strongly correlated (r  =  0.992; r =  0.994) (Equations  4-5).
15.  Based on these results, the first attempt to simplify the grant design
is to distribute the normative grants according to new norms based on the age
cohorts suggested above.  Conceptually, this simplification has its rationale
in that part of the grant targeted to education and social services.  Other
normative grants cannot be related to the given age groups, partly because
they are already based on them.  In addition, building on this demonstrated
connection between public institutional capacity and age cohorts, it can also
be assumed that the normative grants (dependent variable) and Population
characteristics are also correlated. Constrained by the available statistical
data, only population and two age cohorts and (plus  their combination) were
used as independent variables (see  Table 2).
Table 2  Regression for normative Qrants against selected PoRulation
variables for 1991. by municipalities
B2 B 3 Dependent  B,  Age cohort  Age cohort
variable  Constant  Population  [0-18)  [60-1  R  l
Grant  - 845.81  13.134  0.9969
(-1.705)  (981.73)
Grant  - 4411.7  60.947  - 6.104  0.9992
(-12.463)  (175.873)  (-17.0)  I
Grant  - 845.81  13.134  1.141  - 0.504  0.9969
(1.705)  (981.73)  (51.535)  (-64.111)
Note:  N= 3032
T-statistics in parentheses below the regression coefficientANNEX I
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16.  The regression coefficients are statistically significant.  The
coefficients are the future elements of a simplified normative grant system.
Specifically, the 'B'  coefficients are the oer capita grant amounts (in
thousand Forint) allocated to each municipality.  Coefficients express how
much  (in  thousand Forint) is to be allocated to a municipality according to
these need indicators. In the subsequent simulations of grant
simplification/allocation, this formula  with three independent variables and a
constant value provides one simplified design.
17.  The negative constant value can be explained as the "minimum" level of
population (age cohort) where t.Ae  central budget provides grants to the
municipalities. This hypothetical range (where y <  0) is determined by the
actual present distribution of puLlic  institutions in Hungary. The minimum
population level for central budget grants under this model comes from the
regression (for example, 845.81/13.134 =  64 inhabitants, based on equation
(1),  Table 1).  The smaller municipalities are generally below the regression
line, while the larger ones are more often above it, because public service
capacities differ by municipality size.  There are no value judgements
implicit in these findings; i.e., they do not suggest that a population is too
small to be "worth" a central budget grant.  The location and number of public
services today were decided by yesterday's regional policy, which favored
cities over villages.  If it were decided to compensate, small municipalities
could receive grants to raise them up to today's minimums.
18.  Because the total estimated grant amounts estimated based on simplified
indicators closely match the total actual normative grant amounts, (98-100
percent, see Table 3.a), all three regressions are "good fits".  To analyze
the effects of the simplified grant design by size and by type of locality,
the three regression estimates were compared (see  Tables 3a-3c).  Regardless
of which regression-based estimate is used, with respect to grant
distribution, the large negative value of the constant results in a low
estimated grant for municipalities now getting a normative grant under Ft. 5
million. Above this level, the smaller (poorer)  municipalities would get
larger grants than under the present normative grant allocation in 1991.
Under all three regression-based methods of distribution, the larger (richer)
local governments get smaller grants than their present ones.  Only the 45
percent of municipalities with medium-sized grants--normative grants of 10
million to Ft. 100 million--would gain under all three distribution methods.
19.  Differences between estimated simplified grants and the actual alloca-
tion of normative grants can also be explained by differences in public
services by municipalitv size (administrative status).  Because capacity norms
have the greatest share in p:-esent  normative grants, the weight of "costly"
services (such as secondary schorls, and social services) is lower in relative
terms in medium-sized municipalities than in  municipalities with bigger
budgets (see  Table 3.b).  Since they are located below the regression line,
the simplified grant design will "pull" them up to the level of larger cities.
Thus, the simplified linear regression model "undergrants" larger
municipalities with expensive regional, inter-jurisdictional public services
as well as the smallest municipalities with grants below of Ft. 5 million.
This is because of the negative 'B 3' coefficient in equations 2 and equation
3, (Table 2) and the negative constant (equations 1, 2, and 3, Table 2).
Negative values can be explained by the present poor level of public services
in smaller municipalities and relative concentration of services in bigger
cities.  This applies especially to social services for the elderly.  That is
why in smaller municipalities--which usually have a higher concentration of
elderly than do large cities--negative coefficients lessen the estimated
grants.
20.  Size-related differences have the strongest negative impact on
municipalities with 50,000 to 100,000 people, the early county seats, whereANNEX  I1
Page  69
Simplified arant estimates  as norcentsue  of nonnative arant
Table 3a
By Ranges  of nomative grnt  thi milgon  Ft)
_  _  - ^  l~~~~~~  Age
Population  conort  Combined3  Municipali-
Normat  i vo  Normative  estimate'  estimate 2 estimate  ties
grant  grant  X  _  X%  X
- 5  2,641.6  87.0  -36.6  87.8  23.6
5-  10  5,515.1  103.5  54.3  104.9  25.3
10  - 30  18 680.4  118.0  104.9  119.7  35.2
30-  50  7,775.1  _  127.3  129.7  129.2  6.8
50  - 100  7 775.0  122.4  131.7  124.4  3.7
100 - 500  27,990.c  95.3  107.5  96.8  4.3
500 - ¶000  11,738.5  84.2  94.6  85.5  0.6
1000  51,458.4  92.4  98.0  93.7  0.5
TotaL  133,575.0  98.2  98.2  99.6  100.0
'Population-based estimate - - 845.81 +  13.134 population
aAge  cohort  based  estimate =  -4411.7 + 60.947 age cohorttO-181 - 6.104 age cohort
160-XJ




Normative  Population  Age cohort
grant  based  based  Combined
Popu.ation  (miLL.Ft)  estiF  .ate  estimate  estfmate
- 1999  100.0  103 4  65.4  105.9
(19510.8)  .
2000 - 4999  100.0  124.9  121.1  126.7
(15692.9)
5000 - 9999  100.0  117.4  124.5  119.2
(10271.1')
10000 - 49999  100.0  93.6  105.5  95.2
(32678.4)
50000  - 99999  100.0  84.4  96.3  85.7 (130Q8.4)
100000-  100.0  105.3  98.9  90.7
(42322.7)
Table  3c
By Ranges  of nommiave  grant
Population  Age cohort
I  range of  actual  based  estimate  based  estimate  Cosbined  estimate
normative grant  grant  municipatity  grant  munfcipal{ty  grant  municipality
+10  17.6  22.8  50.9  14.2  36.5  21.8
+20  65.5  40.3  68.8  27.4  61.7  41.9
+30  82.6  60.2  77.8  38.7  77.6  62.0
.40  95.1  75.7  91.9  49.1  89.9  77.9ANNEX I
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many regional services were settled. Among the largest cities, with more than
100,000 people, estimates closely track the actual values. Another beneficiary
of the simplified-regression-based estimates is the smallest municipalities,
where fewer than 2,000 people reside. The gains are the highest for medium-
sized municipalities, with 2,000 to 10,000 people (see Table 3.b). 3
21.  The comoarison of simplified regression-based grant estimates and the
actual normative grants presently received is shown in Table 3c.  This shows
that two-thirds of grants and 27-42 percent of municipalities are in a +20
oercent range of actual normative grants.  Thus, although the estimates are
not a perfect fit with the grants distributed in 1991, this is because they
are based on new principles.  Grants are related to citizens/population
instead of institutions/capacities.  In conclusion, combined and population-
based regressions neatly track the actual grant allocation. Here, the +40
percent range covers 76-78 percent of municipalities  (Table  3.c).  Compared to
normative grants allocated in 1991, the simplified regression-based grant
design, will result in lower grants to the largest and the smallest munici-
palities. The medium-sized municipalities (2,000  to 50,000 people and
normative grants of Ft. 5 million to Ft. 100 million) gain additional funds.
C.  Measures of Tax Capacity
22.  In addition to grant simplification, stimulation of revenue capacitv is
another important element of local fiscal reform.  There are three types of
"own revenues", which can be regarded as bases for estimating owr revenue
capacity.  These are: (i) fees. charaes, duties and similar small scale
receipts; (ii) Local taxes (there  are five); and the PIT.
23.  The revenue-incentive element of the revised grant formula requires
estimates of tax ca2acitv.  Municipal tax capacity can be measured by a
representative tax system (RTS) or by regression, based on existing fiscal
information.  As revenue capacity in the formula is deducted from the assumed
"expenditures,n  municipalities whose tax collection is higher than their
estimated tax capacity (however  measured), benefit from the additional
revenue, while municipalities collectina less tax revenue than the amount
calculated by the representative tax capacity are not compensated for these
"losses."
24.  Under the RTS, revenue capacity is calculated as if each local
government applied average tax rates to its own tax base.  The representative
tax system approach was not used because data on neither tax rates nor the tax
bases of each municipality was available.  Instead a regression model was used
to estimate determinants of tax capacity, where the dependent variable is the
aggregated (old) tax yield of each municipality and the independent variables
are available fiscal and real indicators.  The reliability of this model
3The "loss" for the thirteen larger cities could disappear in the longer run.
Raising  grants to sma.l.ler  municipalities  will encourage local investment  in services
currently  being regionally supplied,  thus  decreasing demand for  inter-jurisdictional
services.  During  a  transitional  period,  there  are  many  ways  to  offs.s  the
difficulties encountered by localities by simplication.  The level of adcressed
grants (for  example, for  mass transportation)  can be increased for  the 13 critically
sized  cities (50,000  to 100,000  people).  The problem of the smallest  municipalities
(with normative grants under Ft. 5 million) could be also handled by a temporary
grant system.
4  See Box H.ANNEX I
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depends on several factors.  First, in this regression, the cities' old (1989)
taxes were used as proxies for the taxes likely to be raised under the new tax
assignment regime.  How representative they are of the tax capacity in the new
system is of course a majcz issue.  It is assumed that own-taxes in 1990 are
related to tax capacity in 1991, based on the proposed continuity in "local"
taxes.  The respective 1990 and 1991 taxes are: (i) citizen fees (1990) and
real estate taxes (1991); (ii)  tourism tax (1990, 1991); (iii) contribution to
communal investments (1990), contribution to municipal investments (1990), and
communal tax (1991); (iv) charge on industrial plots (1990), and transfer
revenues (1990); and (v)  business tax (1991,  new).  Second, indicators used to
estimate municipal fiscal capacity should express residents' ability to pay
taxes.  Here, indicators such as PIT (a  proxy of income) and population were
usea: it would have been preferable to use other indicators such as retail
sales, industrial output, or local GNP.
25.  A simple first estimate of local tax capacity was made by calculating
the share of own taxes in local revenues. In 1990 the total sum of "old, own
taxes was Ft. 6.3 billion in our sample of 1,301 municipalities.  The tax
share in total revenues does not differ significantly between cities and
villages (Annex table 6, column 1).  This means, that village municipalities
could levy those "old" own taxes that promised sufficient revenue.  The
relatively small share of "old"  own taxes in total revenues can be explained
by the nature of the local taxes and the size of the denominator (total
revenues in 1990 cover all municipal receipts).
26.  This simple method measure (with PIT in the denominator) was used as a
cross-check for MOF's estimates of revenue capacity (see  Table 6, Column 2).
Table 6  Prooortion of "own taxes" by administrative status. 1990
Percentage of own  Percentage of own
Municipalities  taxes in revenues'  taxes in pit 2
Cities  5.9  18.3
Villages  5.8  15.5
Average  [  5.9  17.5
'Total  revenues =  regulated revenues +  total grants +  SSF transfers +
revenues of own interest.
2Pit: 100% of pit, collected in 1988, Lllocated to municipalities in 1990.
The share of own taxes in PIT was 17.5% on average.  Modifying this for 1990
(because 100 percent of PIT revenue (t - 2) was transferred to municipalities
the denominator was twice as large as in 1991).  The appropriate ratio of
local tax to PIT is 35.0 percent (2  x 17.5).  For 1991 this works out to Ft.
16.5 billion, which is coincidentally, rather close to the MOF local tax
estimates (Ft. 21.0 billion, see main text.)ANNPt_ I
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27.  The local tax capacity can also be estimated by the reoression method.
Of the six independent variables chosen for testing regression, five gave
statistically acceptable results in simple regression, using "old local taxes"
as proxies for local taxes as the dependent variable (see  Table 7).  For the
multiple regressions, three variables were chosen: LIT,  2ooulation,  and
industrial emplovment (see  Table 8, Equation 4).
28.  The regression estimates (Table 8) do not perfectlv fit the actual "old"
own tax distribution (Tables lOa-10c).  This regression model underestimates
old taxes in smaller municipalities and overestimates oLd tax collection
cities with populations of 50,000-100,000.  Estimated tax capacity is
Table  7  Simpal  Reavessions:  "old" own tax.2'  *aalnst  oDulaton  and
*moloyment variables  in 1990.  by munlcbafles
2
Equation No.  -
Dependent  PIT  l
variable  Constant  Population  (1,000 Ft)  R2
Equation  1  - 2544.336  1.426  0.906
Local Tax  (-7.193)  (67.314)
Equation 2  - 482.876  0.189  0.857
Local Tax  (-1.574)  (76.856)
Dependent  Constant  Poputatiop work-  Active
variable  ing age  earners  R2
Equation 3  - 2523.259  2.449  0.823
Local Tax  _(-7.178)  (67.783)
Equation 4  -2697.366  3.006  0.824
Local Tax  (-7.663)  (67.899)
Dependent  Industrial  X  of ind,Ystrial
variable  Constant  employees  employment
Equation  5  347.739  7.105  0.825
Local Tax  (1.039)  (68.080)  l
Equation 6  4391.493  15089.283  0.037
Local  Tax  (5.313)  (6.123)
"oldd" own taxes =  fees of citizens +  tax on tourism +  contribution to
coamunal  investments +  contribution  to municipal  investments +  charge on
industrial plots +  transferred  revenues.
2T-statistics  in pa,intheses  below coefficients.
3Age cohort  19-59.
4Industrial  employees  in percentage  of active earners.ANNEX I
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Table 8  Multiple rearession for "old" own taxes by mun cinalities in 1990
Equation  No.
Dependent  Industriat
variabLe  Constant  PIT  PopuLation  enpLoy.ment  R 2
Equatign 1  -243.843  0.207  - 0.147  0.8573
Tax  (-0.7)  (15.755)  (-1.445)  ,
Equation 2  -378.280  0.150  1.546  0.8595
Tax  (-1.239)  (15.640)  (4.206)
Equation 3  -1177.49  0.692  3.780  0.8397
Tax  (-3.280)  . (9.631)  (10.631)
Equation 4  37.806  0.176  - 0.248  1.737  0.8603
Tax  (0.108)  (12.052)  (-2.406)  (4.630)
therefore lower than actual "old" own taxes in municipalities with populations
below 2,000 and much  igher in larger municipalities (with  populations of
50,000-100,000). This is partly due to the regression method itself and partly
due to real differences in local tax capacities (three-quarters  of "old" taxes
were collected in cities).  Using the tax capacity measure and accepting the
"old" own tax as a basis for estimating revenue capacity, the ratios in table
10.b show that smaller municipalities are "overtaxed while laroer cities are
undertaxed.  Table 10.c shows estimated municipal tax capacity as percentage
ranges of "old" own taxes.  The results are fairly disparate, Table A,
reflecting municipal and regional differences in the extent of the revenue
bases.  The widest range (40 percent) covers only a third of all munici-
palities.
29.  In subsequent simulations of the changes in the grant formula, revenue
capacity is calculated using estimated capacity based on the "old" own taxes.
For lack of better data and estimates, the most complex regression (Table 8
equation (4)),  was chosen for further simulations.
30.  In terms of the totals, the estimates of local revenue capacity in 1991
were similar to each other and to the actuals (see  Table 11).  All were in the
Ft. 15 billion-17 billion range, which is not very different from the
calculations described earlier of the average sh&re of old taxes in PIT.  In
three of the four regressions tested, the estimates of local revenue capacity
in 1991 were similar to each other and to the actual (see Table 11).  All were
in the Ft. 15 billion-17 billion range, which is not very different from the
calculations described earlier of the average share of old taxes in PIT.
D.  Variants of the Grant Redesign: Some Simulations
Basic Reform (1):  Grant Simplification with Representative Tax Capacitv
31.  In the formula proposing grant simplification and a measure of tax
capacity, the weight of grants is greater than other components of revenue and
will thus play the major role in determining the transfer's allocation.  (The
ratio of estimated own revenues is only about 8 percent, too low to
5See  Table 7ANNEX  I
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Estimatos  of  estimated capacitv as percentac*  of "old" own taxes by municipalities  In 1990 (See Table 8)
Table  I  Oa  By  Admnilstrative status
Old tax  PITPOP  PITIND  INDPOP  PINDPI
Municipality  (mill.Ft)  Equation  (1)  Equation  (2)  Equation  (3)  Equation  (4)
City  100.0  100.3  104.1  109.5  102.5
(4644.1)
Village  100.0  98.2  89.0  72.7  91.8
__________-  ____  (1615.2)  __  II
Average  - 100.0  I  99.8  I  100.2  [  100.0  99.8
Table  1-b  By  Municipalltv size
Number  of  Old  tax  PITPOP  PITIND  INDPOP  PINDPI
population  -(mill.Ft)  Equation  (1)  Equation  (2)  _Equation  (3)  Equation  (4)
- 1999  100.0  64.2  48.6  - 6.5  73.9
(306.2)
2000  - 4999  100.0  83.1  76.8  69.0  77.3
(804.3)
5000  - 9999  100.0  99.3  100.6  219.5  94.6
. . *  ________  (648.3)
10000  - 49999  100.0  106.1  110.4  118.8  107.7
(2187.0)  _
50000  - 99999  100.0  164.7  168.6  168.7  168.6
(524.4)
100000  - 100.0  86.8  86.8  84.4  86.2
=______________  (1789.0)  _  _  _
Table 10c  Bv Ranaes  of 'Old" Own Taxes
Estimates  ±10 range  +20X  range  ±30%  range  +40%  range
PITPOP  Equation  (1)
grant(M)  20.5  33.3  41.5  49.3
municip.(X)  9.5  18.5  28.5  36.9
PITIND  Equation  (2)
grant(X)  22.7  34.7  42.3  46.5
municip(X)  9.3  19.0  27.6  35.3
INDPOP  Equation  (3)
grant(%)  22.7  26.9  34.7  46.8
municip.(X)  6.6  12.1  18.3  25.6
PINDPI  Equation  (4)
grant(X)  21.2  33.4  41.8  47.8
nunici  .(X)  9.8  19.5  28.2  38.7
(1)  PITPOP=  - 243.843  *  0.207  pit  - 0.147  population
(2)  PITIND  - 378.280+  0.15  pit+  1.546  industrial  employees
(3)  INDPOP=  - 1177.495  + 3.78  industrial  employees  - 0.147  population
(4)  PINDPI=  5.7.806-0.248  population  +  1.737  industrial  employees  + 0.176  pitANNEX I
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Table 11  Estimatesl  of revenue capacity in 1991
(million Ft)
a/By Administrative status
F  Municipa-  |  PITPOP  PITIND  |  INDPOP  |  PINDPI
ity  _
City  13 982.0  12 554.5  8 540.4  13 152.7
Village  2 852.8  2 229.2  176.3  4 436.0
Total  16 834.8  14 783.7  8 716.7  16 131.9
b/Revenue capacity as a percentage of total normative and equalizina grant
by municipality size
Population  PITPOP  PITIND  INDPOP  PINDPI
- 1999  3.2  1.5  -5.8  4.8
2000  - 4999  6.9  6.1  4.5  6.4
5000  - 9999  8.6  8.1  7.3  8.0
10000  - 49999  10.2  9.8  8.6  9.9
50000  - 99999  12.8  12.0  9.3  12.4
100000 - 20.7  17.7  9.8  18.9
Average  12.0  |  10.5  [  6.2  |  11.5
'See  Table 10
significantly modify the present distribution.)  Simulations on Option I show
the combined effects of grant simplification and representative tax capacity
assumption (see  Table A).  Comparing the present and the calculated municipal
total revenues the actua- differences are explained by the factors discussed
in Sections B and C.  The amount of estimated revenues are 92.4% of the
present local receipts, because the expected taxes are deducted from the
"total" expenditures (4a=E-R).  So the estimates in Table A are to be compared
with this (92.4) average value.
32.  As shown, revenues in cities, in the South-Transdanubian region and on
the Plains, in the municipaliLies with more than 10,000 residents are lower,
than in 1991 municipal budgets.  Grant simplification with tax capacity
assumption is favorable for villages, municipalities on the Plains and in
local governments with less than 10,000 residents (Table  A).ANNEX  I
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Table  A  Estimates of ODtion  I
a/By  Administrative-  status
Municipalities  Tctal  revenue  Option  I in  %
estimate  (mill.Ft)  of  total  rev.
City  110,163.7  85.2
village  1  62,269.8  108.8
Average/Total  172,433.1  92.4
b/By  Reoions
Regions  Total  revenue  Option  I in %
estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
Nor*h-Transdanubian  22,981.7  92.2
South-Transdanubian  25,712.9  88.2
Transdanubian  (subtotal)  48,694.6  90.0
Duna-Tisza  32,083.9  100.4
Plain  33,043.9  95.7
Great  Plain  (subtotal)  65,127.8  98.0
North  21,727.0  91.5
Budapest  36,884.1  87.2
c/Bv  Municipalitv  size
Number  of population  Total  revenue  Option  I in %
estimate  (mill.Ft)  of  total  rev.
- 1 999  25,104.4  99.7
2 000  - 4 999  23,948.2  114.7
5 000  - 9 999  15,069.7  107.7
10 000  - 49 999  39,320.1  88.7
50 000 - 99 999  14,056.7  80.0
100  000 - 54,934.4  85.0
option  I: PIT+simplified  grant+equaLizing  grant-representative  tax  capacityANNEX I
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Total Revenue Under Variant II t  Simplification with Tax Capacitv
33.  The second variant of the "Basic Reform" formulated a central transfer
option based on simplifying the full revenue transfer to local government (PIT
+  PIT equalizing grant +  normative grant).  The total amount of PIT is also
allocated by the simplified granting formula.
34.  Since actual PIT is now distributed is more favorably for larger
municipalitieo and the PIT share is low in villages, rural areas, and smaller
municipalities, we would expect that allozating the PIT according to the
simplified formula would be more distributive than either the present system
or the basic reform.  (See Table B)  Comparing Table B and Table C one sees
this is so.  This variant reinforces the tendency of grant simplification,
because here the grants are 40% higher than the present normative grants.
35.  Interestingly, the "revenue capacity" measure built into the grant
design formula does not compensate for low PIT in "poor" small, rural
municipalities.  Below populations of 2,000, PIT is only 17 percent of current
(proposed 1991) revenue.  The lower estimated resources in larger
municipalities also owe much to the assumed higher revenue capacity.  Thus,
the idea behind this formula, to centralize the PIT and allocate it by the
simplified granting method will help medium-sized municipalities  (with
populations of 2,000-50,000).  The smallest municipalities are the greatest
"losers" under this model, because their estimated resources are lower than in
the present system, where they are the main beneficiaries to the PIT
equalization grant.  By itself, the revenue capacity element of the formula
does not compensat? for their PIT shortfall, (perhaps because this is a poor
measure of revenue capr ity).
Basic Reform with PIT Surcharge (111)
36.  The PIT surcharcf is a possible third new element of the proposed basic
reform of the transfer system, in addition to grant simplification and the tax
capacity assumption.  Simulations of its local effects were run.  First,
however, we measured the actual contribution a PIT surcharge would make to
local revenues.  "How much revenue will the PIT surcharge yield (in  relation
to total local revenues if levied at the maximum rate?"  This was measured by
the share of PIT in local budgets. (Tables 12a-c)  The share of PIT in "total"
revenues varies from locality to locality, but it is generally higher in
cities, urban regions, and larger  municipalities than in smaller
municipalities (see Annex table 12a). In the 169-city sample, the average rate
of PIT in "total" revenues 'PIT +  normative grant +  equalizing grant) is 60
percent higher than the equivalent share in the 2,900 village municipalities.
Thus, PIT is an urban revenue, collected in higher amounts in the more
industrially developed regions (see  Table 12b).  The Trans-Danubian region,
for example, is more industrialized than the Great Plains regizn, and more of
its revenues come from PIT (21.5  percent against 20.1 percent).  The seeming
disp.trity  in rural/urban PIT yield, however, is a function of the income tax
system itself: the PIT grants many tax exemptions for agriculture.  Judging
only by PIT revenue, the agrarian Plains look poorer than the Trans- Danubian
region.  Settlement structure also influences PIT revenue.  The smaller
municipalities are located in the North and South Trans-Danubian regions.
37.  The PIT share in total revenues also differs by municipality size.  Only
7.5 percent of PIT revenues is collected in the 74 percent of mL1icipalitieeANNEX  I
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Table  B  Estimates  of Option  II
a/By  Administrative  status
Iunicipalities  Total  revenue  Option  II in  %
_______  ____  estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
City  104,062.4  80.5
Village  63,371.1  119.4
l  Average/Total  172,433.4  92.4
b/Bv  Reaions
Regions  Total  revenue  Option  II in %
estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
North-Transdanubian  23,708.2  95.1
South-Transdanubian  26,887.2  92.2
Trrnsdanubian  (subtotal)  50,595.5  93.5
Duna-Tisza  33,414.6  104.6
Plain  35,109.1  101.8
Great  Plain  (subtotal)  68,523.7  103.1
North  22,976.5  96.8
Budapest  30,337.8  71.8
c/wB  Municipalitv  size
Number  of population  |  Total  revenue  Option  II in %
j  estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
- 1 999  27,428.9  108.9
2 000  - 4 999  26,565.4  127.4
5 000  - 9 999  16,136.3  _  115.3
10 000  - 49 999  39,808.3  89.8
50 000  - 99 999  13,978.3  79.6
100 000  - 45,516.2  70.4
Option  II: simplified  grant+[PIT+equalizing  grant]-representative  tax
capacityANNEX  I
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Table  C  Estimates  on Option  III
a/By  Administrative  status
Municipalities  Total  revenue  Option  III  in %
_  estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
City  111,507.8  86.2
Village  1  60,926.3  106.4
Average/Total  [  172,433.4  92.4
h/Bv  Regions
Regions  Total  revenue  OptionIII  in %
|______________________________  estimate  (mill.Ft)  of  total  rev.
North-Transdanubian  23,336.9  93.6
South-Transdanubian  25,347.6  86.9
Transdanubian  (subtotal)  48,684.5  90.0
Duna-Tisza  32,018.9  100.2
Plain  31,992.9  92.7
Great  Plain  (subtotal)  64,011.7  96.3
North  21,526.8  90.7
3udapest  38,210.4  90.4
c/By  Municipality  size
Number  of population  Total  revenue  OptionIII  in %
estimate  (mill.Ft)  of total  rev.
- 1 999  24,064.0  95.5
2 000  - 4 999  23,489.3  112.6
5 000  - 9 999  14,716.4  105.2
10 000  - 49 999  38,685.0  87.2
50 000  - 99  999  14,$35.7  82.7
100  000  56 943.1  88.1
Option  III:  PIT  surcharge  +  simplified  grant+[equalizing  grant)-representative
tax  capacityANNEX  I
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with populations below 2,000 (Table 12.c).  Here, the share of PIT in local
budgets  is also lowest, below the village average.6
38.  The average PIT revenue transferred to local governments is Ft. 4,453 per
person, but ranges ot 0 to Ft. 10,390 per capita.  With one exception, growth of
PIT's share in local budgets parallels  the rise in per  capita PIT revenues.  The
exception is in the ninth decile, where per capita PIT is high but where
Budapest depresses the average (Table 13).  Tables 12 and 13 both show the
fiscal side the of urbanization.  Small, remote village municipalities are
generally poorer than large, centrally located cities.  In Hungary, municipal
size is the greatest determinant of regional and social differences.
39.  The variant of the basic reform, which incorporates headroom for local
taxation depends on differences in PIT  distribution, because PIT defines how
much "headroom" is to be taken up. As seen in table 12, villages, rural areas,
and small municipalities have a lower proportion of PIT in their budgets than do
larger localities.  Reducing central PIT rates and simultaneously authorizing
local governments to levy a municipal surcharge on PIT will leave local revenues
intact, assuming that identical (100  percent) rates of surch&rge are levied.  In
municipalities with populations below 2,000, the 100 percent surcharge could
raise 14 percent of total revenues (Annex  table 12.c).  The 50 percent central
PIT would simply be replaced by a locally defined tax burden of Ft. 2,062 per
year per person--for every resident.  In the second group of municipalities
(with 2,000-10,000 residents), current PIT revenues are higher, around 18-20
percent of total.  This increase makes the local tax
worth levying.  The municipal surcharge in cities with populations over 10,000
would yield more than 20 percent of local revenues.
40.  The Variant III formula incorporates a discretionary local PIT surcharge,
simplified grants, and the local tax capacity estimate. In the simulation, a 1CZ
percent local surcharge was assumed, i.e., the allocation of current PIT (50
percent of 1989 PIT) is built into the model.  It contains the simplified total
(normative +  equalizing) grants (equation (3), Annex table 4) and revenue
capacity, based on the three variable regressions (equation (4), Annex table 8).
41.  The simulation results show a modified local resource allocatior compared
to the present.  Simulated revenues of cities and municipalities with more than
10,000 residents are less than the 1991 budget projections smaller
municipalities gain, since grants, which are greatest part of local revenues,
determine the fiscal status of smaller municipalities.  Because equalizing
grants are included in the total grant, small localities gain slightly over
Option I also.
42.  Conclusion.  These simulations are only illustrative and do not reflect
even the first steps in preparations for a new local transfer system in Hungary.
Many questions remain.  First, the uncertainty of fiscal data raises many
questions:  (i)  we have left out counties, which were excluded from these
calculations; (iij  there are many est3malzes  in the data, and, absent data on tax
bases, especially incomes and profits, retail sales, the calculations of
capacity and simulations employing these data can only be thought of as very
teAtative.  They are presented here in the spirit of illustration; to indicate
what might be refined by way of further work, should this prove to be of
interest.  Uncertainty in estimates does not discredit the idea; further
improvements in their calculatiun depend on the availability of data.
'Another observation to be made on the ratios in Table 12 is that the PIT
surcharge is  low where grant simplification results in  gains and where, on the other
hand, the taxes collected by the PIT surcharge are high,  the simplified grant system
cuts present municipal normative grants.ANNEX  I
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Proportion  of PIT  in "total"  revenuesl
Tablo_12a  By Administrative  status
PIT  percentage  in
Municipalities  total  revenues  PIT  distribution
City  (169)  27.7  78.5
Village  (2900)  17.5  _21.5
Total/Average  24.7  100.0
Table  12b  Sy Regions




Transdanubian  (subtotal)  21.5
Duna-Tieza  23.1
Plain  17.3
Great  Plain  (subtotal)  20.1
North  19.3
Budape-3t  39.6
Table  12c  By Municipalitv  size
PIT
percentage  Munici-
in total  PIT  Population  palities
Population  revenues  (l)  (%)  (%)
1999  13.8  7.5  16.1  73.7
2000  - 4999  18.2  8.2  14.9  17.4
5000  - 9999  19.6  5.9  8.8  4.3
10000  - 49999  21.3  20.2  22.1  3.9
50000 - 99999  24.9  9.3  8.0  0.4
100000  - 34.1  48.9  30.1  0.3
Average/Total  24.7  100.0  100.0  100.0
tTotal  revenues  - PIT  +  normative  grant  -*  equallzing  grant.ANNEX  I
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Table  13  Proportion  of PIT  by dociles  of  yer  capita  PIT
I-
PIT  percentage  in
DecileB  total  revenues  Population
.____________________  _  . .Pit(%)  (M)
10.  42.4  0.7  0.3
9.  39.6  35.8  18.7
8.  41.3  1.0  0.5
7.  29.0  4.7  3.3
6.  28.4  9.9  2.9
5.(avg)  24.1  19.6  18.2
4.  20.6  10.7  13.3
3.  16.8  11.3  19.5
2.  11.4  5.9  16.4
1.  5.5  0.4  1.9
Average/Total  24.7  100.0  100.0ANNEX  I
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Annex Table  1  Local Government/Councils/Structure
in Numbers and Percentages
1  st of March.  1989
Name  Number  Percentage
A.  County  councils  19
B.  County  town  cls.  8  4.8
C.  Town  councils  140  84.9
D.  Town  joint  councils  17  10.3
E.  Town  councils
Total  (B+C+D)  165  1LO. 
F.  Great village  councils  118  8.7
G.  Great village joint
councils  162  11.9
H.  Village councils  571  42.1
I.  Village joint  councils  507  37.3
J.  Village councils
Total  (F+G+H+l)  1358  100.0
K.  LOCAL COUNCILS
TOTAL (E+J)  1523  98.8
L.  COUNCILS TOTAL  1542  100.0
Source:  Ministry  of  InteriorANNEX  I
Page  84
Annex Table 2  Self Government  Structure
in Numbers  and Percentaaes
1  st of January 1991
Name  Number  Percentages
A.  County Self government  19
B.  Town Self government
with country rights  20  11.9
C.  Town Self government  148  88.1
D.  Town St If government
TOTAL  IJ+C)  168  100.0
E.  Village Self government  2902  94.5
F.  Municipal  Self government
TOTAL ID+ E)  3070  100.0
G.  Self-governments
TOTAL  (A + E)  3089
Note:  Tha tables (1 and 2) do not contain the data of the (Budapest)  in
which a iwo-tier local government  functioned.
Source:  Ministry of InteriorANNEX  I
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Annex Table 3  Grant Subsidy for Disadvantaaed
Localities. 1991
I.  Subsidy for the newly funded
local governments  230
II.  Capital and its districts  1000
III.  7 Country governments  456.6
IV.  136 local governments  892.4
V.  A Skyscraper  in Pecs  65
Total: Mid-year money  2643
Sourge:  Items (I-V): Peteri  (op. cit)/ Law on the
additional subsidy from the state budget (draft) -nd
not Doc.# 2248.ANNEX  I
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Annex Table 4  Components  of the Formula  Grant. 1990
1.  Lump  Sum Grant to each Town and Villages  Ft. 2 million
(but only for populations  above 200; below
200 the grant is Ft. 10,000 per capita)
2.  Per capita grant to Towns and Villages  Ft. 3,550 per capita
3.  Per capita grant to Counties/Capital  City  Ft. 1,220 per capita
4.  Per capita grant for population of ages
0 to 18 and over 60  Ft. 2,850 per capita
5.  Per capita grant for people in care:
children in care  Ft. 175,000 per capita
homes for the elderly or mentally handicapped  Ft. 1  50,COO  per capita
6.  Per capita grant for primary schools  Ft. 31,000 per capita
7.  Per capita grant to independent  music school  Ft. 20,000  per capita
8.  Per capita grant to schoo!s  for the mentally
handicapped  Ft. 58,000 per capita
9.  Per capita grant to high schools  Ft. 45,000  per capita
10.  Per capita grant to vocational  schools  Ft. 55,000  per capita
11.  Per capita grant to boarding  schools  Ft. 54,000 per capita
12.  Grant for theaters and open air performances  Ft. 450,000 per capita
NB.  In the case of pupils undertaking  primary, high or vocational  schools courses
by correspondence  or evening classes,  one third of the full time per capita grant
is payable.- 87 -
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